Amend. 1-Religion, Free Speech, etc. a State lottery, is not obnoxious to this provision which forbids Congress passing any law abridging the freedom of the press; the circulation of newspapers is not prohibited, but the Government declines itself to become an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people. In re Rapier, 143 U. S. 134. Motion-Picture Censorship Act of April 16, 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, p. 399), creating a board of censors of motion-picture films, held constitutional. Mutual Film Corp. v. Ohio, 236 U. S. 230. Free Speech The first amendment, while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such, can not have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every possible use of language. Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204. The espionage act of June 15, 1917, does not fall within the language of this amendment. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47. Grievances This amendment, like the others proposed and adopted at the same time, was not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but to operate upon the National Government alone. They left the authority of the States just where they found it and added nothing to the already existing powers of the United States. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 552. Amendment 2.-BEARING ARMS. A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment declares that this right shall not be infringed, but this means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This amendment is one of those that has no other effect See p. 25 for ratification. Amend. 2.-Bearing Arms. than to restrict the powers of the National Government and not those of the States. U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 553. See also Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 265. Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535. In Robertson v. Baldwin (165 U. S. 275) it was held that an act which prohibits the carrying of concealed weapons does not violate this amendment. Amendment 3.'-QUARTERING SOLDIERS. No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. Amendment 4.-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Leading Cases In Boyd v. U. S. (116 U. S. 616) it was held that a compulsory production of private papers to be used in evidence against the owner is an unreasonable search and seizure within this amendment, and that an act of Congress which requires a party to produce his private books and papers, and if he refuses to do so upon demand, permits the Government to assume as true its allegations as to the contents of said books and papers, is unconstitutional. In Ex parte Jackson (96 U. S. 733) it was held that— No law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with the Postal Service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great principle embodied in the fourth amendment. In Interstate Com. Com. v. Baird (194 U. S. 25) the court held (at p. 44): The inquiry of a board of the character of the Interstate Commerce Commission should not be too narrowly constrained by technical rules as to the admissibility of proof. Its function is largely one of investigation, and it should not be hampered in making inquiry pertaining to interstate commerce by those narrow rules which prevail in trials at common law where a strict correspondence is required between allegation and proof. See p. 25 for ratification. Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. Not a Limitation on the States 1 This amendment has no application to State process. Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71. Affirmation of Common-Law Principles This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 392. Applicable to Criminal Cases Only A distress warrant issued by the Solicitor of the Treasury under an act of Congress is not forbidden by this article because issued without the support of an oath or affirmation. This article has no reference to civil proceedings for the recovery of debts of which a search warrant is not made part. The process in this case is termed in the act of Congress a warrant of distress. The name bestowed upon it can not affect its constitutional validity. Murray v. Hoboken Land, etc., Co., 18 How. 274. Mere interrogation under oath by a government official of one lawfully in confinement is not a search and seizure. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 260 U. S. 149. There is an intimate relation between the fourth and fifth amendments. In Boyd v. U. S. (116 U. S. 633) the court said: They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. Unreasonableness Reasonableness a Judicial Question The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is not unreasonable all of the circumstances under which it is made must be looked to. Mason v. Rollins, 2. Biss. (U. S.) 99. 1 See also same subject, under Amend. 1, p. 567. Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. "Search and seizure" laws enacted to aid in the suppression of the unlawful traffic in liquors have been sustained in many States as not being violative of the fourth amendment. State v. Nejin, 74 So. 103; but see Amos v. U. S. 255 U. S. 313, where it was held that a search and seizure was unlawful without proper warrant. Necessity for Warrant A seizure of books and papers found in a person's office immediately after his arrest, without authority of law and without warrant, is an unreasonable search and seizure. U. S. v. Mounday, 208 Fed. 186. An information signed by the district attorney, but without any affidavit as required by the Constitution, is insufficient to authorize an arrest. U. S. v. Wells, 225 Fed. 320. Opening Letters and Papers in Mail The use in evidence in a criminal case of letters voluntarily written by the accused after the crime, while he was in prison, and which came into the possession of the prison officials under established practice reasonably demanded to promote discipline. did not infringe the constitutional safeguards against selfincrimination or unreasonable searches and seizures. Stroud v. U. S., 251 U. S. 15. Compulsory Production of Books and Papers Suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred by the commission of offenses against the law are of a quasi criminal nature, and a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself and is the equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 634. The admission in evidence of papers taken from the person of a defendant in a criminal case is not a violation of the fourth amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Sharpless, 111 S. W. 69. There is no unreasonable search and seizure when a writ, suitably specific and properly limited in its scope, calls for the production of documents which, as against their lawful owner to whom the writ is directed, the party procuring its issuance is entitled to have produced. It was so held in Wilson v. U. S. (221 U. S. 361) as to an officer of a corporation who was compelled to produce books and papers of the corporation whose guilt of an offense was under investigation. See also Wheeler v. U. S., 226 U. S. 478. Heike v. U. S., 227 U. S. 131. Amend. 4.-Searches and Seizures. If a litigant has no right in or to the papers in the hands of third person, nor any legal interest in them, it might possibly violate the fourth amendment to force the latter to produce them by an unwarrantable seizure, actual or constructive. See In re Comingore (96 Fed. 552, affirmed in 177 U. S. 470), as to the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the regulations as to the custody, use and preservation of the records, papers, and property appertaining to the business of his department, to take from a subordinate, such as a collector, all discretion as to permitting the records in his custody to be used for any other purpose than the collection of the revenue, and reserve for his own determination all matters of that character. This clause was not intended to interfere with the power of courts to compel, through a subpœna duces tecum, the production, upon a trial in court, of documentary evidence, and an officer or agent of a corporation may be required, under such process, to produce the books and papers of the corporation. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. American Lith. Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616. Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U. S. 541. Potter v. Beal, 49 Fed. 793, distinguishing Boyd v. U. S., supra. Essgee Co. v. U. S., 262 U. S. 151. Dier v. Banton, 262 U. S. 147. Requiring Corporations to Make Tax Returns The provisions of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, known as the corporation tax law, requiring certain returns to be filed by corporations in the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, do not offend against this amendment. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107. Compelling Interstate Corporations to Produce Contracts Compelling interstate corporations to produce contracts with coal companies, to be used as evidence before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which would tend to show a discrimination against coal companies not having such contracts and paying the full rate, does not constitute a violation of the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. I. C. C. v. Baird, 194 U. S. 44. Requiring Witness to Testify Before Senate as to Business Transaction A party is not subjected to an unreasonable search by reason of being required, in an investigation conducted by the Senate, to appear as a witness and answer the question whether the firm of which the witness was a member had bought or sold certain stocks for or in the interest of any United States Senator. In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 669. Chapman v. U. S., 5 App. Cas. (D. C.) 122; 8 App. Cas. 302. 12703°-S. Doc. 157, 68—1—40 |