Amend. 5.-Rights of Persons-Due Process. sary for performing carriage, or hold itself out to perform carriage by publishing rates therefor, or receive compensation from shippers whose shipments move in its cars, is not a carrier by railroad," within the meaning of section 209 of the transportation act, 1920, which made a guaranty of income for six months after March 1, 1920, with respect to any carrier by railroad with which a contract had been made fixing the amount of just compensation under the Federal control act. Chicago Refrigerator Co. v. I. C. C., 265 U. S. 292. Connecting carriers.-The Carmack amendment to the act to regulate commerce holding the initial carrier engaged in interstate commerce as having contracted for through carriage to the point of destination, and liable to the shipper for loss of or injury to property on a connecting line, does not deprive the initial carrier of its liberty or property without due process of law. Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission requiring a railroad company to give to one connecting carrier the same transportation facilities over its terminals that it gives to another connecting carrier, under the same circumstances of connection does not deprive it of any property right without due process of law. Pennsylvania Co. v. U. S., 236 U. S. 351. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 238 U. S. 1. See also Wilson v. New, 243 U. S., 332, as to eight-hour day for railroad employees. Jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission of District of Columbia over public utilities under act March 4, 1913, section 8, can not be defeated because such jurisdiction has not been assumed over other similar concerns. Terminal Taxicab Co. v. D. C., 241 U. S. 252. Prohibiting trunk line allowing rebate to tap line.—An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission prohibiting trunk line carriers from making to any tap line an allowance or division out of the joint rates in excess of the maximum amounts prescribed does not deprive a trunk line of its property without due process of law, as a trunk line has no constitutional right to compete and build up its business by paying bonuses or rebates that have been forbidden by act of Congress. O'Keefe v. U. S., 240 U. S. 294. Railroad Labor Board.-Act providing for Federal Labor Board held not in contravention of this clause. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 282 Fed. 693. Divisions of joint rates.—Where joint rates among a group of carriers were increased by the commission with special reference to the financial necessities of a part of them, a division which gave the needy carriers a relatively greater share, but left the Amend. 5.-Rights of Persons-Due Process. share of the others adequate to avoid a confiscatory result, did not deprive them of their property without due process of law. New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184. U. S. v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 263 U. S. 515. Recapture of excess income.—In Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. U. S. (263 U. S. 456) it was held that the provisions in the transportation act of 1920 for recapture and use of railroad income in excess of a certain percentage do not violate the due process clause of this amendment. Issuance of stocks and bonds.—Act requiring carrier to obtain permission before issuing stocks and bonds held not to deny due process. Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. v. I. C. C., 293 Fed. 1001. Gas companies.-Order raising rates chargeable to private consumers without changing lower rate fixed by Congress for gas furnished the Government and the District does not discriminate against private consumers or take their property without due process. Hollis v. Kutz, 255 U. S. 452. Food and drugs.-Food control act of August 10, 1917, as amended October 22, 1919, penalizing the making of sales of necessaries at unreasonable prices, sets up no ascertainable standard of guilt and is therefore invalid. U. S. v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. Act of August 23, 1912, which declares that "If its package or label shall bear or contain any statement, design, or device regarding the curative or therapeutic effect of such article, or any of the ingredients or substances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent," is not so uncertain in its operation as to deny due process of law in its enforcement. Seven Cases v. U. S., 239 U. S. 510. Intoxicating liquors.-Act of Congress of March 1, 1913, known as the Webb-Kenyon law, divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases, is not repugnant to the due-process clause. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U. S. 326. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, as to war-time Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, as to the Volstead Act. Amos v. U. S., 255 U. S. 313, as to taking of illicit whisky by rev enue agents without search warrant. War-time prohibition did not result in deprivation of property without due process of law. Dryfoos v. Edwards, 284 Fed. 596. Dealers in beer, ale, and stout who were prevented by the supplemental prohibition act from disposing of stocks acquired 1 See also same subject, pp. 685, 734, and 747. 12703°-S. Doc, 157, 68-1-42 Amend. 5.-Rights of Persons-Due Process. before it was passed were not thereby deprived of property without due process of law in violation of this amendment. Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545. Validating registration of mortgages as against judgment creditors. An act validating the registration of mortgages of personal property is not a deprivation of property without due process of law as against creditors who had obtained judgments and had sued out attachments prior to the enactment of the statute. McFaddin v. Evans-Snider-Buel Co., 185 U. S. 513. Deprivation of use of the Postal Service.-Due process of law is not denied when the disposition of property is affected by the order of an executive department and a statute authorizing the Postmaster General to seize or return to sender all letters addressed to a particular person, firm, or corporation which he is satisfied is making use of the mail for an illegal purpose. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U. S. 508; but see Hoover v. Statute of limitations.-May be modified by shortening the time prescribed, but only if this is done while the time is still running, and so that a reasonable time still remains for the commencement of an action before the bar takes effect. Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U. S. 139. Giving unwarranted effect to decision of State court.—A judgment of the circuit court of the United States claiming to give such unwarranted effect to a decision of a State court as to wrongfully deprive a party of his property may be considered as presenting a question of how far it can be sustained in view of the prohibitory language of this clause. Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U. S. 298. Inspection of mining claim to ascertain interest.-A Territorial statute providing that whenever any person shall have any right to or interest in any mining claim which is in the possession of another person, and it shall be necessary to the ascertainment of such right that an inspection of the mining claim shall be made, does not deprive anyone of property without due process of law. Montana Co. v. St. Louis Min., etc., Co., 152 U. S. 162. Right to practice law. A summary proceeding against an attorney to exclude him from the practice of his profession on account of acts for which he may be indicted and tried by a jury is not a violation of this amendment when due notice was given and a trial and hearing was had before the court in the manner in which proceedings against attorneys, when the question is whether they shall be struck off the roll, are always conducted. Ex parte Wall., 107 U. S. 288. Amend. 5.-Right of Persons-Due Process. Prohibiting disposition or encumbrance of community property.— In a Territory in which the rule of community property as between husband and wife obtains, a statute providing that "neither husband nor wife shall convey, mortgage, encumber, or dispose of any real estate or legal or equitable interest therein unless both join in the execution thereof," does not deprive a husband of property rights without due process of law. * Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311. Requiring property in District of Columbia to be connected with drainage.-Act of Congress requiring improvements of property within the District of Columbia to be connected with the city sewage system does not deprive an owner of property of any rights without due process of law, though it does not appear that any nuisance existed on the property or that the means of drainage already there were unsatisfactory or insufficient. D. C. v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138. Regulation of rents.-District of Columbia rents act of Congress of October 22, 1919, held not unconstitutional as depriving owners of property without due process of law. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135. Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170. Chastleton v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543. Zoning ordinance held invalid as depriving owners of their property without due process of law. Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid, 297 Fed. 307. Taking of Private Property Power of Eminent Domain In general. This clause contains an implied recognition of the right of eminent domain beyond what may justly be implied from the express grants of power. Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 372. The right of eminent domain does not rest on a statute or on a constitutional enactment. In re Rugheimer, 36 Fed. 369. Shoemaker v. U. S., 147 U. S. 298. Land for lighthouse.-Act of Congress authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to acquire land for the purpose of a lighthouse by condemnation under judicial process in a court of the United States is a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress. Chappell v. U. S., 160 U. S. 511. Harris v. Elliott, 10 Pet. 25. Cherokee Nation v. Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641. Land for use of Emergency Fleet Corporation.-The act of March 1, 1918, authorized the taking of land for an electric railway terminal for the purpose of providing convenient transportation Amend. 5.-Rights of Persons-Private Property. for employees of a near-by shipyard for whom houses were being provided under the act. Manufacturers' Co. v. Fleet Corp., 264 U. S. 250. This clause a mere limitation on the power.-The right of eminent domain is an incident of sovereignty and requires no constitutional recognition. This clause, providing for just compensation for property taken, is merely a limitation upon the use of the power. U. S. v. Jones, 109 U. S. 518. Alabama Power Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 283 Fed. 606. With or without concurrent act of the State.—The United States, at the discretion of Congress, may acquire and hold real property in any State, and it may be taken against the will of the owners by the United States, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, upon making just compensation, with or without a concurrent act of the State in which the land is situated. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 154. Private Property Franchises. When Congress, under its power to regulate commerce, condemns and appropriates a lock and dam belonging to a navigation company, its action does not destroy the State franchise, and just compensation requires payment for the franchise to take tolls as well as for the value of the tangible property. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 312. The franchise of a private corporation is property which can not to be taken for public use without compensation. Wilmington etc., R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264. Indian allotments.-A Creek homestead allottee under an agreement incorporated in congressional legislation by which, in consideration of relinquishment by Indians of their claim to tribal property, they were to receive nontaxable homestead allotments inalienable for a specified period, acquired a vested right to exemption from State taxation, protected by the Federal Constitution against abrogation by Congress. English v. Richardson, 224 U. S. 680. See also U. S. v. Rowell, 243 U. S. 464, as to recall of patent. Pensions.-Pensioners of the United States have no vested legal rights to their pensions, and it was competent for Congress by act July 25, 1882, to provide that no person receiving a pension under a special act should receive in addition a pension under the general law. U. S. v. Teller, 107 U. S. 64. See also Calhoun v. Massie, 253 U. S. 170, and Newman v. Moyers, 253 U. S. 182, as to compensation to pension agents. |