Amend. 7.-Civil Trials. Facts Reexamined Only According to Rules of Common Law This is a prohibition to the courts of the United States to reexamine any facts tried by a jury in any other manner. The only modes known to the common law to reexamine such facts are the granting of a new trial by the court where the issue was tried or to which the record was properly returnable, or the award of a venire facias de novo, by an appellate court, for some error of law which intervened in the proceedings. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 447. Barbour v. Moore, 10 App. Cas. (D. C.) 50, discussing Metropolitan See also Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 7, for a discussion of "Rules of common law." Control of Court Over Verdict This does not mean only and barely that there shall be a verdict of 12 men under any conditions that may be prescribed, but that there shall be a trial by jury as understood at common law. The control of the court over the verdict after it is given is as much a part of the trial by jury as the giving of the verdict itself, and the right to have the issues tried by a second jury (or even a third jury) when the verdict of the first jury is affected by some infirmity for which the common law required the trial court to set that verdict aside, is as much a right of "trial by jury" preserved by the Constitution as the first trial. Hughey v. Sullivan, 80 Fed. 76. See also Baylis v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 113 U. S. 320, as to setting aside of verdict on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence; Arkansas Valley Land, etc., Co. v. Mann, 130 U. S. 72, as to decision on motion for new trial dependent on remission of part of the verdict. Expression of Opinion on the Facts by the Court In the courts of the United States, as in those of England from which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to the jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important, and express his opinion upon the facts; and the expression of such an opinion, when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the determination of the jury, can not be reviewed on writ of error. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 553. Entering Judgment for Defendant Notwithstanding Verdict Where a verdict has been rendered for the plaintiff, the court is without authority, on a motion for new trial, to render judg Amend. 7.—Civil Trials. ment for the defendant on the evidence notwithstanding the verdict. Pedersen v. Delaware, etc., R. Co., 229 U. S. 146. On Removals from State Courts This clause has no application to a case which has been removed from a State court into a United States court after a judgment in the State court had been vacated, the verdict set aside, and a new trial granted. Insurance Company v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 226. Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall, 277. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 598. Stevenson v. Williams, 19 Wall. 576. McKee v. Rains, 10 Wall. 25. On Writ of Error from Federal Supreme Court The last clause of this amendment is not restricted in its application to suits at common law tried before juries in United States courts. It applies equally to a case tried before a jury in a State court and brought to the United States Supreme Court by a writ of error from the highest court of the State. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 242. This clause applies to the appellate powers of the United States in all common-law cases coming up from an inferior Federal court, and also to the circuit court in like cases in the exercise of its appellate power, and also in cases of Federal cognizance coming up from a State court. Justices v. Murray, 9 Wall 274, in which the court held unconstitu tional under this amendment the act of Congress of March 3, 1863, providing for removal to United States circuit courts of cases brought in State courts against Federal officers for arrests, etc., made under authority of the President, the circuit court to try the facts and the law as though the case had been originally brought there. Amendment 8.-PUNISHMENT FOR CRIME. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. Leading Cases Weems v. U. S. (217 U. S. 349), containing a history of the adoption of this amendment and cases thereunder. In In re Kemmler (136 U. S. 436) it was held that death by electrocution was not cruel. In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (212 U. S. 86) it was held that the Supreme Court of the United States will interfere with the action of the State courts only when they impose fines which amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323. Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475. 1 For ratification, see p. 25. Amend. 8.-Punishment for Crime. Not a Limitation on the States This amendment "is addressed to the courts of the United States exercising criminal jurisdiction, and is doubtless mandatory to them and a limitation upon their discretion," and does not apply to the States. Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 574. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131. Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 34. McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 158. O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 332. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. U. S., 148 U. S. 324. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 606. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 174. Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U. S. 87. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U. S. 447. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U. S. 481. Effect of the Fourteenth Amendment In O'Neil v. Vermont (144 U. S. 323), Justice Field, in a dissenting opinion, holds that the fourteenth amendment has made this amendment applicable to the States. See also State v. Burlington Drug Co., 78 Atl. 882. As to applicability to Territories, see— Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 133. Excessive Bail To require larger bail than the prisoner could give would be to require excessive bail and to deny bail in a case clearly bailable by law. In U. S. v. Lawrence (4 Cranch [C. C.] 518) the court said that the discretion of the magistrate in taking bail in a criminal case is to be guided by the compound consideration of the ability of the prisoner to give bail and the atrocity of the offense. U. S. v. Brawner, 7 Fed. 89. Excessive Fines, Cruel and Unusual Punishments The sentence and punishment imposed upon a defendant for any violation of the provisions of the statute, which is within the punishment provided for by the statute, can not be regarded as excessive, cruel, and unusual. Jackson v. U. S., 102 Fed. 473. Gulf, etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 58. Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment in another case to a cruel one. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U. S. 136. Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which prohibits the inflic Amend. 8.-Punishment for Crime. tion of cruel and unusual punishments, but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such as those formerly inflicted for atrocious crimes and for high treason, and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, have been forbidden by this amendment. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 135. The act of Congress prohibiting the placing of letters in the mail for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud is not invalid for making each putting of a letter into the post-office a separate offense. Badders v. U. S., 240 U. S. 391. Fifty dollars fine and three months' hard labor for the illegal sale of liquor held not to be violative of this amendment. Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475. Shooting as a mode of executing death penalty held not to be a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of first-degree murder. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 134 Appellate Jurisdiction of Federal Supreme Court The Supreme Court has no appellate jurisdiction to revise sentences of inferior courts in criminal cases, and can not, even if the excess of the fine were apparent on the record, reverse the sentence. Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. 573. American Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, etc., R. Co., 148 U. S. 378. The act of Congress of March 2, 1907 (34 Stat. 1246), authorizing the United States to take a writ of error in criminal cases to the Supreme Court for certain purposes, is valid. Taylor v. U. S., 207 U. S. 120. Amendment 9.'-RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE. The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. This amendment restrains only the powers of the General Government and indicates that the Federal Constitution is but a delegation of powers, which powers, together with the implied powers, constitute all that the Federal Government has or may presume to exercise.2 Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 551. 1 For ratification, see p. 25. See Rules of Construction, p. 37. Amendment 10.'-RESERVED STATE POWERS. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. Leading Cases In McCulloch v. Maryland (4 Wheat. 406) Chief Justice Marshall said: The tenth amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word “expressly" and declares only that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people," thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one Government or prohibited to the other to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument. * A constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution would partake of the prolixity of a legal code and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American Constitution is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument but from the language. In Collector v. Day (11 Wall. 124) the court held: It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union that the sovereign powers vested in the State governments by their respective constitutions remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the Government of the United States. That the intention of the framers of the Constitution in this respect might not be misunderstood this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the tenth article of the amendments. In Kansas v. Colorado (206 U. S. 46) Justice Brewer, in referring to this amendment, said that it disclosed widespread fear that the National Government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justification in the organic act, and that if in the future further powers seemed necessary they should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending that act. The principal factor in this article is "the people." In McClung v. Silliman (6 Wheat. 604) it was held that a State court can not issue a mandamus to an officer of the United States. Definition The reservation to the States respectively can only mean the reservation of the rights of sovereignty which they respectively possessed before the adoption of the Constitution of the United 1 See also "Powers remaining in the States," under commerce clause, p. 145. See p. 25 for ratification. For general rules of construction and interpretation, see p. 37. |