Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce either in person or by counsel, and requires that the decisions Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 211. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. U. S. 243, U. S. 412. Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38. Loewe v. Lawler, 208 U. S. 274. Eastern States Lbr. Assn. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 600. Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375. U. S. v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417. Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590. U. S. v. Schrader, 252 U. S. 85. Frey & Son v. Cudahy, 256 U. S. 208. El Paso, etc., R. Co. v. Gutierrez, 215 U. S. 87. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. Federal Trade Comm. v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441. Federal Trade Comm. v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 429 (dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis). Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Northern Pac. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U. S. 135. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U. S. 554. Texas v. I. C. C., 258 U. S. 158. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204. Section 16 of the interstate commerce act, providing, "All actions at law by carriers subject to this act for recovery of their charges . . . shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after," does not apply to an action by the Director General of Railroads to recover demurrage charges accrued to the United States during the period of Federal control of railroads. Dupont & Co. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 456. This clause vests power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, etc., exclusively in Congress. Whether the power in any given case is vested exclusively in the General Government depends upon the nature of the subject to be regulated. It is only direct interferences with the freedom of interstate commerce that bring a case within the exclusive domain of Federal legislation. Hanley v. Kansas, etc., R. Co., 187 U. S. 617. Ohio v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 101. Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 358. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 727. Field v. Barber Asphalt Co., 194 U. S. 623. The National Government may remove all obstructions to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails, either by force operating through the Executive or by process emanating from the courts. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564. Any act of a State interfering in any way with the free traffic between citizens of different States in any article of commerce is an attempted regulation of such commerce, and an invasion of the power exclusively conferred upon Congress, whose nonaction with respect to any particular commodity is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce therein shall be free. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313. Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce by any means which may be proper, so long as such means are not contrary to some provision of the Constitution. I. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447. Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Kaw Valley, 233 U. S. 75. A valid regulation of commerce need not apply to all commodities alike, but the regulations may make a discrimination between articles and carriers. Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce Commerce among the States in any commodity can only be free when the commodity is exempted from all discriminating regulations and burdens imposed by local authority by reason of its foreign growth or manufacture. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 351. This power is exclusive when the subjects of regulation are national in character or admit only of one uniform system of regulation. Ex Parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 236. State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232. Mobile County v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. Cardwell v. American River Brdg. Co., 113 U. S. 205. Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160. No part of the power of regulating commerce that is vested in Congress can be executed by a State; that power, so far as it is thus vested, belongs exclusively to Congress. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Inhibitive congressional legislation is not essential to exclude State legislation upon incidental matters relating to interstate commerce with respect to which the States and Congress have a concurrent power. It is sufficient if the congressional legislation occupies the field of regulation. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. Same v. Reid & Beam, 222 U. S. 444. National Subjects Requiring Uniform Regulations The power to regulate commerce among the States, etc., is an absolute and exclusive grant of power to Congress; so far exclusive that no State has power to make any law or regulation which will affect the free and unrestrained intercourse and trade among the States. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. The power embraces all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. Commerce, as embraced by this clause, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. Whatever may be the nature and extent of the police power, no definition of it and no urgency for its use can authorize a State to exercise it in regard to a subject matter which has been confided to Congress exclusively. Whenever the statute of a State invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to Congress, it is Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall or how closely allied to powers conceded to belong to the States. Pittsburg, etc., Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U. S. 587. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 204. Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 455. Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 271. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 108. Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 471. McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 12. Congress has the power to declare what may be the subject of commerce; may pass all laws necessary or proper for carrying into execution any of the powers specifically conferred, and may make use of any appropriate means for the same. The rule that in the enforcement of provisions guaranteeing civil rights, Congress is limited to the enactment of legislation corrective of any wrong committed by the States and not by the individuals, does not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct. plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, as in the commerce clause, where it has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof. The power of Congress must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States, but in regulating commerce with foreign nations it does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is that of the whole United States. If Congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised within the State. This principle is, if possible, still more clear when applied to commerce among the several States. U. S. v. Popper, 98 Fed. 423. Luxton v. North River Brdg. Co., 153 U. S. 529. Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 18. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 195. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 16. The power to regulate commerce is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. The constitutional guaranty of liberty of contract does not prevent Congress from prescribing the rule of free competition for those engaged in interstate and international commerce. The means necessary Sec. 8.-Powers of Congress Cl. 3.-Commerce or convenient to the exercise of the power of Congress over commerce may have the quality of police regulations, and Congress has the power to authorize injunctions to restrain obstructions of commerce, but the power of Congress does not comprehend the purely internal domestic commerce of a State. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 196. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203. Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 574. U. S. v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 44. Trade-mark Cases, 100 U. S. 96. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it. Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control over the internal commerce or domestic trade of a State. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution except such as is strictly incidental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to it. The power to authorize a business within a State is plainly repugnant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But it reaches only existing subjects. License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 470. Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475. Incidental Control of Intrastate Rates Congress may control intrastate rates of a carrier under State authority when necessary to remove the resulting unjust discrimination against interstate commerce from the relation between intrastate and interstate rates which are unreasonable in themselves. Houston, etc., R. Co. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 342. Wisconsin v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 257 U. S. 533. New York v. U. S., 257 U. S. 591. Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204. New York, etc., R. Co. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. Southern R. Co. v. Reid, 222 U. S. 424. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Edwards, 227 U. S. 265. |