WHITE, J., dissenting. 391 U.S. doned, thus avoiding the reversal of this criminal conviction because of introduction at trial of statements by the petitioner that were unquestionably voluntary by traditional standards but were made without the petitioner's having received the so-called Miranda warnings. However, even were I to agree that Miranda was correctly decided, I would not join the unexplained extension which the Court gives Miranda in this case. At issue are two questions1 asked of petitioner by an Internal Revenue agent in the course of a civil investigation. The interview was indistinguishable from the thousands of inquiries into tax liability made annually as a necessary adjunct to operation of our tax system. The Court said in Miranda that "proper safeguards" were needed for "in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime," 384 U. S., at 467. In this case the majority states that criminal investigation of Mathis began soon after the second of the visits to him of Revenue Agent Lawless. This suggests a view, unsupported by the record before us, that the civil investigation had raised suspicions of criminal conduct by Mathis at the time of this visit. However, the majority also says that "tax investigations frequently lead to criminal prose 2 1 Petitioner was asked whether tax returns received by the Government bearing his name had in fact been prepared by him and whether he would consent to an extension of the statute of limitations for causes of action arising from those returns. 2 A civil investigator is required, whenever and as soon as he finds "definite indications of fraud or criminal potential," to refer a case to the Intelligence Division for investigation by a different agent who works regularly on criminal matters. In the case before us, such a reference was made eight days after the second visit to petitioner by Agent Lawless. The criminal agent visited petitioner, gave him the full set of "Miranda warnings," and was told petitioner did not wish to discuss the case with him. No further questions were asked. 1 WHITE, J., dissenting. cutions," a hint that any in-custody questioning by an employee of the Government must be preceded by warnings if it is within the immensely broad area of investigations which "frequently lead" to criminal inquiries. Fortunately, voluntary compliance with civil regulation is widespread in this country. Nevertheless, compliance must be supplemented and encouraged by constant and widespread investigations, during which questions are asked and data are requested by employees of the Government whose goal is only to settle fairly the civil accounts between the United States and its citizens. Sometimes, of course, the possibility of a criminal violation is discovered through such inquiries. I had not thought that Miranda extended its checklist of warnings to these civil investigations. Certainly the explanation of the need for warnings given in the Miranda opinion does not cover civil investigations, and the Court's opinion in this case furnishes no additional support. The Court is equally cavalier in concluding that petitioner was "in custody" in the sense in which that phrase was used in Miranda. The State of Florida was confining petitioner at the time he answered Agent Lawless' questions. But Miranda rested not on the mere fact of physical restriction but on a conclusion that coercionpressure to answer questions-usually flows from a certain type of custody, police station interrogation of someone charged with or suspected of a crime. Although petitioner was confined, he was at the time of interrogation in familiar surroundings. Neither the record nor the Court suggests reasons why petitioner was "coerced" into answering Lawless' questions any more than is the citizen interviewed at home by a revenue agent or interviewed in a Revenue Service office to which citizens are requested to come for interviews. The WHITE, J., dissenting. 391 U.S. rationale of Miranda has no relevance to inquiries conducted outside the allegedly hostile and forbidding atmosphere surrounding police station interrogation of a criminal suspect. The Court's willingness to reverse without explaining why the reasons given for the Miranda decision have any relevance to the facts of this case is deeply troubling. Syllabus. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION v. SUNRAY DX OIL CO. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT. No. 60. Argued January 22-23, 1968.-Decided May 6, 1968.* The Federal Power Commission (FPC) has decided to rely on area rate proceedings to establish just and reasonable rates for producer sales under §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act. Pending completion of those proceedings the FPC has rested interim producer regulation on §7. Under that section, natural gas may be sold only pursuant to an FPC certificate of public convenience and necessity, which under §7 (e) may be conditioned "in such manner as the public convenience and necessity may require." In Atlantic Rfg. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n (CATCO), 360 U. S. 378, this Court held that the FPC should use its §7 conditioning power to prevent large initial contract price advances, pending the determination under §§ 4 and 5 of just and reasonable rates, which would become effective only prospectively. The FPC thereafter began to use its conditioning power to determine maximum initial prices at which sales could occur, basing these "in-line" prices upon current prices in the area of the proposed sale but excluding current prices which for various reasons were "suspect." In United Gas Improvement Co. v. Callery Properties, Inc., 382 U. S. 223, this Court generally approved this regulatory approach, holding that the FPC might properly refuse to hear cost evidence in such "in-line" price proceedings, and that *Together with No. 61, United Gas Improvement Co. v. Sunray DX Oil Co. et al., No. 62, Brooklyn Union Gas Co. et al. v. Federal Power Commission et al., No. 80, Federal Power Commission v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, a Division of Chevron Oil Co., et al., and No. 97, United Gas Improvement Co. v. Sunray DX Oil Co., also on certiorari to the same court; No. 111, Shell Oil Co. v. Public Service Commission of New York, No. 143, Skelly Oil Co. et al. v. Public Service Commission of New York et al., No. 144, Federal Power Commission v. Public Service Commission of New York et al., and No. 231, Superior Oil Co. v. Federal Power Commission et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. when issuance of permanent certificates was held erroneous on judicial review, the FPC might on remand impose new certificate conditions for refunds of amounts previously collected above the subsequently determined in-line price. On September 28, 1960, the FPC began its post-CATCO regulation of sales in Texas Railroad Commission Districts 2, 3, and 4, the three Texas Gulf Coast districts which are involved in these proceedings, by issuing its General Policy Statement, announcing a guideline ceiling price for new sales in each district of 18¢ per Mcf. On March 23, 1964, at the conclusion of the District 4 (Amerada) proceeding, the FPC determined an in-line price of 16¢ per Mcf for sales contracted after the issuance of the Policy Statement. The FPC relied primarily on a comparison of prices in contracts entered into since the Policy Statement and during the preceding two years. The FPC noted that 82% of post-Policy Statement sales were at 16¢ or more per Mcf. It gave "some measure of weight" to its 18¢ Policy Statement guideline price. Some weight was also accorded to prices under temporary certificates because only 1.4% of the gas in the area was moving under permanent certificates, though the FPC was mindful that the temporary prices were "suspect" and took their unreliability into account when it rejected the 17.2¢ average contract price. The FPC's conditional certification of proposed sales in District 4 was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. That court upheld the FPC's price line against contentions by certain consumers and distributors (the "seaboard interests") that the 16¢ price was too high and that in fixing that price the FPC erred in taking account of prices at which gas had been sold under temporary certificates. On September 22, 1965, the FPC issued its in-line price orders in the District 2 (Sinclair) and District 3 (Hawkins) proceedings reaffirming an earlier established price of 16 for the pre-Policy Statement period in District 3, and for the later period fixing a 16¢ price in District 2 and 17 in District 3. In fixing the 16¢ District 2 price the FPC gave full weight to the permanently certificated prices at which about 40% of the gas in the area was then moving; some but "not undue" force to the temporary prices at which 60% of the gas currently flowed; accorded "some weight" to the original, unconditioned prices in the area and to the 16 volumetric median and 15.29¢ volumetric weighted average prices for post-Policy Statement sales; and recognized that 53% of the gas in the area was moving at prices at or below 16. In fixing the 16¢ District 3 price the FPC gave full force to permanently certificated sales of small volumes of gas below 16¢ and comparatively large volumes |