advantages result. Probably not one policy in ten contains the accurate description and division of values required by the conditions of the policy. The insurer is then strictly at the mercy of the office in case of fire. He is made responsible for what he does not usually understand. All such descriptions and divisions in important properties can only be properly made by a competent surveyor, and offices and insurers alike would benefit by some arrangement which would secure official approval of description, divisions, and values.

To sum up these general remarks on the subject, it appears to me that the time has arrived when the associated offices should devise more exact, equitable, and up-to-date conditions and rates.

1. The ordinary rates should be revised and applied more equitably in respect of construction, position, isolation, size, value, fire-preventing appliances, &c.

2. The insured should be able to have his policies approved or agreed to by the offices as to description, division of risks, and general values.

3. The offices should consent as a matter of right (and not merely as now as a customary ex gratia matter) to repay the reasonable costs of establishing a claim after a loss by fire.

4. If the right to sue in a court of law be barred, the costs of the insured in an arbitration should be paid him by the office, or be in the discretion of the umpire.

A. VERNON, President.

(B.)

It is a notable feature in most works upon this subject that the majority of cases cited are American. This,

I think, points to the desire of British fire offices to avoid litigation where possible, and to resort to compromise. The whole practice of a fire assessor may be summed up in the word "compromise." Nothing is definite; everything is so uncertain; cases settled previously may differ in the smallest particular from the one in hand, and do not apply; therefore compromise is resorted to.

Fire insurance is an indemnity. I cannot quite fall into line with Mr. Bedells' remarks about the building, partly shops, partly flats (p. 303). It is understood that the building, as existing, does not conform to the Building Act. Should it at any time have to be rebuilt, then more money would have to be expended on it than was expended on the original building. Now, the fire insurance is not an indemnity against contingent liability; it covers the value of the present building, not that of a hypothetical building which might have to be erected. Therefore I cannot see why the insured should expect the fire office to erect for him an up-to-date building. Buildings do not last for ever; and given that no fire occurs, it is evident that the building will want renewing sooner or later, and then the owner (either the present one or his legal successor) will be bound to expend money upon it. It, therefore, appears that the inclusion of this contingent liability in the policy of insurance re-introduces into the whole system of insurance that old element of gambling, which it was the main object of 14 George III. c. 48 (the Gambling Act) to eradicate.

To further support this contention, I would argue that this extra work comes under the heading of "conse"quential damages," which cannot be covered unless specially insured. Under the same category would be included profits lost during re-instatement of business premises (vide Wright v. Pole) and rent, upon the ques

tion of the recovery of which the case of Wilson v. Jones has a bearing.

The case of Yates v. Dunster (quoted by Mr. Bedells on p. 302) bears directly upon this point. In that case the whole point at issue was the amount of deduction, if any, to be made from the estimated cost of rebuilding for the replacement of old buildings with new; and it was clearly laid down that a deduction should be made, the amount being fixed. This, I maintain, fully accentuates my contention that the policy indemnifies the insured against the loss of existing buildings, not against the probable cost of new. The insured gets the value of what is burnt; he can scarcely expect a new building for an old and dilapidated one. It is decidedly his own fault if he over-insures an old building and then expects the whole of the insurance money to be expended on a new one. Need one add that it would be an everpresent means of renewing old, dilapidated property, this" having a fire"?

The question naturally arises, "would the offices cover "such a risk?

I may here, perhaps, make an observation upon No. 2 of Mr. Bedells' recommendations (p. 333), that the policy should cover "all losses and expenses other than profits," and the definite insurance of all such bona fide losses."

To take the case of the owner of property in good repair, but not complying with the Building Acts in force. Now the valuation of such a risk, as the probable greater cost of rebuilding would be of necessity hypothetical; no one could say definitely what the cost would be. By-laws are continually changing; new Acts come into force, and what is legal one year is out of date and illegal the next. It is quite likely that a new valuation would be needed each year, and as the com

panies could hardly be expected to pay for this, the owner might consider the payment of his surveyor's fees a tax upon his insurance, which made such a mode of protecting his interests oppressive and troublesome.

Again, in order to insure anything one must have a definite thing to be insured; and a probability, a hypothetical uncertainty, cannot by any means be considered to be definite.

As regards reinstatement, in the case of Alchorne v. Savill (quoted by Mr. Bedells on p. 315), the ViceChancellor's judgment laid down that, as the company could not reinstate "in as good a condition as before the

fire happened," they should have paid. It did not set up a rule that an extra amount over and above the value of the building at the time of the fire should be paid the insured. Since the company had reinstated, and in doing so had damaged the insured, they were liable in damages for breach of contract in the ordinary way and not as between insurer and insured, In such a case, therefore, the office has no alternative but to pay in money, for if it reinstates it must do so in accordance with the law.

On p. 318, Mr. Bedells cites the case of a building used as a factory and not conforming to the Factory Acts 1878-1895. In this case Mr. Bedells reasons that the requirement is in "respect of the occupation of the "building," and, therefore, the office would not be liable for the extra cost of rebuilding.

Now, although I do not support Mr. Bedells in his argument, yet I agree with him in his contention. The occupation" of a building is one of the main factors in the determination of a policy. Policies are "personal ; they do not insure the premises, but the owner, against loss, and, as the character of the owner is greatly con

sidered by the office, so is the occupation. If, therefore, a company accepts the insurance of a building used as a factory, it takes all the risks incidental to such user according to the conditions of the policy. All the same, I agree with Mr. Bedells that the extension of the premises in the event of reinstatement would not be covered by the policy, for the reasons set forth in extenso in the earlier part of this article.

I have always understood that the "increase of risk "incidental to the making of reasonable and necessary repairs" is part of the general insurance. Personally I have settled losses which were caused by workmen upon the premises, and I should not anticipate that the companies would demur. It would, however, be on the safe side to give notice, as Mr. Bedells suggests.

As to a contractor, upon the case of Appleby v. Myers rests the statement that "if the property on which the "work is to be done is destroyed by fire, he is excused "from his contract."

"Where from the nature of the contract it appears "that the parties contracted upon the footing of the "existence at the time of performance of some particular "specified thing, and there is no express or implied 66 warranty that the thing shall exist, a condition is "implied that the party to do the act shall be excused, "in case before breach performance becomes impossible "by the perishing of the specified thing without the "default of the party." (Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts.)

Mr. Bedells is, I think, unduly harsh upon those who practise hazardous trades. After all, these trades must be carried on, and it is

surely hard on those

trading under any of the heads enumerated on p. 311 (which is so worded as to include almost all the working