stated to the defendant's predecessor that he claimed the disputed parcel, but that the defendant's predecessor might use it until wanted, is admissible to show that the defendant's predecessor's possession was subordinate to that of the plaintiff's predecessor, and not adverse thereto. Kahler v. Thorn (1913), 155 App. Div 744, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1002. The exclusion, during the trial of such an action brought by the owners of land, as tenants in common, to recover the possession thereof upon the expiration of a tenancy by the curtesy therein, of answers to questions put to the lessee as a witness, in which she was asked to state a conversation which he had testified had taken place between one of the reversioners and herself, and to state whether the said reversioner had said anything to her with reference to her remaining in possession of the premises under her mortgage, cannot be sustained on the ground that the inquiry was not within the issues raised by the pleadings, where the complaint alleges that the defendants are wrongfully in possession without leave of the plaintiffs and without legal right, and the answer denies the allegation; although the reversioner in question, being one of several tenants in common, could not affect the interest of his co-tenants, still he had the right to bind himself and his own interest, and as the questions were broad enough to cover a transaction in which he might have bound or affected his own right to possession, the evidence sought to be elicited was competent and material. Barson v. Mulligan (1908), 191 N. Y. 306, S. C. (1910), 198 N. Y. 23. In an action for ejectment, the defendant sought to justify permanent occupations by proof of usage in connection with a reservation. Proof as to usage examined and held to be insufficient. Spring v. Conklin (1916), 173 App. Div. 719, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1027. ARTICLE XV. VERDICT. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 606-608.) A judgment in ejectment is defective where it does not describe the specific lands in controversy and contains no provision that the plaintiff recover possession. Shanley v. Murty (1909), 134 App. Div. 845, 119 N. Y. Supp. 175. Where the complaint in an action of ejectment involving the location of a disputed boundary line, describes the disputed parcel of land by metes and bounds, and without objection of parties two questions are submitted to the jury, first, whether a former deed of the plaintiff to the defendant's predecessor in title included the parcel, and, second, whether if it was not included in the deed the defendant had acquired title by adverse possession, and no request was made for the submission of these specific questions, the jury may render a general verdict for the plaintiff and a judgment may be entered thereon. Ramapo Mfg. Co. v. Mapes (1913), 155 App. Div. 443, 140 N. Y. Supp. 490. Where the jury in an action of ejectment merely locates a disputed boundary line and finds that the plaintiff has not repossessed herself of the lands, but there is no general verdict or finding as to the plaintiff's estate in the property as required by section 1519 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the verdict does not describe the property to be recovered, or fix the damages, or award possession to the plaintiff, a judgment entered by direction of the court is fatally defective and will be set aside on motion. Shanley v. Murty (1909), 134 App. Div. 845, 119 N. Y. Supp. 175. A verdict which fails to define the estate of the plaintiff is fatally defective. The term "estate" has been defined as the quantity of interest which a person has in the land. Meehan v. Dobson (1911), 131 N. Y. Supp. 37. ARTICLE XVI. NEW TRIAL AND ITS EFFECT, AND EVIDENCE THEREON. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 609-616.) CODE CIV. PRO., § 1526. Effect of judgment by default. §§ 1525, 1527, 1528, and 1530. Repealed L. 1911, ch. 509. Code Civ. Pro., § 1526. Effect of judgment by default, etc. A final judgment for the plaintiff, rendered in an action specified in this article, otherwise than upon the trial of an issue of fact, is conclusively upon the defendant, and every person claiming from, through, or under him, by title accruing, either after the judgment-roll is filed, or after a notice of the pendency of the action is filed in the proper county clerk's office, as prescribed in article ninth of this title. Amended L. 1911, ch. 509. By the repeal in 1911 of section 1525 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that, at any time within three years after the filing of the judgment roll in an action of ejectment, the court on proper application must make an order vacating the judgment and granting a new trial, a judgment in ejectment rendered prior to such repeal is final and conclusive, and a motion to vacate it and for a new trial, made after such repeal took effect, must be denied. Lewis v. Townsend (1913), 79 Misc. 61, 140 N. Y. Supp. 500, affd., 155 App. Div. 931, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1127. ARTICLE XVII. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 616-620.) CODE CIV. PRO., § 1524. Effect of judgment rendered after trial of issue of fact. § 1529. Effect on possession of vacating judgment. Code Civ. Pro., § 1524. Effect of judgment rendered after trial of issue of fact. A final judgment in an action specified in this article, rendered upon the trial of an issue of fact, is conclusive, as to the title established in the action, upon each party against whom it is rendered, and every person claiming from, through or under him, by title accruing, either after the judgment-roll is filed, or after a notice of the pendency of the action is filed in the proper county clerk's office, as prescribed in article ninth of this title. Amended, L. 1911, ch. 509. Code Civ. Pro., § 1529. Effect on possession of vacating judgment. Where the plaintiff has taken possession of real property by virtue of a final judgment, his possession shall not be in any way affected by the vacating of the judgment. In such a case, if the defendant thereafter recovers final judgment in the action, it must award to him the restitution of the possession of the property; and he may have an execution thereupon for the delivery of the possession to him, as if he was plaintiff. Amended, L. 1911, ch. 509. Where, in an action in ejectment by the State to recover possession of certain wild forest lands, a stipulation is entered into between the parties settling the litigation, by which it is agreed that the defendants shall take judgment dismissing the complaint and adjudging them to be the owners of a certain portion of the land, and shall convey to the people certain tracts, a judgment entered in accordance with said stipulation is void and may be set aside because it attempts to dispose of lands belonging to the forest preserve, in violation of the State Constitution, article 7, section 7. People v. Witherbee (1917), 178 App. Div. 368, 164 N. Y. Supp. 915. ARTICLE XVIII. COSTS IN EJECTMENT. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 620-622.) The trial court in setting aside a verdict upon the ground that the preponderance of evidence was against the plaintiff's claim of title should not require the defendant to pay costs. Kahler v. Thron (1913), 155 App. Div. 744, 140 N. Y. Supp. 1002. Application. Matter of People v. Maltbie, 184 App. Div. 743. Art. FORECLOSURE. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 632-835.) I. Nature of the action and courts having jurisdiction. III. Parties plaintiff and defendant. IV. Complaint and notice of pendency of action. V. Answers and defenses. VI. Matters of practice. VII. Reference to compute amount due. VIII. Judgment. IX. Sale and confirmation. X. Judgment for deficiency. XI. Proceedings when mortgagee's debt not all due. XII. Surplus proceedings. ARTICLE I. NATURE OF THE ACTION AND COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 634-639.) SUBD. 1. Character of the action. 3. Courts having jurisdiction and place of trial. Subd. 1. Character of the Action. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 634-636.) The foreclosure of a mortgage is equitable in its nature, although based on legal rights, and it is the province of a court of equity to see to it that a party invoking its aid shall have dealt fairly before relief is given. Germania Life Ins. Co. v. Potter (1908), 124 App. Div. 814, 109 N. Y. Supp. 435. Subd. 3. Courts Having Jurisdiction, and Place of Trial. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 638-639.) The court obtains no jurisdiction of a non-resident defendant in a suit to foreclose a mortgage unless he be served by publication, or voluntarily appear in person or by attorney. Hope v. Shevill (1910), 137 App. Div. 86, 122 N. Y. Supp. 127, affd., 204 N. Y. 563. A County Court is of limited jurisdiction and has, in an action |