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A defendant who pays alimony after having been arrested under a void order adjudging him in contempt pays under duress and is not estopped from moving to vacate the order. Stewart v. Stewart (1908), 127 App. Div. 724, 111 N. Y. Supp. 734.

It seems, that where an order is made requiring the payment of alimony and counsel fee it is the better practice to employ the "long term " order. But, in any event, the order as a basis for contempt proceedings must state clearly, so as to be understood by a layman, the precise directions, not only as to the amount to be paid, but as to the time and place of payment and the person to whom payment is to be made.

However, where the defendant clearly showed that he understood the purport of a "short form" order served upon him by making a motion to modify the same, which motion was granted, he was not in a position to claim that he was ignorant of the requirements of the order when it was sought to hold him in contempt for failure to pay alimony and counsel fees. Adams v. Adams (1917), 179 App. Div. 152, 166 N. Y. Supp. 167.

On a motion to punish a defendant in an action for separation for contempt in failing to pay alimony in compliance with an order resettled as to date of the original order, so as to specify with more definiteness the duty of the defendant with respect to payments, a prior order denying a motion to punish him for contempt for failing to comply with the original order which was in the short form, is not a bar, as said denial was not on the merits, but upon the ground that a long form order should have been entered. Horter v. Horter (1917), 177 App. Div. 827, 164 N. Y. Supp. 889.

Where a husband has been imprisoned for three months for failure to pay alimony in an amount less than $500, he is entitled to a discharge on a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure. People ex rel. Ready v. Walsh (1909), 132 App. Div. 462, 116 N. Y. Supp. 839. Where a defendant has been incarcerated in jail for three months for contempt in failing to pay alimony he is immune against any further attempt to compel the payment by contempt proceedings. Thayer v. Thayer (1911), 145 App. Div. 268, 129 N. Y. Supp.

ARTICLE XXIX.

COSTS AND APPEAL.

(Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1210-1211.)

The court has no power to compel the wife to pay her husband's costs and disbursements, with costs of motion, in an action brought by him for absolute divorce, as a condition for granting her motion to vacate a decree rendered against her upon default and for leave to come in and defend. Moreover, justice does not require a wife, who is penniless and dependent upon her husband for support, to pay him the costs of such action. Fox v. Fox (1911), 143 App. Div. 483, 127 N. Y. Supp. 989.

Where a husband was defeated in an action for absolute divorce and has failed to pay a judgment for costs, the wife in a subsequent action for separation is entitled to an order staying her husband's counterclaim for an absolute divorce upon the ground of the adultery charge in the former action until he pays the costs in said action. Hasse v. Hasse (1912), 149 App. Div. 775, 134 N. Y. Supp. 83.

A finding of a jury in the negative upon the issue of adultery in an action for divorce is not a "special verdict" in the proper sense of the words, and the successful defendant upon his application at Special Term for judgment upon such finding is not entitled to tax in his bill of costs twenty dollars before argument and forty dollars for argument. Anderson v. Anderson (1918), 103 Misc. 427, 170 N. Y. Supp. 612.

Art.

I.

II.

MECHANICS' LIENS.

(Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1212-1344.)

Nature and extent of the remedy.

By and against whom, and on what property lien may be acquired.

III. Notice of lien, filing and service of copy.

IV. Priority of liens and rights of parties.

V. Payment in advance and demand for terms of contract.

VI. Effect of assignment of lien or contract.

VIa. Subordination of liens after agreement with owner or contractor.
VII. Duration of lien.

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The former Lien Law (L. 1897, ch. 418) and sections 33983419 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to mechanics' liens, have been repealed and transferred to the Lien Law, Chapter XXXIII of the Consolidated Laws (L. 1909, ch. 38). See B., C. and G., Consol. Laws (2nd Ed.) pp. 4763-4961.

ARTICLE I.

NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE REMEDY.

(Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1215-1221.)

SUBD. 3. Constitutionality and construction.
LIEN LAW, § 23. Construction of article.
§ 40. Construction of article.

4. Definitions.

LIEN LAW, § 2. Definitions; lienor.

§ 40. Construction of article.

Subd. 3. Constitutionality and Construction.

(Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1218-1220.)

Lien L., § 23. Construction of article.

This article is to be construed liberally to secure the beneficial interests and purposes thereof. A substantial complance with its several provisions shall be sufficient for the validity of a lien and to give jurisdiction to the courts to enforce the same.

Formerly Lien Law (L. 1897, ch. 418), § 22. (B., C. & G. Consol. L., 2nd Ed., p. 4861.)

Lien L., § 40. Construction of article.

This article is to be construed in connection with article two of this chapter, and provides proceedings for the enforcement of liens for labor performed and materials furnished in the improvement of real property, created by virtue of such article.

Formerly Code Civ. Pro., § 3398. (B., C. & G. Consol. L., 2nd Ed., p. 4871.)

The courts are bound to give full effect to section 23 of the Lien Law. Hurley v. Tucker (1908), 128 App. Div. 580, 583, 112 N. Y. Supp. 980, affd. (1910), 198 N. Y. 534. See generally, Griffin v. Ernst (1908), 124 App. Div. 289, 108 N. Y. Supp. 816; Abelman v. Myer (1907), 122 App. Div. 470, 106 N. Y. Supp. 978; Newman Lumber Co. v. Wemple (1907), 56 Misc. 168, 107 N. Y. Supp. 318; Schwartz v. Lewis (1910), 138 App. Div. 566, 123 N. Y. Supp. 319; Pearce v. Knapp (1911), 71 Misc. 324, 127 N. Y. Supp. 1100; Chambers v. Vassar's Sons & Co. (1913), 81 Misc. 562, 143 N. Y. Supp. 615. Said section does not justify the court in dispensing with any of the statutory provisions. Davis Lumber Co. v. Blanchard (1916), 175 App. Div. 256, 161 N. Y. Supp. 474.

Even though the provisions of the statute relating to mechanics' liens are to be liberally construed, yet in an action to foreclose such a lien where timely objection is made the recovery must follow the allegations of the pleading. Brandt v. City of New York (1905), 110 App. Div. 396, 97 N. Y. Supp. 280, affd. (1906), 186 N. Y. 599.

Substantial compliance with requirements of Lien Law is all that is required. Brady v. Rodenbach (1916), 174 App. Div. 795, 161 N. Y. Supp. 691.

The General Construction Law (§ 95) requires the courts to construe the Lien Law as a continuation of the prior law and not as a new enactment, and the Lien Law itself provides (§ 23) that it is to be construed liberally to secure its beneficial interests and purposes. Wahle-Phillips Co. v. Fitzgerald (1919), 225 N. Y.

137.

The remedy provided by article four of the Lien Law is statutory, and the statute must be strictly followed. Abbott v. Easton (1907), 122 App. Div. 274, 106 N. Y. Supp. 970, revd. (1909), 195 N. Y. 372 on other grounds.

Notice of lien liberally construed. Waters v. Goldberg (1908), 124 App. Div. 511, 108 N. Y. Supp. 992; Riley v. Durfey

(1911), 145 App. Div. 583, 130 N. Y. Supp. 297; Leske v. Wolf (1912), 154 App. Div. 233, 138 N. Y. Supp. 859; New York County National Bank v. Wood (1915), 169 App. Div. 817, 153 N. Y. Supp. 860; Krauss v. Brunett (1911), 73 Misc. 428, 130 N. Y. Supp. 1086; Schultz v. Teichman Engineering & Construction Co. (1913), 79 Misc. 357, 140 N. Y. Supp. 429. The provision that the statute shall be construed liberally does not authorize the court to dispense with what the statute says the notice shall contain. Bradley & Son v. Huber Co. (1911), 146 App. Div. 630, 131 N. Y. Supp. 388, affd. (1914), 210 N. Y. 627; Fenchel v. Zickerman (1913), 154 App. Div. 471, 139 N. Y. Supp. 118; Weaver Hardware Co. v. Solomovitz (1917), 98 Misc. 413, 163 N. Y. Supp. 121.

Section 23 of the Lien Law applied to section 2. Caldwell v. Glazier (1910), 138 App. Div. 826, 123 N. Y. Supp. 622. Applied to sections 9, 12 and 17. Matter of Goss v. Williams Engineering Co. (1907), 57 Misc. 78, 108 N. Y. Supp. 862. Applied to section 15. Lincoln National Bank v. Peirce Co. (1917), 98 Misc. 325, 164 N. Y. Supp. 421. Williams Engineering and Contracting Co. v. City of New York (1916), 175 App. Div. 571, 162 N. Y. Supp. 381, mod., 222 N. Y. 1. Applied to section 16. General Fireproofing Co. v. Keepsdry Co. (1916), 93 Misc. 635, 158 N. Y. Supp. 567, mod., 173 App. Div. 528, 159 N. Y. Supp. 179. Applied to section 21. Upson v. United Engineering & Contracting Co. (1911), 72 Misc. 541, 130 N. Y. Supp. 726.

Subd. 4. Definitions.

(Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., p. 1221.)

Lien L., § 2. Definitions; lienor.

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The term lienor," when used in this chapter, means any person having a lien upon property by virtue of its provisions, and includes his successor in interest.

Real property. The term "real property," when used in this chapter, includes real estate, lands, tenements and hereditaments, corporeal and incorporeal, fixtures, and all bridges and trestle work, and structures connected therewith, erected for the use of railroads, and all oil or gas wells and structures and fixtures connected therewith, and any lease of oil lands or other right to operate for the production of oil or gas upon such lands, and the right of franchise granted by a municipal corporation for the use of the streets or public places thereof, and all structures placed thereon for the use of such right or franchise.

Owner. The term "owner," when used in this chapter, includes the

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