party is not liable to any penalty or forfeiture. Hollaman v. El Arco Mines Co. (1910), 137 App. Div. 862, 122 N. Y. Supp. 852. The recovery on a recognizance for the appearance of a defendant to answer an indictment should be limited by the penalty, and interest from the date of the forfeiture should not be allowed. People v. Parisi (1916), 217 N. Y. 24. Payment by district attorney to county treasurer of money collected upon forfeiture of bail. People v. Abrams (1916), 172 App. Div. 577, 158 N. Y. Supp. 637. ARTICLE VI. ACTIONS FOUNDED UPON THE SPOLIATION OR OTHER MISAPPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC PROPERTY. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1735-1738.) Where a newspaper has been paid under a designation both as a State paper and a county paper, an action may be brought under section 1969 of the Code of Civil Procedure to recover the sum paid under one of said designations. People v. Journal Co. (1913), 158 App. Div. 326, 143 N. Y. Supp. 389, affd., 213 N. Y. 2. Moneys illegally raised and expended for lighting districts do not become town moneys, and if restoration be sought for the lighting districts it must be under section 1969 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Montgomery v. Smead (1916), 97 Misc. 283, 161 N. Y. Supp. 431. If a State commission has acted in bad faith and has expended money outside of the scope of the appropriation a remedy is provided under the provisions of section 1969 of the Code of Civil Procedure. And it is peculiarly improper that the Comptroller, who is alleged to have shared in some degree in the improper use of funds, should be called upon to audit the expenditures. People ex rel. Heinrich v. Travis (1916), 175 App. Div. 721, 161 N. Y. Supp. 860. Section 1973 of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to an action to recover alleged excessive payments to the publisher of the State paper. People v. Journal Co. (1914), 213 N. Y. 1, 9. The statute of limitations to recover moneys erroneously audited and paid by the State Comptroller is ten years. People v. Journal Co. (1913), 158 App. Div. 326, 143 N. Y. Supp. 389, affd., 213 N. Y. 2. ARTICLE VII. ACTION TO RECOVER PROPERTY ESCHEATED OR FORFEITED. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1738-1740.) In an action in ejectment by the State under the provisions of sections 1977-1980, upon the theory that certain real estate has escheated to the State, the requirement regarding notice is designed, not as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but as a protection to the heirs of persons dying possessed of real property within the State, and is merely a condition precedent to the right of the State to a judgment in its favor. People v. Troupe (1916), 171 App. Div. 1, 156 N. Y. Supp. 950. ARTICLE VIII. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS RELATING TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1740-1742.) CODE CIV. PRO., § 1986. Relator; when to be joined as plaintiff. Code Civ. Pro., § 1986. Relator; when to be joined as plaintiff. Where an action is brought by the attorney-general, as prescribed in this title, on the relation or information of a person, having an interest in the question, the complaint must allege, and the title of the action must show, that the action is brought upon the relation of that person. In such a case, the attorney-general must, as a condition of bringing the action, require the relator to give satisfactory security to indemnify the people, against the costs and expenses thereof. Where security is so given all costs and disbursements taxed in favor of the plaintiff shall be payable to the relator. Amended by L. 1918, ch. 104. At common law the Attorney-General was vested with authority to maintain quo warranto for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a corporate franchise, but equity did not have jurisdiction of a suit for such relief. The Legislature in abolishing the writ of quo waranto did not intend to deprive the court of jurisdiction of proceedings for such relief, but merely intended to change the form of procedure. People v. Bleecker Street & Fulton Ferry R. R. Co. (1910), 140 App. Div. 611, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1045, affg., 67 Misc. 577, 124 N. Y. Supp. 782. There was no liability at common law for damages resulting from an injunction erroneously granted save in cases of malicious prosecution. The Code requirements for security upon application for provisional remedies must be read in the light of the rule at common law, and invariably the undertaking required is limited to a sum specified by the court or judge. Special rules apply, however, to provisional remedies granted at the instance of municipal corporations. In such cases no security was required, but an amendment in 1894 to section 1990 of the Code of Civil Procedure modified the exemption so as to require that where a municipal corporation is excused from giving security on obtaining an injunction, such corporation shall be liable for all damages that may be sustained by the opposite party by reason of such order or injunction in the same case and to the same extent as sureties to an undertaking would have been if such an undertaking had been given. Sureties would be liable, however, to an extent not greater than the sum specified by the court or judge. The court or judge must, therefore, prescribe in the order of injunction the maximum extent to which a municipal corporation shall be liable. If the amount stated is too low, the defendant may move to increase it. Until some amount is stated, there is no liability on the part of the municipality. City of Yonkers v. Federal Sugar Refining Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 206. Where an action in behalf of the People is brought by the Attorney-General on the relation of a person having an interest in the question under the provisions of section 1986 of the Code of Civil Procedure the defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings unless the complaint alleges that the Attorney-General has required the relator to give satisfactory security to indemnify the People against the costs and expenses of the action and that such security has been given. People ex rel. Delehanty v. McIntyre (1917), 179 App. Div. 528, 166 N. Y. Supp. 634. QUO WARRANTO. See PEOPLE, ACTIONS IN BEHALF OF. REAL PROPERTY, ACTION TO RECOVER. REAL PROPERTY, ACTION TO DETERMINE CLAIM TO. See CLAIM TO REAL PROPERTY, ACTIONS TO DETERMINE. Art. REAL PROPERTY, PROVISIONS RELATING TO. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1743-1880.) II. Action by reversioner. IV. Cutting trees or timber and when treble damages allowed. V. Contents and filing of notice of pendency. VI. When lis pendens proper and cancellation. IX. Sale, how advertised and conducted. X. When sale set aside. XI. When sale enforced. XIII. Referee's fees and expenses and disposition of proceeds. XIV. Payment of moneys arising from sale into court and how paid out. XV. Passing title and writ of assistance. XVI. Effect of judicial sale. XXII. Evidence in actions or proceedings involving a title to real property. ARTICLE II. ACTION BY REVERSIONER. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1747-1748.) By viture of the statutes (1 R. S. 750, § 8, and Code Civ Pro., § 1665), infants seized of an estate in remainder or reversion may maintain an action by a guardian ad litem for waste or trespass causing injury to the inheritance, notwithstanding the existence of an intervening life estate. Muller v. Manhattan R. Co. (1908), 124 App. Div. 295, 108 N. Y. Supp. 852, affd., 195 N. Y. 539. ARTICLE IV. CUTTING TREES OR TIMBER AND WHEN TREBLE DAMAGES ALLOWED. (Fiero, Spec. Act., 3rd Ed., pp. 1753-1761.) The Municipal Court of the city of New York has jurisdiction of an action to recover treble damages for forcible entry and detainer. Bierman v. Werstein (1911), 72 Misc. 29, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1091. The provisions of sections 1667 and 1668 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for treble damages do not relate to damages for cutting trees on lands of the State; but the fact that treble damages are demanded does not render a complaint, otherwise sufficient for an action for trespass upon real estate, liable to demurrer. People v. Bennett (1907), 56 Misc. 160, 107 N. Y. Supp. 406, affd., 125 App. Div. 912, 109 N. Y. Supp. 1140. To make an entry forcible the force used must be unusual and tend to bring about a breach of the peace, such as an entry with a strong hand, or a multitude of people, or in a riotous manner, or with personal violence, or with threat and menace to life or limb, or under circumstances which would naturally inspire fear and lead one to apprehend danger of personal injury if he stood up in defense of his possession. Although the entry was peaceable, still if a party entitled to the possession is kept out through fear of personal violence, he is entitled to recover treble damages for a forcible detainer. When deprived of possession without right, he has the right to re-enter, after dispossession is complete, if he can do so peaceably. Fults v. Munro (1911), 202 N. Y. 34. In an action for treble damages for forcible entry upon, or detainer of real property, the plaintiff must give proof of facts which will bring the case within the provisions of the statute (Code Civ. Pro., § 1669), and where in such an action the entry was shown to be peaceable and under legal process, and the evidence discloses that there was no force used to keep the plaintiff out of the premises and that he was not in fear of any personal violence, a judgment against the defendant for the forcible detainer of the premises cannot be sustained. Hallock v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co. (1911), 202 N. Y. 201. To recover the treble damages authorized by section 1669 of the Code of Civil Procedure in actions for forcible entry or detainer, the entry must be shown to have been riotous or accompanied with personal violence. The fact that the defendant, the owner of the premises, broke the lock of a cellar door and removed the plaintiff's goods without resistance upon his part, does not entitle him to treble damages. When in such action it is shown that the plaintiff whose goods were removed was himself the trespasser, his complaint should be dismissed, for the true owner is not answerable in damages for dispossessing a trespasser divested of all title. Schrier v. Shaffer (1908), 123 App. Div. 543, 107 N. Y. Supp. 1107. A contractor who cuts down trees along a street while moving |