159 N. Y. Supp. 647. A judge presiding at Special Term has no jurisdiction to vacate the order of another judge of the same court for the examination of a judgment debtor in supplementary proceedings. Livingston v. Livingston (1917), 164 N. Y. Supp. 419. A third party having legal title to property against which a restraining order has been issued may move to vacate the order. Rathers v. Kaplan (1911), 138 N. Y. Supp. 1002, 3 Civ. Pro. (N. S.) 21.

Subd. 2. Appeals.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1848-1850.)

Section 2433 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the only method for the review of an order adjudging a judgment debtor to be in contempt for disobedience of an order in supplementary proceedings. Such an order is one made in the course of the supplementary proceedings, and the Appellate Division is without jurisdiction to review it, except upon appeal from an order of the Special Term. Matter of Onetto (1915), 171 App. Div. 211, 157 N. Y. Supp. 170.

An order adjudging a witness in supplementary proceedings guilty of contempt for refusal to answer questions, cannot be reviewed by certiorari, but only by an appeal from the order. Matter of Hanbury (1914), 160 App. Div. 662, 146 N. Y. Supp.

44.

Where proceedings supplementary to execution have lapsed by failure to adjourn, the matter cannot be reviewed without notice to the judgment debtor. Matter of Wilson v. Bracken (1912), 150 App. Div. 577, 135 N. Y. Supp. 435.

An order punishing a party for contempt in supplementary proceedings is not an order finally determining a special proceeding and is not appealable to the Court of Appeals as a matter of right. Matter of Steinman v. Conlon (1913), 208 N. Y. 198.

Section 1356 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to an order made in supplementary proceedings. Matter of Onetto (1915), 171 App. Div. 211, 157 N. Y. Supp. 170.

CODE CIV. PRO., § 2467. Order and bond to be filed.

SUBD. 1. When receiver appointed.

3. Extension of receivership.

4. Matters of practice.

Code Civ. Pro., § 2467. Order and bond to be filed.

An order appointing a receiver, or extending a receivership, and the bond, if any be required, must be filed in the office of the clerk of the county, wherein the judgment-roll in the action is filed; or, if the special proceeding is founded upon an execution issued out of a court, other than that in which the judgment was rendered, in the office of the clerk of the county, wherein the transcript of the judgment is filed.

Amended by L. 1917, ch. 683.

Subd. 1. When Receiver Appointed.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1851-1853.)

Although the court may not make an order requiring a third person to turn over property of the judgment debtor where the debtor's right to the possession of the property is substantially disputed, yet a receiver may be appointed who can take whatever steps may be necessary to obtain the property. Harding v. Conlon (1912), 138 N. Y. Supp. 1014, 3 Civ. Pro. (N. S.) 19.

A receiver may be appointed for property of a judgment debtor in the hands of a receiver of the premises in which the debtor is entitled to a dower interest. Harding v. Conlon (1912), 138 N. Y. Supp. 1014, 3 Civ. Pro. (N. S.) 19.

Although supplementary proceedings may be maintained against domestic corporations by judgment creditors, such right does not authorize the appointment of a receiver. Matter of Boucker Contracting Co. (1916), 218 N. Y. 321.

Subd. 3. Extension of Receivership.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1855-1856.)

As a receiver in supplementary proceedings, unlike a general receiver, is a receiver only for the benefit of the judgment creditor who procures his appointment, other creditors may bring supplementary proceedings to protect their rights, and creditors who

institute separate proceedings may have the former receivership extended to their proceeding. Matter of Walker (1913), 157 App. Div. 609, 142 N. Y. Supp. 972.

Subd. 4. Matters of Practice.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1856-1857.)

As an order appointing a receiver at the instance of a first judgment creditor stopped the debtor from transferring his property, where the debtor's subsequent earnings were recovered by the receiver it inured to the benefit of a second judgment creditor, for there is no distinction between moneys earned before and after the receivership had been extended to the second judgment. After the expenses and costs of the receivership and the first judgment creditor have been paid, the second judgment creditor, to whose judgment the receivership has been extended, should next be paid in full, where he alone appealed from an order distributing the fund among all the judgment creditors. Ward v. Baker (1919), 186 App. Div. 652, 175 N. Y. Supp. 66.

The bond of the receiver must be filed with the clerk of the county wherein the action was tried and judgment roll is filed. Mulstein Co. v. City of New York (1915), 213 N. Y. 308.

ARTICLE XVII.

TITLE OF THE RECEIVER TO PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1858-1868.)

SUBD. 1. When and in what manner property of debtor vests in receiver. 2. How receiver's title extended by relation.

3. Title of receiver to debtor's real estate.

Subd. 1. When and in What Manner Property of Debtor Vests in

Receiver.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1859-1864.)

A receiver in supplementary proceedings takes the legal title to all the personal property of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution; but he takes it only for the benefit of the judgment creditors for whom he is appointed receiver, and of other judgment creditors to whose judgment the receivership may be extended, subject, however, to any rights or defenses existing against

the judgment debtor at the time title vests in the receiver. Steinert v. Van Aken (1914), 165 App. Div. 206, 209, 150 N. Y. Supp.

525.

The receiver does not take title to property subsequently acquired by the judgment debtor unless his receivership is duly extended thereto. Matter of Walker (1913), 157 App. Div. 609, 142 N. Y. Supp. 972.

A receiver who has failed to duly file his bond, takes no title to the property of the judgment debtor, since such property vests only in the receiver who has duly qualified. Mulstein Co. v. City of New York (1915), 213 N. Y. 308.

An order appointing a receiver operates to transfer to the receiver the legal title to the judgment debtor's interest in a partnership; and as the receiver cannot become a member of the partnership, the effect of his appointment and the resulting transfer of the judgment debtor's interest is a dissolution of the partnership. Lovins v. Laub (1914), 85 Misc. 336, 147 N. Y. Supp. 304.

A receiver obtains no greater or other title than the judgment debtor had. It follows that no title to chattels which are mortgaged pass to the receiver from the judgment debtor, who is the mortgagor, although the mortgage is void as to creditors, if, as against him, the mortgage is good. Berliner v. Kuttnerr (1914), 85 Misc. 461, 147 N. Y. Supp. 308.

A receiver is not entitled to a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring a town board to pay over to him sums alleged to be due the judgment debtor by virtue of a resolution adopted by the electorate of the town, if he was appointed receiver prior to said resolution. People ex rel. Duvall v. Cocks (1914), 162 App. Div. 453, 147 N. Y. Supp. 829.

The receiver is not required to reduce to his possession more than sufficient property to pay the claims of those he represents, and costs, and inasmuch as he is subject to the orders of the court appointing him, it is within the province of the court to stay him from taking possession of more than sufficient property to satisfy the claims he represents. Steinert v. Van Aken (1914), 165 App. Div. 206, 150 N. Y. Supp. 525.

On a motion for an order requiring a judgment debtor to turn over to his receiver a certain policy of life insurance, which, though his wife was named as beneficiary therein, contains a clause

reserving to the judgment debtor the right to change the beneficiary, the surrender value of the policy may be applied in payment of his debts under section 52 of the Domestic Relations Law. Clark v. Shaw (1915), 91 Misc. 245, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1101.

The fact that a judgment debtor made a mortgage on certain property does not conclusively establish that he owned it over a year thereafter. Shea v. Lynskey (1912), 133 N. Y. Supp. 477. Where, after the appointment of a receiver, a recovery is had against the judgment debtor for the value of stock certificates alleged to have been converted, an order directing that the judgment debtor and her attorney deliver the stock certificates to the receiver or be adjudged in contempt, should be reversed, where it appears that the defendant in the meantime had disposed of the certificate to her son, and that the prior orders to show cause did not restrain the defendant from disposing of the stock. Matter of Eckert v. Truman (1914), 163 App. Div. 17, 148 N. Y. Supp. 48.

A receiver takes legal title to the personal property of the judgment debtor for the benefit of the judgment creditor for whom he is appointed receiver and all other judgment creditors to whose judgments the receivership may be extended. Ward v. Baker (1919), 186 App. Div. 652, 175 N. Y. Supp. 66.

Subd. 2. How Receiver's Title Extended by Relation.

(Fiero, Spec. Pro., 3rd Ed., pp. 1864-1865.)

The title of a receiver in supplementary proceedings is superior to a lien filed after the commencement of proceedings. Mulstein Co. v. City of New York (1915), 213 N. Y. 308.

An assignment of a judgment to an attorney in consideration of legal services in obtaining the judgment, and in a prior action, is not affected by the title of a receiver in supplementary proceedings against the assignor thereafter appointed under an order. granted prior to the assignment. Frieder v. Adlerman (1916), 95 Misc. 259, 159 N. Y. Supp. 120.

The title of a receiver in supplementary proceedings now extends back to the date of the service of the order for the debtor's examination, although the receivership has been extended to subsequent judgments. Ward v. Baker (1919), 186 App. Div. 652, 175 N. Y. Supp. 66.