included a judgment debt, had not the context of the will disclosed a larger intention (p). The bequest of a debt due on a particular security will pass the capital only, and not arrears of interest due at the testator's death (9); and e converso, the bequest of arrears of a debt will not pass the principal ("). In Collins v. Doyle (s), a testatrix who was entitled to a distributive share of the assets of an intestate, to whom, at her death, no administration had been taken out, bequeathed "all such sums of money as should be owing to me at the time of my decease from G. B.:" And it was holden by Lord Gifford, that these words would not pass her beneficial interest in a sum of money which was then due from G. B. to the estate of the intestate. But in Bainbridge v. Bainbridge (t), where testatrix being *entitled to her son's residuary estate (the amount of which was unascertained at her death), bequeathed as follows: "If any debts due to me at my decease, I request my executors will collect and pay into the hands of my children;" Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C., held, that the son's residue passed by the request. "Jewels." In the Attorney-General v. Harley (u), a testatrix "Jewels." "Pearls." "Necklaces." directed all her jewels to be sold to pay her debts, except a particular ring set with diamonds, which she gave to a friend, and she then bequeathed the remainder of her rings, her necklaces of every description, pearls, garnets, cornelians, and watches, to B.; by a subsequent testamentary disposition (p) But see Bridges v. Bridges, Vin. Abr. tit. Devise (O. b.) pl. 13. Chalmers v. Storil, 2 Ves. & Bea. 222. (4) Roberts v. Kuffin, 2 Atk. 112. Harvey v. Cooke, 4 Russ. Chanc. Cas. 34. But where the bequest was of "all my interest and claim on household property in W. on which I have a mortgage of 1,500l.," the legatee was held entitled to the arrears of interest due upon the mortgage at the time of the testator's death. Gibbon v. Gibbon, 13 C. B. 205. And where a testator gave "the amount of the bond from J. H.," it was held that the legatee was entitled to the arrears of interest upon the bond as well as to the principal. Harcourt v. Morgan, 2 Keen, 274. (r) Hamilton v. Lloyd, 2 Ves. Jun. 416. (8) 1 Russ. Chanc. Cas. 135. (t) 9 Sim. 16. But, it seems that the estate out of which the money be queathed is payable, must have been got in by the executor so as to constitute a debt from him. It is otherwise if the estate has not been so got in: Martin e. Hobson, L. R. 8 Ch. 401; and see the observations of James, L. J., in that case on the case of Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, ib. 405. (u) 5 Russ. 173. A bag of coins found by executors in a testator's strong box were held not to pass under a bequest of "jewelry.” Sudbury v. Brown, 4 W. R. 736. she gave all her trinkets of every denomination, her jewels excepted, to C.; and, in another part of the same instrument, directed her jewels to be sold; afterward, by a third testamentary instrument, she bequeathed to C. all her trinkets and pearls, with various specific articles, among which were some rings set with diamonds; the testatrix was possessed of a very valuable diamond necklace and cross, and of a pearl necklace, beside other necklaces, and of various diamond rings, besides those which were specifically bequeathed: And it was held by Lord Lyndhurst, that the diamond necklace and cross, and the diamond rings, not specifically mentioned, were not to be sold, and did pass to B.: His lordship further held, that the pearl necklaces passed to B., under the gift of necklaçes of every description, and did not pass to C. under the gift of pearls. The term "plate" has been held to be confined to articles of solid silver and not to include a plated service (x). 66 "Plate." "Books." 69 In Willis v. Curtois (y), a question arose under the will of the celebrated Dr. Willis, whether a collection "Books." of *books bound into volumes, which contained manuscript notes of his attendance upon King George III., would pass by a bequest to his nephew, a gentleman engaged in the like branch of the medical profession as the testator, of "all and every the books in and about my house in Tenterden Street:" Lord Langdale, M R., held in the affirmative. (2) Holden v. Ramsbottom, 4 Giff. 205. 69. An unfinished edition of a book will pass under a bequest of the book 'with the right of renewal of all previous and future editions," and not under a bequest of "unsold copies on hand." Hone . Kent, 6 N. Y. 390. "Books and papers of every description" include promissory notes. Perkins. Mathes, 49 N. .H. 107. But "books and papers" will not include a savings bank deposit and pass book. Mathes . Smart, 51 N. H. 438. "All my accounts" will not include a deposit in savings bank, Gale v. Drake, 51 N. H. 78; but " all my personal prop erty of whatever kind, except my notes, (y) 1 Beav. 189. [*1066] "Personal ornaments." "Personal ornaments." 70 In the construction of the same will, his lordship held that a pocketbook and a case of instruments, usually carried about the person of the testator, did not pass under a bequest of "personal ornaments." But the learned judge inclined to be of opinion that a gold pencil case, toothpick case, lip-salve box, and eyeglass, similarly circumstanced, would pass. "Linen." Under this term, without qualification, table and bed "Linen and clothes." linen, and every article to which that general word can be applied will pass: But where there is a bequest of "all linen and clothes of all kinds," it has been held, that only body linen will pass (z). "Medals." By this word, curious pieces of current coin, which have been kept by the testator with his medals, have been held to pass (a). "Medals." "Portraits." "Portraits." Where a testator bequeathed the portraits of himself, of his grandfather and grandmother, and of his mother, and of the Duke of Schomberg, to A. B.; and the testator had one portrait of himself, one of his grandfather and grandmother, and one of his mother, and a three-quarter portrait and a portrait in crayon of the Duke of Schomberg, and also a picture in which the duke is represented on horseback, with a battle in the distance; it was held that that picture was a portrait of the duke, and that it passed, together with all the other portraits, by the bequest (b). It should seem, that by a devise of a West Indian the West Indies. *plantation, the stock, implements, utensils, &c., upon it will pass (c). "Plantation" in Mistakes in the Mistakes in the description of legacies,71 like those in the description of legatees, may be rectified by reference to the terms description of a of the gift, and evidence of extrinsic circumstance, legacy. taken together (d). 70. "Ornaments" include personal jewelry. Estate of Taylor, 75 Cal. 189. 46 All my apparel, linen, silver, and jewelry now contained in eight trunks" will include jewelry found in a valise, there being none in the trunks. McCoy v. Vulte, 30 How. Pr. 265. But wearing apparel" will not include a watch habitually worn by testator. Gooch, 33 Me. 535. Gooch v. (2) Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro. C. C. 311. (a) Bridgman v. Dove, 3 Atk. 202. (b) Duke of Leeds v. Amherst, 13 Sim. 459, affirmed by Lord Lyndhurst, C. (c) Lushington v. Sewell, 1 Sim. 435. See Wood v. Gaynon, 1 Ambl. 395. Ante, p. *650. 71. The rule as to two or more objects, all answering partially, and none (d) Ante, p. *1010, et seq., and post, note (g). The error of the testator, says Swinburne (e), in the proper name of the thing bequeathed, did not hurt the validity of the legacy, so that the body or substance of the thing bequeathed is certain: As for instance, the testator bequeathed his horse Cripple, when the name of perfectly, to the description of the will, applies also to the subject of the gift. Worthington . Hylyer, 4 Mass. 202; Boggs r. Taylor, 26 O. St. 604. And, in general, evidence is admissible to identify the subject of the devise, Pritchard v. Hicks, 1 Paige 270; Ashworth. Ashworth, 12 O. St. 381; Young . Twigg, 27 Md. 620; or to show that by a bequest of my bond for $1500, given to A.," a bond was intended which the testator had made to B., and delivered to A. as B.'s agent, Smith . Wyckoff, 3 Sandf. Ch. 77; or to explain a bequest of a right to live in testator's house "and enjoy the same privileges as she now does," Maeck v. Nason, 21 Vt. 115; or a bequest of the "increase" (actual or future) of a female slave, Reno v. Davis, 4 Hen. & Mun. 283. So, in Roman Catholic Orphan Asylum v. Emmons, 3 Bradf. 144, a bequest of shares in "the Mechanics' Bank so usually called in the city of New York" was held to pass testator's shares in the 'City Bank" on its being shown that he never had any in the Mechanics' Bank. So, "dollars" may be shown to mean Confederate dollars. Elder v. Ogletree, 36 Ga. 64. So, where a devise is charged with a payment of $125 to testator's widow for her life, it has been held to mean $125 per annum. Estate of Hellerman, 17 Phila. 495. So, a bequest to testator's widow of " all rents in arrear on her real estate" may be shown by memoranda written and signed by testator to mean all moneys received by him as rents or others from his wife's property. Wadsworth v. 44 Ruggles, 6 Pick. 63. A gift "to my wife the provision made for her by the statutes I deem sufficient," and residue to A. after payment of bequests, gives the wife what she would have taken under the intestate laws. Kelly v. Reynolds, 39 Mich. 464. But "so much of my property, real and personal, as is allowed by law to widows in case no will is made, or in lieu of personal property allowed her by law, $500," refers to widow's right to select $450 in specific property, and not to her third of the real property. ney, 34 Mich. 250. provided for his decent burial and "so much of my estate I give to A." (his only son) without other provisions, it was held to carry his entire estate. Garrett v. Wheeless, 69 Ga. 466; Morgan v. Huggins, 42 Fed. Rep. 869. Kinney v. KinWhere testator In Andress v. Weller, 2 Gr. Ch (N. J.) 604, the evidence of the scrivener that he had omitted a legacy directed by the testator, was held inadmissible. So too, Comstock v. Hadlyme, 8 Conn. 254; Harrison v. Morton, 2 Swan 461; Hawman v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30; Rosborough v. Hemphill, 5 Rich. Eq. 95. But it is competent to prove under the statute of Massachusetts that the omission of children by the testator in his will was intentional and not an oversight. Ramsdill v. Wentworth, 101 Mass. 125; Buckley v. Gerard, 123 Mass. 8; Peters v. Siders, 126 Id. 135; Converse . Wales, 4 Allen 512; Wilson v. Foskett, 6 Metc. 404. So, in Whittemore v. Russell, 80 Me. 297. But in Rhode Island the rule is otherwise. Chace v. Chace, 6 R. I. 407. But (e) Pt. 7, s. 5, pl. 7. See also Godolph. Pt. 3, c. 25, s. 10. the horse was Tulip; this mistake shall not make the legacy void; for the legatary may have the horse by the last denomination; for the testator's meaning was certain, that he should have the horse; if therefore he hath the thing devised, it is not material if he hath it by the right or the wrong name. Accordingly, in Door v. Geary (ƒ), where a husband bequeathed to his wife 700l. East India stock, having none; but there was 7007. bank stock, to the surplus of which the wife was entitled as an executrix, after payment of her testator's debts, and which the husband afterward transferred in his own name: Lord Hardwicke held, that the 7007. bank stock should go to the wife; the learned judge being of opinion, that, as it was a case merely of error of description, the words "East India" should be rejected: and his lordship said it was no greater mistake than the devise of a black horse, the testator in South Carolina the court admitted parol evidence that the name of one child was omitted by mistake. Geers v. Winds, 4 Desaus. 85. "In regard to mistakes in Wills, there is no doubt that courts of equity have jurisdiction to correct them when they are apparent on the face of the Will, or may be made out by a due construction of its terms; for in cases of Wills the intention will prevail over the words. But then the mistake must be apparent on the face of the Will, otherwise there can be no relief." Story Eq. Jur. § 179. Parol evidence is inadmissible where there is no ambiguity, e. g., to show that "notes or mortgages in my favor against A." meant a note of B. secured by mortgage assumed by A. on land which A. had bought, Woodruff v. Migeon, 46 Conn. 236; or to show that the scrivener had used other words than those directed by the testator, Iddings v. Iddings, 7 Serg. & R. 111; or that a devise to A., B., and C. as tenants in common should have been to A. for life with remainder to B. and C., Clark v. Clark, 2 Lea 723. And in the case of the American Bible Society v. Pratt, 9 Allen 109, a bequest of "all (f) 1 Ves. Sen. 255. |