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not explained to the widow, and she died ninety days after testator's death, James v. Dunstan, 38 Kan. 289; nor by her agreement after testator's death and before probate to sell land devised to her, the agreement being afterward repudiated, Elbert v. O'Neil, 102 Pa. St. 302 ; nor by her occupation of the mansion house, Payton v. Bowen, 14 R. I. 375 ; or filing a bill in equity for partition, claiming one-third of the real property for life, the widow being ignorant of the nature of the estate chosen by her, Payton v. Bowen, 14 R. I. 375; or filing an inventory as executrix, including her community property afterward claimed adversely, Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731 ; or receiving money from the executor for her present support. Beem v. Kimberly, 72 Wis. 343.

Time for election. When the time is limited by statute, it makes no difference whether the letters testamentary are issued to an executor or to an administrator cum testamento annexo. Smith v. Smith, 20 Vt. 270. And after long acquiescence the illegality of probate will not affect the validity of the election. Sanders v. Sanders, 22 Miss. 81. It was formerly held, in Kentucky, that a court of equity had no power to extend the time fixed by statute, Nicholas v. Nicholas. Sneed (Ky. Dec.) 338; but it has since been held that the time may be extended until the condition of the estate can become known. Smither v. Smither, 9 Bush 230; Grider 0. Eubanks, 12 Bush 510. So too, an election made before probate is suffi. cient, Atherton v. Corliss, 101 Mass. 40 ; Sherman v. Newton, 6 Gray 307 ; but not an election during coverture indorsed on the will itself. Kreiser's Appeal, 69 Pa. St. 194. But see Stod. dard v. Cutcompt, 41 Ia. 329. If no time is fixed by statute, a reasonable time only will be allowed. Reed v. Dickerman, 12 Pick. 149 ; Delay v. Vinal, 1

Met. 57. But see Piercy v. Piercy, 19 Ind. 468; Leach v. Prebster, 39 Ind. 492. And in Vermont, the court may allow time up to the final settlement of the estate. Hathaway v. Hathaway, 44 Vt. 658. And the widow will not be obliged to make her election pending a controversy about the will. Church v. Ackerman, Saxton 40; Pindell v. Pindell, 40 Md. 537. If her dissent is properly executed and handed to a friend to be filed, and the widow dies before it is filed, it may be filed after her death within the statutory time. McGrath v. McGrath, 38 Ala. 246. But the statu. tory consent required, in Iowa, must be filed not only within the prescribed time, but during the lifetime of the widow. Houston v. Lane, 62 la. 291.

In general, where the statute prescribes a time for the widow's dissent, it can only be made within that time, Mathews v. Mathews, 141 Mass. 511 ; although the widow was ignorant of the value of the property devised, and was wrongly advised by the executor that it was worth more than the dower, Akin v. Kellogg, 119 N. Y. 441, affg. 48 Hun 459 ; and although an appeal is still pending from a denial of probate of the will. Albright v. Albright, 70 Wis. 528. And a fortiori she cannot dissent after the end of the statutory time, where she cannot restore what she has received. Steele v. Steele, 64 Ala. 438.

Widou takes subject to debts. A devise accepted in lieu of dower is subject to its proportion of testator's debts, Bray 0. Neill, 6 C. E. Gr. 343 : Stevenson v. Brown, 3 Gr. Ch. 503 ; Briggs r. Hosford, 22 Pick. 288 : Inge r. Boardman, 2 Ala. 331 ; Steele v. Steele, 64 Ala. 438; Kayser v. Hotopp, 116 Ind. 428 ; Tracy v. Murray, 44 Mich. 109; but only after other specific devises, Hickey v. Hickey, 26 Conn. 261 ; and, generally, after all legacies and devises, Steele v. Steele, ubi supra ;

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Security Co. v. Bryant, 52 Conn. 311 ; Warren . Morris, 4 Del. Ch. 289; Hendrix o. McBeth, 61 Ind. 473 ; Matter of Dolan, 4 Redf. 511; Estate of Kirk, 13 Phila. 276 ; Potter v. Brown, 11 R. I. 232. And this immunity extends to a power of appointment included in the testamentary provision for the widow. Betts v. Betts, 4 Abb. N. C. 317. See also American note, p. *1218, ubi supra. But a provision in lieu of dower abates with the other provi. sions of the will ratably in favor of an after-born child. Warren v. Morris, 4 Del. Ch. 289. In Maryland, a legacy in lieu of “dower and all her rights as widow" constitutes her an equitable creditor of the estate. Addison v. Addison, 44 Md. 182. And by the North Carolina statute her claim to the land devised in lieu of dower is superior to the rights of creditors of the estate, up to the value of her dower. Code, $ 2105; Shackelford v. Miller, 91 N. C. 181. If only her statutory dower is devised to her, she will take under the statute, and not under the will, and be entitled to the statutory privileges (e. g., in Mississippi, exemption from execution for her own debts). Ligon v. Spencer, 58 Miss. 37.

Effect of acceptance. A gift to the widow in satisfaction of all her claims on the testator's estate does not preclude her from claiming her share of the personalty under the statutes of distribution, in the event of the failure of a bequest of that property." 2 Jarm. on Wills 35. This rule holds good whether the bequest of the personal property be originally void, Manice v. Manice, 1 Lans. 348; Lefevre v. Lefevre, 59 N. Y. 434, revg. 2 Thomp. & C. 330 ; or fail by lapse, Hatch v. Bassett, 52 N. Y. 359; Dildine v. Dildine, 5 Stew. (N. J.) 78 ; Canfield v. Crandall, 4 Dem. 111 ; or by lapse of a residuary share, Estate of Read, 82 Pa. St. 428 ;

intestacy, Melizet's Appeal, 17 Pa. St. 449 ; Kempton's Appeal, 23 Pick. 163 ; Nickerson o. Bowly, 8 Met. 424 ; John. son v. Goss, 132 Mass. 274; Handy o. Marcy, 1 Stew.(N.J.) 59 ; Skellenger o. Skellenger, 5 Id. 659 ; Sink o. Sink, 53 How. Pr. 400; Edsall 0. Waterbury, 2 Redf. 48; and formerly, in Wisconsin. Matter of Wilber, 52 Wis. 295 ; but not under the present statute. Hardy e. Scales, 54 Wis. 452. But the rule does not apply where the personalty is disposed of by residuary gift. Perkins 7. Little, 1 Me. 148; Matter of Benson, 96 N. Y. 499. So, she may take as heir of the testator a share of lands as to which he died intestate by reason of a lapsed devise, after deducting the statutory third, which was relinquished by electing to take under the will. Collins v. Collins, 126 Ind. 559.

But where there is no intestacy, her election to take under the will cuts off her claim to any statutory distributive share either of the real property, Ragsdale v. Parrish, 74 Ind. 191; Van Guilder v. Justice, 56 Ia. 669; or of the personal property, Estate of Smith, 60 Mich. 136 ; or to her common-law quarantine in the homestead, Brokaw v. Brokaw, 14 Stew. (N. J.) 304 ; or her dower in lands mortgaged or conveyed in testator's lifetime, Cony 0. Lamb, 45 0. St. 203; or to a statutory widow's allowance. Shipman r. Keys, 127 Ind. 353; Hurley v. McIver, 119 Ind. 53. But, in Ohio (1890 R. S. SS 6040, 5964), quarantine and allowance are expressly saved by the statute. So, an allowance for maintenance, in North Carolina (1883 Code, $ 2116). But the statutory exemption from debt in her favor is not cut off, Hubbard 0. Russell, 73 Ala. 578 ; Sheldon v. Bliss, 8 N. Y. 31; nor, in like case, in the husband's favor. Matter of Harris, 2 Connoly 4. Her statutory exemption cannot be cut off in Pennsylvania. Estate of Peebles,

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The language of the will may, however, indicate a clear intention of the testator either way, e. g., in full settlement of all demands upon my estate” (barring the statutory sbare), Burke v. Colbert, 144 Mass. 160 ; or "in lieu of all interest in my estate which she might have as my widow" (barring her statutory allowance), Langley v. May. hew, 107 Ind. 198; or in lieu of dower " and her rights as widow" (barring her exemption), Young v. Hicks, 92 N. Y. 235 ; or in lieu of “dower, thirds and all other interest in my estate (barring her interest in property not disposed of), Lee v. Tower, 124 Mass. 370; or in lieu of dower “

or any other claim against my estate” (barring a debt to the wife for her moneys taken by him to invest), Rusling v. Rusling, 15 Stew. (N.J.) 594 ; although a similar expression has been held not to bar her claim as mortgagee under a mortgage made before her marriage as part of an ante-nuptial settlement, Russell v. Minton, 15 Stew. (N. J.) 123; or “ in full satisfaction of her dower or thirds, which she may in any wise claim or demand” (barring her share in lapsed legacies), Matter of Hodgman, 140 N. Y. 421, affg. 69 Hun. 484 ; or“ after my wife has taken her portion according as the law provides ” (vot barring such share), Burkhalter v. Burkhalter, 88 Ind. 368 ; or a bequest of “the amount now allowed her by law out of my estate” (not barring her interest as heir in a lapsed residuary share), Johnson v. Johnson, 32 Minn. 613; or “on condition that she renounce all claim against my estate” (not barring her right to com. munity property). Estate of Mumford, Myrick's Prob. 133. But, in Pennsylvania, a devise of one-third of testator's whole estate for life in lieu of dower is a complete disposition of the estate to the widow, and leaves her no interest in the rest of the estate, though not otherwise dis

posed of. Jackson's Appeal, 126 Pa. St. 105.

In some states the acceptance of the testamentary provision also bars the widow's homestead right, Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 ; Brokaw v. McDougall, 20 Id. 212; Hickson v. Bryan, 41 Ga. 620 ; Stunz v. Stunz, 131 III. 210; Meech v. Meech, 37 Vt. 414; especially where it is expressly in lieu of dower “and all other rights, interests, and claims,” Cowdrey v. Hitchcock, 103 III. 262 ; or where the homestead is expressly devised to another. Gorham v. Dodge, 122 III. 528. But, in Missouri, the testator cannot put his widow to election as to her homestead right. Missouri (R. S. $ 2693); Kaes v. Gross, 92 Mo. 647, overruling Davidson v. Davis, 86 Mo. 440.

Effect of dissent. The widow's election not to take under the will supersedes the will as to her. A conversion, therefore, which is to be made by direction of the will does not take effect as to her, Brink v. Layton, 2 Redf. 79; Barnett v. Barnett, 1 Met. (Ky.) 254 ; Hoover v. Landis, 76 Pa. St. 354 ; Armstrong v. Park, 9 Humph. 195; although the power of sale may be exercised and the conversion remain effective as to other parties interested. Sullivan v. Kieffer, 122 Pa. St. 135. So, she cannot take a life interest under the will in the property not taken by her under her adverse claim of dower. Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 121. In like manner a specific appro. priation of funds by the testator for her will not inure to her benefit on her election of a distributive share as in the case of intestacy. Morris v. Garland, 78 Va. 215. She need not, however, relinquish an independent trust for her children vested in her by the will. Rittgers v. Rittgers, 56 Ia. 218.

At common law, and in the absence of further statutory provisions, the widow electing not to take under the will is entitled to her dower only, and not to

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any share in the personal property. tacy, in the personal property up to Matter of Vowers, 45 Hun 418 ; Per- $10,000 absolutely, and above that sum kins v. Litile, 1 Me. 148. By statute, for life, the income of such excess runif she renounces the testamentary pro- ning from testator's death, Pollock o. vision, she takes both dower and her Learned, 102 Mass. 49; but the $10,000 share as in case of intestacy of the per- carrying interest only from the date of sonal property, in Alabama (1886 Code, the order for its payment. Atherton § 1963), Arkansas (1884 Dig. Stats. SS v. Corliss, 101 Mass. 40. This share is 2591, 2595); and her homestead also, in determined not by the law of distribuWisconsin (1889 An. Stats. $ 2172). In tions in force when the act providing Colorado (1891 An. Stats. & 3011), the for election was passed, but by that surviving wife may elect to take one- which was in force at the time of testahalf of the real and personal property, tor's death. Cochran v. Thorndike, 133 after the debts are all paid. Hanna v. Mass. 46. In Michigan (1882 An. Stats. Palmer, 6 Col. 156. In Connecticut SS 5847, 5824), she takes dower, and (1888 G. S. § 623), a wife married since homestead, and her exemption in the 1877 takes one-third of the real and per- personal property, and her intestate sonal property for life. In Illinois (1891 share of the personal property up to R. S. c. 41, SS 10, 12), she takes her dower $5000, and above that one-half of such and one-third of the personal property, share. In New Hampshire (1891 P. S. c. or if there are no children, one-half ; and 195, SS 10, 11), she takes dower, homeif the husband is illegitimate and has stead, and distributive share of the perno legal heirs, the whole estate. Evans sonal property, and may take one-third v. Price, 118 Ili. 593. In Indiana of the real property absolutely, or, with(1888 R. S. SS 2490, 2505), one-third of out dower and homestead, one-half of the the real property absolutely. If there real property. Such share is subject to are no children or parent, she also takes charges existing against the property all the property undisposed of by the in the hands of the testator, Coppo. will, but this will not reach a share of Hersey, 31 N. H. 317; and to his debts, the estate which is bequeathed to others, Hall v. Smith, 59 N. H. 315; but not to if she elects against the will. Morris other provisions of his will. Id. In v. Morris, 119 Ind. 341. In Iowa (1888, North Carolina (1883 Code, $ 2116), she R. C. SS 2440, 2452), she takes one-third takes in addition to her dower her disin value of the entire estate unless she tributive share in the personal property expressly consents to the will. Ward and a year's support for herself and V. Wolf, 56 Ia. 465 ; Baldozier v. children. In Ohio (1890 R. S. § 5964), Haynes, 57 Ia. 683 ; Potter v. Worley, she takes her quarantine and allowance Id. 66. In Maine, since the act of 1835, in any case. In Pennsylvania (1883 the widow takes her share of the per- Purd. Dig. 631, SS 4, 5), she takes, sonal property also as in case of intes- besides her dower, a share of the pertacy, Brown v. Hodgdon, 31 Me. 65. sonal property as in case of intestacy, In Maryland (1888 P. G. L. Art. 93, Anderson's Appeal, 36 Pa. St. 476 ; and $ 291), if she elects against a devise of her right to the property vests at the real property, she takes her dower, and time of election, although she dies beif against a bequest, she takes her dis- fore its amount is ascertained. Greiner's tributive sbare in the personal property. Appeal, 103 Pa. St. 89. In Tennessee In Massachusetts (1882 P. S. c. 127, S 18, (1884 Code, $ 3251), she takes, besides act of 1861), her share in both real and her dower, her share of the personal personal property as in case of intes

property as in case of intestacy (one

third, or a child's share). In Vermont (1880 R. L. § 2108), she takes her exempt property and her distributive share of the personal property as in case of intestacy.

Effect of Dissent on others. The widow's renunciation of the will accelerates a remainder limited after a life estate to her. Brown v. Hunt, 12 Heisk. 404; Wood 0. Wood, 1 Met. (Ky.) 512 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 97 N. Y. 460 ; Sarles v. Sarles, 19 Abb. N. C. 322; Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey 340 ; Fox v. Ferguson, 138 Pa. St. 208; Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S. C. 396. Her right of election does not, however, make the remainder over contingent. Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 III. 144. And her dissent will not accelerate the time for distribution fixed to take place at her death, both the remaindermen having already died. Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 III. 11. If she renounces an annuity charged on land devised to others, it will inure to the benefit of the devisee by discharging the lands, Armstrong v. Park, 9 Humph. 195; and the annuity will not be preserved at his expense to compensate a disappointed residuary legatee. Stewart's Appeal, 110 Pa. St. 410. But where the net income of the estate is devised in equal shares to the widow and three other persons, her share on its renun. ciation by her will not go to her colegatees, Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19. But a devise to the wife and daughter will remain valid as to the daughter. Dean v. Hart, 62 Ala. 308. Other priorities created by the will, e. g., between general and residuary legatees, will be left undisturbed. Estate of Vance, 141 Pa. St. 201 ; Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391.

But if the life estate renounced by her is needed to compensate other devisees for lands taken by her, it will be so applied rather than to the re

mainderman exclusively, Wallace v. Wallace, 15 W. Va. 722 ; Hauk v. McComas, 98 Ind. 460; Jones v. Knappen, 63 Vt. 391 ; the equities between the other devisees being left to be settled on the accounting. Estate of Evans, 150 Pa. St. 212. And a disappointed devisee may have the personal assets marshaled for his relief. Gallagher's Appeal, 87 Pa. St. 200. And where his original interest was a remainder in one-third of the estate after the widow's death, and the other interests in remainder have been released on cash payment, the entire balance of the estate may be paid over to him after deducting the widow's share. Estate of Batione, 136 Pa. St. 307.

Where she is entitled to a distributive share of the personal property, general legacies will abate for it pro rata, Capron v. Capron, 6 Mackey 340 ; and in Colorado, general devises (to anyone “not an heir ') abate with general legacies. Logan v. Logan, 11 Col. 44. Where the widow takes her third of the real estate against the will, it will cause the rents devised to children to abate proportionally. Heineman's Appeal, 92 Pa. St. 95. The property devised to the widow and renounced by her is not the primary fund for compensation, but all must abate ratably. Witherspoon v. Watts, 18 S. C. 396. But it has been held that the share taken by her against the will will be taken out of the half bequeathed to her for life, with remainder to her daughter A., rather than out of the other half bequeathed absolutely to her daughter B. Hoskins v. Hoskins, 43 Ia. 452. And if the homestead is taken by her as part of her dower lands, a third person to whom the homestead was devised will not be compensated out of other assets of the estate. Gainer v. Gates, 73 Ia. 149.

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