XX. insurrec In less than ten days after the occupation of Milan, CHAP. national guards in the Republican interest were organized in the whole of Lombardy; revolutionary 1796. authorities were every where established, and the country rendered subservient to the military power of Alarming France. The garrison of two thousand men, which tion at Beaulieu had left in the citadel of Milan, was closely Pavia, invested, and the headquarters moved to Lodi. But an event here occurred which threatened great danger to the French army, and was only averted by the decision and severity of their chief. Opinions were much divided in Italy, as in all states undergoing the crisis of a revolution, on the changes which were go command of one general. I have hitherto conducted the campaign without consulting any one; the result would have been very different if I had been obliged to reconcile my views with those of another. If you impose upon me vexations of every description; if I must refer all my steps to the commissaries of government; if they are authorized to change my movements, to send away my troops, expect no further success. If you weaken your resources by dividing your forces; if you disturb in Italy the unity of military thought, I say it with grief, you will lose the fairest opportunity that ever occurred of giving laws to that fine peninsula. In the position of the affairs of the Republic, it is indispensable that you possess a general who enjoys your confidence; if I do not do so, I shall not complain, and shall do my utmost to manifest my zeal in the service which you intrust to me. Every one has his own method of carrying on war; Kellerman has more experience, and may do it better than I; but together we would do nothing but mischief. Your reso- 1 Corresp. lution on this matter is of more importance than the fifteen thousand Secrète men whom the Emperor has just sent to Beaulieu." But Napoleon did Nap. i. not intrust this important matter merely to these arguments, strong as 160, 162. they were. Murat, who was still at Paris, received instructions to inform Barras, that a million of francs were deposited at Genoa for his private use; and the influence of Josephine was employed both with him and Carnot to prevent the threatened division, and the result was that it was abandoned. "The Directory," said Carnot, "has maturely considered your arguments; and the confidence which they have in your talents and republican zeal, have decided the matter in your favour. Kellerman will remain at Chamberry, and you may adjourn the expedition to Rome as long as you please."-HARDENBERG, iii. 49, 351. XX. CHAP. ing forward. The lower classes in the towns had been moved by the equality which the French every where 1796. proclaimed; but the peasantry in the country, less liable to the contagion of new principles, and more under the influence of the nobility and priests, were still firmly attached to the ancient régime, with which the Austrian authority was now identified. When men's minds were in this divided state, the prodigious contributions levied upon Milan, and the vast requisitions of provisions and horses which had been made for the use of the army, over the whole country districts, inflamed the rural population to the highest degree. The people of Lombardy did not consider themselves as conquered, nor expect to be treated as such: they had welcomed the French as deliverers, and now they found a severer yoke fastened about their necks than that from which they had just escaped. Roused to indignation by such treatment, a general insurrection was rapidly organized over the whole of that beautiful district. An attack, in concert with a sortie from the garrison of the castle, was made on Milan; and though it failed, the insurgents were more successful 1 Th. viii. at Pavia, where the people rose against the garrison, 272,273. forced it to capitulate, admitted eight thousand armed 191, 195. peasants within their walls, and closed their gates against the French troops. Nap. iii. Jom. viii. 136. sack of that French troops. The danger was imminent; the tocsin sounded in Storm and all the parishes; the least retrograde movement would city by the have augmented the evil, and compelled the retreat of the army, whose advanced posts were already on the Oglio. In these circumstances, prudence prescribed temerity; and Napoleon advanced in person to crush the insurgents. Their vanguard, posted at Brescia, was routed by Lannes; the village burnt, and a hundred of the peasants killed; but this severe XX. iii. 194. 138. Bot. example having failed in producing intimidation, he CHAP. marched himself next day to the walls of Pavia, with six pieces of light artillery. The grenadiers rushed 1796. forward to the gates, which they broke open with hatchets while the artillery cleared the ramparts, the victorious troops broke into the town, which the peasants precipitately abandoned to its fate. Napoleon, wishing to terrify the insurgents, ordered the magistrates and leaders of the revolt to be shot, and the city to be delivered up to plunder; while the unhappy peasants, pursued into the plain by the French dragoons, were cut down in great numbers. The pillage continued the whole day, and that opulent and flourishing town underwent all the horrors of war; but the terrible example crushed the insurrection 1 Th. viii. over the whole of Lombardy, where tranquillity was 275. Nap. speedily re-established, and hostages were taken from Jom. viii. the principal families and dispatched into France.1 i. 390, 394. In this act was displayed another feature of Napoleon's character, who, without being unnecessarily Moral recruel, never hesitated to adopt the most sanguinary tribution measures when requisite for his own purposes. Pil- this system lage and rapine, indeed, invariably follow the capture led. of a town carried by assault, and it is impossible to prevent it but Napoleon in this instance authorized it by a general order, and shot the leading persons of the city in cold blood. It is in vain to appeal to the usages of war for a vindication of such cruelty; the inhabitants of Pavia were not subjects of France who were not entitled to resist its authority; they were Austrian citizens, entitled to defend their country from invasion. Nor can it be said they were not soldiers, and that simple citizens have no title to interfere with the contests of hostile armies; the words of Napoleon himself furnish his own condemnation :-"It is the first to which ultimately CHAP. duty," said the Emperor, in his proclamation to the .XX. peasantry of France, in February 1814, "of every 1796. citizen to take up arms in defence of his country. 1 Procla- Let the peasantry every where organize themselves in bands, with such weapons as they can find; let them fall upon the flanks and rear of the invaders; and let a consuming fire envelope the presumptuous host which has dared to violate the territory of the great nation."1 mation, March 5, 1814. Gold smith's Recueil, vi. 645. Infra, x. 192. enters Bres Venetian Having by this severity stifled the spirit of insur28th May, rection in his rear, Napoleon continued his march, Napoleon and, on the 28th, entered the great city of Brescia, cia and the situated on the neutral territory of Venice. Meanterritory. while, Beaulieu experienced the usual fate of a retiring army, that of being weakened by the garrisons necessary for the fortified places which it leaves uncovered in its retreat. He threw twenty battalions of his best troops into Mantua, and took up a defensive position along the line of the Mincio. There he 29th May. Was assailed on the following day by Napoleon, who, after forcing a bridge in front of his position, attacked his rearguard at Vallegio with all his cavalry, and * Nap. iii. made prisoners, in spite of the bravest efforts of the 202. Jom. Austrian horse, twelve hundred men, and took five 142. pieces of cannon.2 viii. 139, When the French army entered the Venetian terDebates in ritory, and it had become evident that the flames of tian Senate war were approaching its capital, it was warmly disshould be cussed in the Venetian Senate what course the Re on what done. public should pursue in the perilous circumstances that had occurred. Peschiera had been occupied by the Austrians, but, being abandoned by them, was instantly seized by the French, who insisted that, though a Venetian fortress, yet, having been seized by one of the belligerent powers, it had now become CHAP. XX. the fair conquest of the other; and, at the same time, Napoleon threatened the Republic with all the vengeance of France, if the Count de Lille, after- 1796. wards Louis XVIII., who had long resided at Verona, was not immediately compelled to leave their territories. The Republican forces, under Massena, were advancing towards Verona, and it was necessary to take a decided line. On the one hand it was urged, that France had now proclaimed principles subversive of all regular governments, and in an especial manner inimical to the aristocracy of Venice; that certain ruin, either from foreign violence or domestic revolution, was to be expected from their success; that the haughty tone even now assumed by the conqueror, already shewed that he looked upon all the continental possessions of the Republic as his own, and was only waiting for an opportunity to seize them for the French nation; and, therefore, that the sole course left, was to throw themselves into the arms of Austria, the natural ally of all regular governments. On the other, it was contended that they must beware lest they mistook a temporary irruption of the Republicans for a permanent settlement; that Italy had in every age been the tomb of the French armies; that the forces of the present invader, how successful soever they had hitherto been, were unequal to a permanent occupation of the Peninsula, and would in the end yield to the persevering efforts of the Germans; that Austria, therefore, the natural enemy of Venice, and the power which coveted, would, in the end, attempt to seize, its territorial possessions; that their forces were now expelled from Lombardy, and could not resume the offensive for two months, a period which would suffice to the French general to destroy the Republic; that interest, therefore, equally with pru |