CHAP. dence, prescribed that they should attach themselves XX. to the cause of France; obtain thereby a barrier 1796. against the ambition of their powerful neighbour, and

receive in recompense for their services part of the Italian dominions of the Austrian empire. That in so doing, they must, it is true, to a certain degree modify their form of government; but that was no more than the spirit of the age required, and was absolutely indispensable to secure the dominion of their continental possessions. A third party, few in numbers but resolute in purpose, contended, that the only safe course was that of an armed neutrality; that the forces of the Republic should be instantly raised to fifty thousand men, and either of the belligerent 408, 409. powers which should violate their territory, threatened with the whole vengeance of the Republic.'

1 Bot. i. 403, 405,

Th. viii.

276, 279.

They

Had the Venetians possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, they would have adopted the first precate the Course; had they been inspired by the spirit of the hostility of Athenian democracy, they would have followed the

merely de

France.

second; had they been animated by the courage of the Swiss confederacy, they might have taken the third. In either case the Republic would probably have been saved; for it is impossible to consider the long and equal struggle which ensued round Mantua, between France and Austria, without being convinced that a considerable body, even of Italian troops, might have then cast the balance. The Venetian Government possessed a country inhabited by three millions of souls; the capital was beyond the reach of attack; their army could easily be raised to fifty thousand men; thirteen regiments of Sclavonians in their service were good troops; their fleet ruled the Adriatic. But Venice was worn out and corrupted; its nobles, drowned in pleasure, were destitute of energy;

XX.

its peasantry, inured to peace, were unequal to war; CHAP. its defence, trusted merely to mercenary troops, rested on a tottering foundation. They adopted in conse- 1796. quence the most timid course, which, in presence of danger, is generally the most perilous: they made no warlike preparations; but merely sent commissioners to the French general to deprecate his hostility, and endeavour to secure his good-will. The consequence Bot. i. was, what might have been anticipated from conduct Nap. iii. so unworthy of the ancient fame of Venice: the com- Th. viii. missioners were disregarded; the war was carried 278, 280. on in the Venetian territories, and at its close the 357. Republic was swept from the book of nations.1*

Massena entered the magnificent city of Verona,

1

408, 413.

204, 205.

Hard. iii.

2

Corresp. Secrète.

7th May

• In adopting this course, Napoleon exceeded the instructions of his government; and, indeed, on him alone appears to rest the atrocious perfidy and dissimulation exercised in the sequel towards that Republic. The directions of the Directory were as follows:-" Venice should be treated as a neutral, but not a friendly power; it has done nothing to merit the latter character. But to the Venetian commissioners, Napo- 1796. leon from the first used the most insulting and rigorous language. "Venice," said he, "by daring to give an asylum to the Count de Lille, a pretender to the throne of France, has declared war against the Republic. I know not why I should not reduce Verona to ashes—a town 3 Hard. iii. which had the presumption to esteem itself the capital of France."3 361. He declared to them that he would carry that threat into execution that very night, if an immediate surrender did not take place. The perfidy of his views against Venice, even at this early period, was fully evinced in his Secret Despatch to the Directory on 7th June. "If your object," said he, "is to extract five or six millions out of Venice, I have secured for you a pretence for a rupture. You may demand it as an indemnity for the combat of Borghetto, which I was obliged to sustain to take Peschiera. If you have more decided views we must take care not to let that subject of discord drop; tell me what you wish, and be assured I will seize the most fitting opportunity of carrying it into execution, according to circumstances, for we must take care not to 4 Corresp. have all the world on our hands at once.' ""4 The truth of the affair of Secrète de Peschiera is, that the Venetians were cruelly deceived by the Austrians, Nap. i. 232. who demanded a passage for fifty men, and then seized the town.

enters Ve

rona, and

is establish

ed on the

Adige.

CHAP. the frontier city of the Venetian dominions, situated XX. on the Adige, and a military position of the highest 1796. importance for future operations, in the beginning of Massena June. Its position at the entrance' of the great valley of the Adige, and on the high road from the Tyrol Napoleon into Lombardy, rendered it the advanced post of the French army, in covering the siege of Mantua. He occupied, at the same time, Porto Legnago, a fortified town on the Adige, and which, along with Verona, strengthened that stream, whose short and rapid course from the Alps to the Po formed the best military frontier of Italy. There Napoleon received the commissioners of Venice, who vainly came to deprecate the victor's wrath, and induce him to retire from the territories of the Republic. With such terror did his menaces inspire them, that the Venetian government concluded a treaty, by which they agreed to furnish supplies of every sort for the army, and secretly pay for 1 Th. viii. them; and the commissioners, overawed, by the comHard. iii. manding air and stern menaces of Napoleon, wrote to 364. Nap. the Senate-" This young man will one day have an important influence on the destinies of his country.1

June 3, 1796.

June 4,

1796.

288, 289.

iii. 205.

Description and blockade of

Mantua.

Napoleon was now firmly established on the line of the Adige, the possession of which he always deemed of so much importance, and to the neglect of which he ascribed all the disasters of the succeeding campaigns of the French in Italy. Nothing remained but to make himself master of Mantua; and the immense efforts made by both parties for that place, prove the vast importance of fortresses in modern war. Placed in the middle of unhealthy marshes, which are traversed only by five chaussées, strong in its situation, as well as the fortifications which surround it, this town is truly the bulwark of Austria

XX.

and Italy, without the possession of which the con- CHAP. quest of Lombardy must be deemed insecure, and that of the Hereditary States cannot be attempted. 1796. The entrance of two only of the chaussées, which approached it, were defended by fortifications at that time; so that by placing troops at these points, and drawing a cordon round the others, it was an easy matter to blockade the place, even with an inferior force. Serrurier sat down before this fortress, in the middle of June, with ten thousand men ; and with this 14th June. inconsiderable force, skilfully disposed at the entrance of the highways which crossed the lake, and round its shores, he contrived to keep in check a garrison of fourteen thousand soldiers, of whom, it is true, more than a third encumbered the hospitals of the place. As the siege of this important fortress required a considerable time, Napoleon had leisure to deliberate concerning the ulterior measures which he should pur

sue.

An army of forty-five thousand men, which had so rapidly overrun the north of Italy, could not venture to penetrate into the Tyrol and Germany, the mountains of which were occupied by Beaulieu's forces, aided by a warlike peasantry, and at the same time carry on the blockade of Mantua, for which at least fifteen thousand men would be required. Moreover, the southern powers of Italy were not yet subdued; and, though little formidable in a military point of view, they might prove highly dangerous to the blockading force, if the bulk of the Republican troops were engaged in the defiles of the Tyrol, while the French 1 Nap. iii. armies on the Rhine were not yet in a condition to 158, 209. give them any assistance. Influenced by these con-146. Th. siderations, Napoleon resolved to take advantage of Personal the pause in military operations,' which the blockade

Jom. viii.

viii. 290:

observa

tion.

XX.

CHAP. of Mantua and retreat of Beaulieu afforded, to clear the enemies in his rear, and establish the French in1796. fluence to the south of the Apennines.

Napoleon

proceed

against Florence

Austrian

succours arrive.

The King of Naples, alarmed at the retreat of the German troops, and fearful of having the whole forces resolves to of the Republic upon his own hands, upon the first appearance of their advance to the south, solicited and Rome an armistice, which the French commander readily before the granted, and which was followed by the secession of the Neapolitan cavalry, two thousand four hundred strong, from the Imperial army. Encouraged by 5th June. this defection, Napoleon resolved instantly to proceed against the ecclesiastical and Tuscan states, in order to extinguish the hostility, which was daily becoming more inveterate, to the south of the Apennines. In. truth, the ferment was extreme in all the cities of Lombardy; and every hour rendered more marked the separation between the aristocratical and democratical parties. The ardent spirits in Milan, Bologna, Brescia, Parma, and all the great towns of that fertile district, were in full revolutionary action, and a large proportion of their citizens seemed resolved to throw off the patrician influence under which they had so long existed, and establish republics on the model of the great Transalpine democracy. Wakened by these appearances to a sense of the danger which threatened them, the aristocratic party were every where strengthening themselves: the nobles in the Genoese fiefs were collecting forces; the English had made themselves masters of Leghorn; and the Roman pontiff was threatening to exert his feeble strength. 1 Nap. iii. Napoleon knew that Wurmser, who had been detached 414, 420. from the army of the Upper Rhine with thirty thou293, 294. sand men, to restore affairs in Italy,' could not be at

213. Bot.i.

Th. viii.