THE contest, which had for so many years raged in South America, was, during the year 1817, carried on with unintermitting fury, and with various success. At the same time, the accounts which we have received of those events, are so confused and contradictory, that they scarcely afford materials for a detailed or connected narrative. It was in the end of December 1816, that Bolivar, after being obliged to quit the Caraccas, again landed for the purpose of making a new effort for the emancipation of the country. He joined M'Gregor at Barcelona; and in the course of December and February following, several sanguinary battles appear to have taken place. The result was, as usual, variously represented. The action in December was said to be unfavourable to the patriots, who were in consequence pursued to Barcelona, where they were blockaded by the royal troops. In February, Bolivar was repulsed in an attack on the posts of the enemy at Cumana, and was forced to retreat to Barcelona, which was entered on the 10th by the royalists. They were here

attacked by Bolivar's army, and defeated, according to the accounts received, with the loss of 1000 men. This attack was renewed next day with equal success. In April we find an action took place between the republicans under General Piar, and the royalists, on the banks of one of the tributary streams of the Orinoco, which terminated in the defeat of the latter, with a considerable loss both of men and warlike stores. In the course of the summer, various actions were fought between the independent generals and Morillo, all of which are variously represented. From their consequences, however, we may judge that they were favourable to the patriot cause. Morillo, who retained possession of the towns on the coast, being informed that the army of General Paez approached Calabozo, ordered out a force consisting of 1500 men to oppose his progress. This detachment being overthrown, he collected all the troops which were stationed in the towns of La Guira, Caraccas, and Porto Cabello, and advanced for the purpose of attacking the independent

troops under General Paez. A battle took place, in which Morillo was said to have been routed with the loss of 600 men, and to have returned in great disorder to Valencia with the remainder of his army; while, according to Morillo's own account, he defeated the enemy, and took 500 prisoners. It is certain, however, that the events of the campaign turned out, in the course of the summer, decidedly in favour of the patriotic armies. The victory gained in April by General Piar on the Orinoco, was attended with important consequences. Having destroyed the royalist forces opposed to him, he was enabled to blockade the fortresses of Angostura and Guyana, which surrendered in the course of July and August. The capture of these important posts gave the independent troops the command of the course of the Orinoco, and of the whole interior country, and enabled them to communicate freely both with New Granada on the west, where the adherents of the cause of independence, though depressed by the successes of the royalists, were still ready to join in any new efforts for the emancipation of the country; and also with the troops under Paez in the province of Varinas, and on the Lower Apure, where the fortress of San Fernando had lately surrendered to their victorious arms. The royalist troops, after these successes of the patriots, were confined to the two towns of Barce. lona and Caraccas, and to the country to the northward of the plains along the sea coast, the cavalry attached to the independent army scouring the open country, and straitening the enemy's quarters on the coast. In the course of this year, the independent government had succeeded in establishing a naval force under the command of Admiral Brion, which was of the most essential service in assisting their military operations against

the fortresses on the Orinoco, and also in obstructing, in the same degree, the operations of the enemy. The royalist forces, after being defeated in April by General Piar in attempting to escape by the Orinoco, were intercepted by Brion's fleet, who captured fourteen of their largest vessels, containing both troops and treasure, and a large quantity of warlike stores.

Morillo, who retreated to Valencia after his action with Gen. Paez in the vicinity of Calabozo, was there strengthened by considerable accessions to his force from the mother country; and it is stated that he received orders to attempt, without loss of time the reduction of the island of Margaritta. Thither he accordingly proceeded; and, having landing his troops, he commenced his operations for the reduction of the island. appears, however, to have encountered a resistance from its brave inhabitants for which he was not prepared. Several bloody actions were fought, in which the inhabitants were decidedly victorious, and the Spanish general, finding all his efforts to reduce them ineffectual, was at length obliged to re-embark his troops, and he set sail on the 17th August for Cumana.

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To this measure of abandoning his hopeless attempt on the island of Mar. garitta, Morillo was determined by the operations which were carrying on in the main land. Merino, one of the independent generals in Venezuela, hearing that the inhabitants of Margaritta were hard pressed by Morillo, determined to make a diversion in their favour. With this view, having collected a body of troops from different points, he resolved to make an attack on Cariaco. On the 30th August he entered the town, and found the enemy's force, to the amount of only 80 soldiers, barricadoed in a church. The same night, at about eight o'clock, he

was attacked by the royalist troops. A desperate action took place, which was finally determined by the bayonet in favour of the patriotic troops. The successful general now laid close siege to the church, which was at length carried by storm, the besieged being mostly put to the sword. Another action with the advanced guard of Morillo's second in command took place on the 3d December, in which the royalists were routed, and having taken refuge in some houses, which they prepared to defend to the last extremity, they were attacked by Merino's band with determined intrepidity. In the course of these desperate encounters, however, Merino was wounded; this circumstance, joined to the want of ammunition, which now began to fail, terminated the battle. Merino employed himself in collecting his wounded, and, being in want of warlike stores, he was finally obliged, though victorious, to retreat to his former position at Cumanacoa. The royalist force en gaged in these actions consisted of 900 men, of which 400 were said to be left on the field of battle. That of the patriots was estimated to 600, of which 150 were slain.

No serious result followed from this action, and this colonial war, indeed, from its commencement, appears to have been marked by one uniform character. It presents a variety of successes and reverses, bloody, yet indecisive; wasting the strength, but continuing to feed the expectations of both parties. In the course of December, General Zaraza, who was marching to join Bolivar, was attacked by a superior force near Calaboso, 120 miles south of the city of Caraccas, and defeated. The independent troops fought with great valour, and as Bolivar was ready to take the field with his army, numerous, it is said, and well equipped, this disaster does not seem to have produced any lasting consequence. The

patriotic troops, at the end of the year 1817, maintained the ground they had gained during the war, occupying all the interior, and the open countries, while the royalists were confined to the coast towns. These advantages, however, they do not appear to hold by a very secure tenure, so long as the royalists, retaining possesion of the sea-ports, continue to receive, through this channel, supplies of troops from the mother country, which enable them to protract the war, and to defy all the efforts of the independent generals to reduce them.

While the country of the Caraccas was in this manner agitated by this protracted and indecisive war, the same contest was carried on with various fortune throughout the other provinces of the Spanish empire. No where had the royal cause been more decidedly triumphant than in Mexico, all open resistance in the field having been put down, and the patriot force reduced to guerilla parties, which still continued to resist and to hold out a rallying point to the adherents of the independent cause. To encourage this patriotic spirit, General Mina, well known for his gallantry as a general and guerilla leader in the late contest of the mother country with France, landed on the 15th May, 1816, at Soto La Marina, a small point of Mexico, in the province of Cohahuila. His force, which he had collected chiefly in the United States, amounted to about 400 men. As soon as the Spanish authorities had certain information of his landing, General Arredondo, with 2000 troops and 17 pieces of artillery, was sent against him. Mina, threatened in this manner by an overwhelming force, threw up entrenchments at the town of Soto La Marina, and leaving about 100 troops, with orders to defend themselves to the last extremity, he resolved, by a secret and rapid march, to deceive General Arredondo, and to pe

netrate into the interior, where he might be joined by such of the inhabitants as continued well affected to the independent cause. He commenced his march on the 24th May, and after suffering great hardships, he arrived at the town of El Valle de Maiz, about 100 miles south of Soto La Marina, after defeating a body of 400 cavalry, by which his advance was opposed. On the 19th he learnt that he was pursued by a battalion of European infantry, under the command of the royalist officer Arminan, and as his great object was to effect a junction with the patriotic troops in the interior, he resolved to decline a battle. With this view his troops were on their march by day-break. Being hotly pursued by the enemy, they were at length forced to a battle at the Hacienda de Peotillos, where, after an obstinate contest, the enemy was totally defeated, though superior in number in the proportion of four to one. Mina's little band, amounting to 172, had 56 killed and wounded in the action. On the 17th they arrived at the town of Pinas, which was fortified and defended by 300 troops. This important post was gallantly carried in a night-attack. On the 228, Mina still advancing, effected a junction with some of the wandering guerilla parties of the patriots which were scouring the country, and on the 24th he entered the fort of Sombrero, in the intendancy of Guanaxuato, and about eighteen leagues northwest of the city of that name, of which the patriots, notwithstanding all their reverses, still retained possession. In the course of thirty days, he had thus marched about 220 leagues, harassed by the enemy, and frequently in want of provisions.

In the year 1816, and the beginning of 1817, when Mina landed in Mexico, it was calculated that the different revolutionary chiefs had under their command about 8000 troops, some of them

well equipped, and the cavalry the finest in the kingdom. If they had wisely concentrated this force, they might have made a formidable resistance to the royal authorities, and, with the assistance of the inhabitants, who were generally well affected to their cause, might, in the end, have succeeded in establishing the independence of the country. But their councils were distracted by jealousies and discord—there was no unity of action among them— and though partial successes were gained, they were attended with no general and permanent benefit to their cause. After taking possession of the fort of Sombrero, Mina received information of a movement in the direction of the fort by a body of 700 of the enemy under Castanon, a royalist general, who was a distinguished and cruel enemy of the independent cause. On the evening of the 28th, Mina's patriot band, amounting to about 300, marched out to meet their enemies, and next morning a decisive action took place at about nine leagues from the town of San Felippe, in which Castanon's force was utterly routed and put to flight at the point of the bayonet, leaving 339 dead on the field, and 150 prisoners, besides 2 pieces of artillery and 500 muskets, and all the ammunition and baggage. This signal success spread far and wide the reputation of Mina's troops, and the fruit of the victory was the capture of the castle of the Marquis of Jaral, containing 140,000 dollars, which were put into the military chest, besides various other necessaries and comforts for the soldiers. After these advantages, Mina had an interview with the republican chiefs at Sombrero, when they appeared highly satisfied with his success, and assured him of their support. the meantime intelligence was received of the fall of Soto La Marina, the fortress at which Mina had first landed, and where he had left a body of troops. It was besieged by the royalists, and

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its defenders, being reduced to the last extremity, were forced to surrender on terms. These terms were, however, shamefully violated, and the unhappy prisoners were treated with every degree of cruelty and indignity by the perfidious royalists.

The successes of Mina gave great alarm to the viceroy of Mexico, and, as a last effort, he mustered a force of between 3000 and 4000 men, which he sent to oppose the enemy under Don Pasqual Linan, a Spanish marshal. Mina, in the meantime, being misinformed as to the strength of the garrison of Leon, made an attack on that important place, in which he failed, with the loss of 100 killed and wounded, some of the latter Americans, who were immediately put to death. On the 30th July information was received that Linan's troops, amounting to 3541, with 10 pieces of artillery and 2 howitzers, were in the plain before the fort of Sombrero, which they prepared to besiege. The place, though not calculated either to sustain a formal siege or a vigorous as sault, made a desperate resistance; in every attempt to storm, the enemy being repulsed with great loss. The besieged were reduced to the most dreadful extremities by the want of water and of provisions; to procure a supply of which, from Padre Jones, one of the patriotic guerilla leaders, Mina contrived privately to escape from the fort, leaving it under the command of Colonel Young, an American, whose daring intrepidity pointed him out for that perilous station. In all his attempts to relieve the garrison, Mina was unsuccessful; and though they still gallantly repulsed the enemy from the walls of the fortress, they were so reduced by famine and privations of every sort, that they prepared to abandon the fort, leaving the wounded behind them, and forcing their way through the enemy's lines. They executed this bold attempt during the night; but having

along with them the women and children, these soon took fright, and gi ving the alarm by their cries, the enemy opposed their progress, and at length the whole garrison dispersed, each making his escape as he best could, and many of them that were sick and helpless being massacred by the enemy's cavalry, even when begging for mercy on their knees. Next morning the enemy entered the deserted fort, and they celebrated their victory by the inhuman massacre of all the wounded and prisoners.

The capture of Fort Sombrero was a great blow to the patriot cause. Finding all his efforts vain to arrest this fatal catastrophe, Mina proceeded with an escort of 100 cavalry, to the foot of Los Remedios, which was strongly fortified both by nature and art. He found the commander, Padre Torres, engaged in adding, by every expedient, to the strength of the fort. It was agreed between these two commanders, that Torres should take the command of this stronghold of the independents, which was abundantly supplied with water, and every necessary, and that Mina, with a body of irregular cavalry, should scour the country, and interrupt as much as possible the communications of the besiegers. Mina found that the cavalry, which he received under his command, though extremely brave in a sudden and desultory attack, were totally deficient in steadiness or discipline.

The siege of Los Remedios commenced on the 31st of August, and the Spanish commander, notwithstanding the unusual difficulties of the ground, contrived, with extraordinary skill and trouble, to complete a line of attack, which straitened the garrison, and menaced their works on every side. No great progress, however, was made in the reduction of the fortress: the besiegers were repelled in all their attacks; and a sortie was undertaken by