ensue when the alienation is only partial. Fratíni v. Caslani, 66 Vt. 273. No pecuniary loss need be shown. Adams v. Main, supra; Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich. 371. If the conduct was unjustifiable, and caused the injury, the jury may infer malice from such conduct. Westlake v. Westlake, 34 Ohio St. 621. The conduct of the plaintiff toward, and lack of affection for, the consort may be shown in mitigation of damages. Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439; Rudd v. Rounds, 64 Vt. 452; Fratini v. Caslani, 66 Vt. 273. But the rank and condition of the defendant cannot be considered in assessing the damages. Bailey v. Bailey (Iowa, May, 1895), 63 N. W. Rep. 341. When two parties act together in producing such alienation, they are jointly liable therefor. Price v. Price, 91 Iowa, 693. Even a stranger is justified in giving shelter to a wife who has left her husband. Pollock v. Pollock, 29 N. Y. Sup. 37; Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439. Since it is but natural that a child should apply to a parent for advice in times of distress, and that the parent should advise such child for its best interests, a parent cannot be held responsible therefor, though it may conduce to conjugal alienation, if such advice was given in good faith according to the information received, though such information subsequently proved to be unfounded. Bennett v. Smith, supra. In such matters, the law presumes that the parent acts for the best interests of the child, and no cause of action in such cases is stated against a parent, unless it is alleged that his action was malicious. Reed v. Reed, 6 Ind. App. 317; Pollock v. Pollock, 29 N. Y. Sup. 37; Bennett v. Smith, supra. Where a young couple had been living with the husband's parents, and the latter ordered the wife to leave, such conduct was not considered to sustain an action for alienating the husband's affections, since they were not bound to support the wife. Young v. Young, 8 Wash. 81.

Impeaching a Witness.-There is a large difference of opinion among the courts as to the latitude which should be allowed in attacking the character of a witness in the effort to impeach his testimony. On the one hand it is claimed that the jury should be fully informed as to his character in order to determine what weight should be given to his testimony. On the other hand it is said, that such testimony will introduce other issues, when in turn such character is defended, that parties will be deferred from testifying, and that a bad moral character may exist with scrupulous veracity, which is all that is asked for from a witness. A compilation of the rulings may be found in 30 Cent. L. J. 241. Many courts confine the examination to the character of the witness for truth and veracity. In such courts, evidence, that the witness is a thief or a confidence man, or a prostitute is excluded. Conway v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 327; Stayton v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 33. Other courts allow evidence to be introduced of the bad general moral character of the witness. Rhea v. State, 100 Ala. 119; Ward v. State, 28 Ala. 53; Holland v. Barnes, 53 Ala. 83; People v. Harrison, 93 Mich. 594. Here specific acts of immorality cannot be proved (State v. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160; Holland v. Barnes, 33 Ala. 83; Blough v. Parry [Ind. March, 1895], 40 N. E. Rep. 70); nor is it competent to restrict the inquiry to the reputation of the witness for honesty (Davenport v. State, 85 Ala. 336); nor can a special vice, as a want of chastity, be singled out and made a special ground of impeachment. Spicer v. State, 105 Ala. 123; Rhea v. State, 100 Ala. 119; People v. Mills, 94 Mich. 630. Where an examination as to the bad general character of the witness is allowed, it is not deemed necessary to show that his character for truth and veracity

is bad. Yarbrough v. State, 105 Ala. 43; Mitchell v. State, 94 Ala. 68; State v. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160. Other courts have allowed the examination to be extended to particular matters, as sobriety and chastity (State v. Shroyer, 104 Mo. 441); but an inquiry as to the general character of the witness as a law-abiding orderly man was not allowed. State v. Ragsdale, 59 Mo. App. 590. The Supreme Court of Missouri at first thought, that only the evidence of females should be impeachable for lack of chastity, then they extended it to males, and have now returned to the earlier ruling. State v. Sibley (Dec., 1895), 33 S. W. Rep. 167. Of course these rulings are based upon the individual ideas of the judges regarding human nature. An old doctor once told the writer, that a woman could not be guilty of a breach of chastity without a great shock to her moral nature, but that with man it was different. Such a belief may account for the distinction these judges have made in this matter. S. S. MERRILL.

JETSAM AND FLOTSAM.

ACCESSION.

It is held in Powers v. Tilley, 87 Maine, 34, 47 Am. St. Rep. 304, that the owner of trees cut from his land by a willful trespasser, and by him manufactured into railroad ties, and sold to an innocent purchaser, may recover from the latter their value as ties, without any allowance for the increased value put upon the timber by the trespasser. This is the precise doctrine of Strubbee v. Trustees Cincinnati Railway, 78 Ky. 481, 39 Am. Rep. 251; Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 236; Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N. C. 85, 44 Am. St. Rep. 439; Franklin Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549, 33 Am. Rep. 280. But in Omaha, etc. Co. v. Tabor, 13 Colo. 41, 5 L. R. A. 236, it was held that in trover for such conversion of ore, sold to a third person, the measure of damages is the value when first severed, less cost of raising and hauling to defendant.

It has sometimes been held that where the trespass was involuntary and under mistake, the owner should recover only his actual loss, and not the increased value bestowed by the trespassers, except that in coal cases sometimes the cost of digging is allowed to defendant. Beede v. Lamprey, 64 N. H. 510, 10 Am. St. Rep. 426. "The weight of authority, it must be conceded, sustains the rule that where the action is brought for damages for logs cut and removed in the honest belief on the part of the purchaser that he had title to them, the measure of damages is the value in the woods from which they were taken, with the amount of injury incident to removal, not at the mill where they were carried to be sawed. Tilden v. Johnson, 52 Vt. 628, 36 Am. Rep. 769, and note, 770; Herdic v. Young, 55 Pa. St. 176, 93 Am. Dec. 739; Hill v. Canfield, 56 Pa. St. 454; Moody v. Whitney, 38 Me. 174, 61 Am. Dec. 139; Cushing v. Longfellow, 26 Me. 306; Goller v. Fett, 30 Cal. 482; Foot v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490, 20 Am. Rep. 151; Railway Co. v. Hutchins, 32 Ohio St. 571, 30 Am. Rep. 629;" Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N. C. 85, 44 Am. St. Rep. 439, and notes, p. 444, 25 L. R. A. 813. To same effect: Ross v. Scott, 15 Lea. 479; Forsyth v. Wells, 41 Pa. St. 291, 80 Am. Dec. 617; Coal Creek M. Co. v. Moses, 15 Lea, 300, 54 Am. Rep. 415; Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 525; Blaen Avon C. Co. v. McCulloh, 59 Md. 403, 43 Am. Rep. 560; Franklin Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md. 549, 33 Am. Rep. 280; Waters v. Stevenson, 13 Nev. 157, 29 Am. Rep. 293; Austin v. Huntsville Coal & M

Co., 72 Mo. 535, 37 Am. Rep. 446. But this has been denied. Isle Royal Mining Co. v. Hertin, 37 Mich. 332, 26 Am. Rep. 520; Hazelton v. Week, 49 Wis. 661, 36 Am. Rep. 796. And in Gaskins v. Davis, supra, it was held that the increased value added by the draw. ing of logs to mill belongs to the owner. In Woodenware Co. v. United States, 106 U. S. 432, the rule is stated to be that if the trespass was willful the trespasser is liable for the value at time of demand or suit, but if not willful, the trespasser or an innocent purchaser from him is entitled to a deduction for the increased value which either has bestowed upon the property; if the defendant is an innocent purchaser from a willful trespasser he is not entitled to any deduction therefor.-The Green Bag.

ever," and the further expression, "said land is not to be sold or incumbered during the minority of said grandchildren," shows very clearly that the testator intended to vest the fee simple title to the land in said grandchildren, and it thus appearing from the face of the will that such was the intention of the devisor, that intention controls the case, and a fee vests. See Korf v. Gericks, 44 N. E. Rep. 24, Indiana Supreme Court. Without citing authorities, it may be safely stated that in the absence of anything in a will contravening the general rule, an estate vests in devisees immediately upon the death of the testator, and the right to the rents from that time would seem to follow. Lawrenceburgh, Ind. W. H. B.

CORRESPONDENCE.

ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY FROM A FORMER TRIAL.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal:

The article written by Mr. George Kroncke, in the issue of the 17th inst., on "The Admission of Testimony From a Former Trial When the Witness is Absent," does not cite Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, decided February 4th, 1895. In that case it was held by a divided court that when a person, accused of the crime of murder, is tried in a district court of the United States, and so convicted, and the conviction is set aside by the supreme court and a new trial ordered, a properly verified copy of the reporter's stenographic notes of the testimony of a witness for the government at the former trial, who was then fully examined and cross-examined, and who died after the first trial and before the second, may be admitted in evidence against the accused on the second trial. The opposing opinions of Mr. Justice Browne and Mr. Justice Shiras show that there is much to be said on each side of the question, and that it may still be considered an unsettled one. Very truly yours, Washington, D. C. L. T. M.

RIGHTS OF INFANTS IN INDIANA.

To the Editor of the Central Law Journal: In 1864 A died, leaving widow and one child. Soon thereafter his real estate was disposed of, in the conveyance of which, by warranty deed,' his widow joined. Subsequently the property has passed through different hands, during all of which time the infant child has never been mentioned. The property is pretty much in the same condition now as when A died, excepting some improvements. The child (heiress) married when 19 years of age, and she is now 82 years of age. Now, is she a tenant in common with the present owners of the property? And if so, when will she be barred by statutes of limitation from instituting partition proceedings? Can adverse possession be asserted against an infant, even though the infant had a guardian? Will you please give reference to Indiana decisions on these points, for which I

HUMORS OF THE LAW.

Judge-Have you anything to say before sentence is pronounced against you?

Convicted Burglar-The only thing I'm grumblin' about is bein' identified by a man as kept 'is 'ead under the bedclothes the whole time. That's wrong.

"Why do you wish to be excused?" asked the judge of the unwilling juror. "I'm deaf, your honor; so deaf I really don't believe I could possibly hear more than one side of the case."-Harper's Bazaar.

Getting Justice-"All I demand for my client," shouted the attorney, in the voice of a man who paid for it, "is justice!"

"I am very sorry I can't accommodate you," replied the judge, "but the law won't allow me to give him more than fourteen years."-Cincinnati Enquirer.

viving husband, wife, children and parents of deceased, and the sum recovered will not be liable for deceased's debts; that it may be brought by all of the parties entitled, or by any one or more of them for the benefit of all; that, in case suit has been brought, and defendant dies while it is pending, it may be revived and prosecuted to judgment against his executor or administrator; and that, if the sole plaintiff die pending the suit, and he is the only party entitled to the money recovered, the suit shall abate: Held, that a cause of action for death by wrongful act does not survive the death of the wrongdoer, where suit is not brought before his death, there being no statute expressly providing therefor.-JOHNSON V. FARMER, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1062.

2. ALTERATION OF NOTE-Materiality.-When a note is given by a corporation, payable to the manager's wife, for money due him for salary, and for expenditures made in behalf of the company out of funds rep. resented by him to have belonged in part to his wife, an alteration of the note so as to make it payable to the manager himself is a material one.-SNEED V. SABINAL MINING & MILLING CO., U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 925.

3. APPEAL-Final Judgment.-A judgment which recites that a defendant was cited, and made default, but makes no disposition of a cause of action alleged against him in the petition, is not a final judgment in the action, and an appeal therefrom will not lie.-STATE NAT. BANK OF VERNON V. WAXAHACHIE NAT. BANK, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1083.

4. ARBITRATION-Powers.-Arbitrators, on disagreement, have no implied powers to appoint an umpire to make the decision, and therefore an award by an umpire so appointed is void.-ALLEN-BRADLEY CO. v. ANDERSON & NELSON DISTILLERIES Co., Ky., 35 S. W. Rep. 1123.

5. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.-An assignment for the benefit of two creditors of all of the assets of an insolvent partnership, amounting to more than double such creditors' claims, will be treated as an assignment for the benefit of all the creditors, the preferences being void.-Fox v. CURTIS, Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 952.

6. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.-A mortgage given by a merchant of his entire stock in trade to secure a pre-existing debt. may be enforced by a creditor of the insolvent as a general assignment for benefit of creditors.-FAIRFIELD PACKING CO. V. KENTUCKY JEANS Clothing Co., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 63.

7. ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-Estoppel. -Where appellee submits his case on the facts contained in appellant's abstract, the court will not consider any matter in the record not contained in the abstract. One who, with knowledge of the facts, accepted a pro rata share under a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, cannot thereafter attack the assignment for fraud.-ADLER V. BELL, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 83.

8. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Attachment.-Defendants contracted to pay plaintiffs for their services as attorneys in an action brought by the defendants against a street railway company 40 per cent. of the amount recovered. Defendants afterwards settled with the street railway company, and refused to pay plaintiffs the percentage agreed upon: Held, that plaintiffs' claim for services became due absolutely upon the settlement, and an attachment would lie to enforce it.BOGERT V. ADAMS, Colo., 45 Pac. Rep. 235.

9. BANKS AND BANKING-Collections.-Plaintiff delivered to a bank for collection a draft received by him from a lottery company, in payment of prizes drawn by tickets owned jointly by him, M and five other persons. The agreement between plaintiff and the bank was that it should pay to plaintiff, when the draft was collected, three-sevenths of the proceeds, which included M's share of one-seventh. Plaintiff did not agree to accept such share for M, or recognize M's

right to any part of the fund; and he told M he would have to get his share by law, if at all: Held, that the bank was under no obligation to pay M any part of the money collected on the draft.-ROSELLE v. MCAULIFFE, Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 1135.

10. BENEVOLENT SOCIETY-Beneficiaries.-Where, by fraud, one procures his substitution as beneficiary in a benefit certificate, an action for the fraud will not lie against him by the original beneficiary.-HOEFT V. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF HONOR, Cal., 45 Pac. Rep. 185.

11. CARRIERS-Passenger-Contributory Negligence. -A person riding on the bumper on the rear of a street car, without the knowledge of the conductor, is, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence, so as to prevent a recovery for injuries occasioned by the car upon which he was riding being struck from the rear by another car.-BARD V. PENNSYLVANIA TRACTION Co., Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 953.

12. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Contract of Carriage. Defendant railroad, a Pennsylvania corporation, issued and delivered to plaintiff, in the State of New Jersey, a pass from Philadelphia to Elmira, N. Y., which provided that plaintiff assumed all risks of accident. Plaintiff was injured, within the State of Pennsylvania, by the admitted negligence of defendant's employees: Held, that the contract of carriage, since it was to be performed in Pennsylvania, was governed by the laws of that State, and not by the laws of the place where it was made.-BURNETT V. PENNSYLVANIA R. Co., Penn., 34 Atl. Rep. 972.

13. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS-Loss of Baggage.When a person takes passage upon a railroad, pur. chases his ticket and checks his baggage to the place of his destination, and such baggage arrives at its des tination, and is not, from any cause, delivered to such passenger, it is the duty of the company to deposit the baggage in its baggage room, in which event its responsibility becomes that of warehouseman, and it must respond in damages for any neglect in that capac ity.-KANSAS CITY, FT. S. & M. R. Co. v. PATTEN, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 108.

14. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Title of Act.-Laws 1895, ch. 64, authorizing the several courts of the State "to hear, try and determine prosecutions upon information, for crimes, misdemeanors and offenses" thereto. fore triable on indictment only, embraces but a single subject, and is not in violation of Const. art. 3, § 21, which provides that "no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in the title."STATE V. AYERS, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 611.

15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Obligation of ContractsCorporate Franchises.-An accepted act of incorpora. tion of a private corporation is a contract between the State and the corporation, and any law of a State which destroys or impairs any valuable franchise granted by such an act violates § 10, art. 1, of the constitution of the United States, which provides that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, and is ineffective, unless the right so to de stroy or impair the franchise is reserved by the State before or at the time the charter is granted. -PEARSALL V. GREAT NORTHERN RY. Co., U. S. C. C. (Minn.), 73 Fed. Rep. 933.

16. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Obligation of Contracts.Act March 20, 1895, providing that the proceeds of life insurance policies shall be exempt from all liability for any debt, would be unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of contracts if applied to antecedent policies and antecedent debts, and is, therefore, not retroactive.-IN RE HEILBRON'S ESTATE, Wash., 45 Pac. Rep. 153.

17. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Quo Warranto Against Cor poration.-Rev. St. 1895, art. 4343, in so far as it attempts to confer on district and county attorneys authority to institute proceedings in the name of the State against a private corporation exercising power not conferred by law, contravenes Const. art. 4, § 22,

authorizing the attorney-general to bring such proeeedings.-STATE V. INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. Co., Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1067.

18. CONTRACT — Liquidated Damages. -Defendants took plaintiff, who had theretofore been their clerk, into partnership. Plaintiff, who had been addicted to the excessive use of intoxicating liquor, but who had reformed, again became intoxicated, whereupon the parties entered into an agreement which provided that, if he should again use liquor to excess, he should forfeit to plaintiffs all interest in the partnership and in the profits, and should instead be paid a certain salary for his services: Held, that the forfeiture of plaintiff's interest in the partnership in case of his becoming intoxicated would be enforced as liquidated damages.-HENDERSON V. MURPHREE, Ala., 20 South.

Rep. 45.

19. CONTRACT-Validity.-In an action against a bank for the proceeds of a draft, in which an interplea was filled, it appeared that plaintiff, interpleader, and several holders of lottery tickets agreed to hold them jointly, and divide their winnings equally; that plaint. iff, holder of a successful ticket, forwarded it, with other successful tickets turned over to him, to the lottery company, and received a single draft, payable to himself, for all the money won; that the bank accepted it for collection only, agreeing with plaintiff, interpleader, and another holder to pay the proceeds in specified portions to themselves and one other ticket holder: Held, that the agreement with the bank was valid, though the transaction in which the draft was obtained was illegal, and the bank, under the agree ment, liable to interpleader for the part of the proceeds assigned by it to him.-ROSELLEE V. BECKEMEIR, MO., 38. W. Rep. 1132.

20. CONTRACTS FOR SALE OF LAND.-A contract for the sale of land provided that the vendee should, on conveyance by the vendor, execute his notes in payment, due in one, two and three years: Held, that an action by the vendor for breach of the contract on the part of the vendee, the complaint alleging a performance on the part of the vendor, in which the amount of the first installment note was recovered, was a bar to a second action on the contract to recover the subsequent installments after they became due.-CoOKE V. COOK, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 64.

21. CONTRACT OF REGENTS OF STATE. - Where one plants trees on the grounds of the State agricultural college under a contract with the board of régents which it was not authorized to make, and no subsequent ratification is shown, the State is liable only for the reasonable value of the trees.-JEWELL NURSERY Co. v. STATE, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 629.

22. CONVERSION-Evidence-Demand.-Refusal to restore goods on demand is only evidence of conversion, and, whenever the conversion can be otherwise proved, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to allege or prove a demand and refusal.-ADAMS V. CASTLE, Minn., 57 N. W. Rep. 637.

23. CORPORATIONS-Ultra Vires-Estoppel.-A bank which causes property owned by it to be conveved by a deed regular in form to a worthless corporation, organized by its own directors, and then loans such corporation money, takes its notes, and discounts them with strangers, by representing them as prime paper and on the strength of such corporation's apparent ownership of such property, is thereafter estopped, as against the holders of the notes, to assert that the conveyance was ultra vires.—BUTLER V. COCKRILL, U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 946.

24. CORPORATION-Joint Stock Company-Subscriptions. Where one has subscribed money under an agreement to form a joint-stock company or partnership, if the subscriptions reach a stated amount, he is not bound thereby if a majority of the subscribers organize as a corporation.-KNOTTSVILLE ROLLER MILL Co. v. MATTINGLY, Ky., 35 S. W. Rep. 1114.

25. CORPORATIONS-Manufacturing-Stock-Payment in Property.-A corporation, unless prohibited by

some constitutional or statutory provision, may, in good faith, issue paid shares of its stock for the purchase of property at a fair valuation; and in such case both the corporation and its creditors will be bound thereby. But if there is a material overvaluation of the property, to the knowledge of the contracting parties, the transaction is fraudulent as to subsequent creditors of the corporation without notice; and, if it becomes insolvent, the shareholders so paying for their stock will be charged in favor of such creditors with the difference between the real value of the property and the par value of their stock.-HASTINGS MALTING CO. V. IRON RANGE BREWING CO., Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 652.

27. CORPORATIONS-Stockholders-Action to Enforce Liability. Where a plaintiff obtains judgment against an insolvent corporation, whose stockholders have not paid their subscriptions to stock, and the complaint alleges the return of an execution nulla bona by a sheriff of the county other than where such defendant resides or has property, such return, of itself, is not sufficient allegation of insolvency of the corporation to justify proceedings in equity against stockholders of the corporation who have not paid their subscription to stock.-SALT LAKE HARDWARE CO. V. TINTIC MILLING Co., Utah, 45 Pac. Rep. 200.

28. COSTS-Criminal Cases.-A prosecution by a city for keeping a tippling shop in violation of a city ordi nance, brought to the supreme court by writ of error, is, as affects the question of taxation of costs, to be considered a criminal case. - CITY OF YANKTON V. DOUGLASS, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 630.

29. COUNTIES-Validity of Contract.-A county contracted for the construction of waterworks in a town, agreeing, in consideration therefor, to pay the contractor a certain sum, and to grant him an exclusive right of way to lay piping for supplying said town with water: Held that, the grant of the exclusive right of way being unlawful, under Const. art. 1, § 26, providing that perpetuties and monopolies shall never be allowed, the contract was void.-EDWARDS COUNTY V. JENNINGS, Tex., 35 S. W. Rep. 1053.

30. CREDITORS' BILL-Right to Maintain.-A simple contract creditor may file a bill in equity to reach and subject assets of his insolvent debtor which have either been fraudulently conveyed, or in respect to which a suit has been commenced, or a decree or judgment suffered, with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors, and which action has that effect.-ALABAMA IRON & STEEL Co. v. MCKEEVER, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 84.

31. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Insanity.-Where the plea of insanity is interposed on a trial for murder, the burden is on defendant to prove his insanity at the time of the killing, though the evidence shows that he was, at a time prior thereto, insane.-STATE V. WRIGHT, Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 1145.

32. CRIMINAL LAW-Homicide-Self-defense.-A person on his own premises, outside his dwelling house, is not obliged to retreat, or consider whether he can do so safely if attacked by another with a deadly weapon.STATE V. CUSHING, Wash., 45 Pac. Rep. 145.

33. CRIMINAL PRACTICE-Scandalous Matter.-A complaint for vagrancy, which was otherwise sufficient, should not have been dismissed on the ground that it contained scandalous matter, in that it also charged defendant with "being a first-class pimp." The court, of its own motion, should have stricken out the objectionable words, and rebuked the persons who used

them, or permitted them to be used.-CITY OF BUTTE V. PEASLEY, Mont., 45 Pac. Rep. 210.

34. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Action by Adminis tratrix. The plaintiff, an administratrix appointed under the statute of New Jersey, sues to recover dam. ages for the death of her intestate, who died of injuries caused by the wrongful negligence of the defendant in Pennsylvania, the statute of which State gives, in such cases, the right of action to the widow of the deceased: Held, on demurrer, that this action cannot be main. tained by the administratrix.-LOWER V. SEGAL, N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 945.

35. DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT-Action by Widow.— Rev. St. Ariz. 1887, tit. 36, §§ 2145, 2155, providing that an action for wrongful death may be brought, for the benefit of the husband, wife, children, and parents of deceased, by one of them for the benefit of all, and that the jury shall divide the recovery among the persons entitled to the benefit of the action, does not au thorize one of such persons, suing for the benefit of all, to remit damages allotted to some of the persons entitled, so as to reduce to nominal damages the sums awarded to them, and defendant may complain of such remittitur.-SOUTHERN PAC. Co. v. TOMLINSON, U. S. S. C., 16 8. C. Rep. 1171.

36. DEED Estoppel. Where the purpose of the grantor as expressed in his deed is to convey the land itself, and not merely his right, title, and interest therein, and the grant is followed by a covenant of general warranty "against the lawful claim or claims of all persons whomsoever," such grantor, his heirs and assigns, are estopped from asserting an afteracquired title against the grantee, his heirs and assigns, although the deed does not, in so many words, purport to convey to the grantee "an indefeasible estate in fee-simple absolute."-ARMSTRONG V. PORTSMOUTH BLDG. CO., Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 67.

37. DEED

Record-Notice.-A deed conveyed "all the lands in the State of M which my former husband, H S, owned, and which he devised to me in his last will and testament; excepting, however, out of said grant, those certain tracts of land which, from time to time, have been conveyed by deed, either by Mr. S or myself, and which are of record, and none other:" Held, that the grantee took subject to an unrecorded deed, executed by his grantor, of which he had actual notice.-HENDERSON V. CAMERON, Miss., 20 South. Rep.

2.

38. DESCENT-Rights of Heirs.-The next of kin of an intestate may, without appointment of an administrator, where it is affirmatively shown that there are no debts of the estate- maintain an action to recover the share of their decedent as a distributee of another estate.-HURT V. FISHER, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 1085.

39. ELECTION OF REMEDIES-Rescission of Contract. -A vendee who has been induced by the fraud of his vendor to make a contract of purchase, which contains warranties made by the vendor, has a choice of remedies. He may rescind the contract, restore what he has received, and recover back what he has paid, or he may affirm the contract, recover the damages he has sustained for the fraud, and also those resulting from a breach of the warranties of the vendor, but he cannot do both.-WILSON V. NEW UNITED STATES CATTLE RANCH CO., U. S. C. C. of App., 73 Fed. Rep. 994.

40. EQUITY Specific Performance.-Equity will not decree specific performance of a contract, where there is an adequate remedy by action at law for breach of the contract.-YOUNG LOCK NUT Co. v. BROWNLEY MANUF'G CO., N. J., 34 Atl. Rep. 947.

41. EXTRADITION Waiver Surrender.-A person against whom a warrant has been issued by a magis. trate of the State, and who is outside of the limits of the State, may waive the issuance of extradition papers, and voluntarily surrender himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State.-STATE V. GARRETT, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 93.

42. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-Contract.-A contract for the renting of land for the term of one year, to commence in the future, is "an agreement not to be performed within one year from the making thereof," which is required to be in writing by Code, § 1732, subd. 1; and such a contract, resting in parol, will not support an action to recover the rent, although payable within the year, the promise to pay and the con sideration therefor not being severable.-RAIN V. MCDONALD, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 77.

43. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.-A creditor may take any number of securities, if the debtor be not insolv. ent, or even if insolvent, provided the securities be not so excessive as to indicate a purpose to shield the property from other creditors.-HENDON V. MORRIS, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 27.

Subsequent Credit

44. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ors. A conveyance of property, though voluntary, cannot be attacked by a subsequent creditor of the grantor without proof of actual fraud in the transaction, and the insolvency of the grantor at the time will not raise a presumption of such fraud without a showing that indebtedness then existing is still unpaid.ELYTON LAND CO. V. IRON CITY STEAM BOTTLING WORKS, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 51.

45. FEDERAL COURTS State as a Party.-A federal court has no jurisdiction, on the ground of citizenship, of a suit brought by a State against either its own citizens or citizens of other States.-STATE OF MINNESOTA V. GUARANTY TRUST & SAFE-DEPOSIT CO., U. S. C. C. (Minn.), 73 Fed. Rep. 914.

46. GARNISHMENT - Pleading.-A complaint in gar nishment showed the rendition of the original judg ment, the issuance of the execution, the levy by gar nishment, and the refusal of the garnishees to apply the funds. The answer of the garnishees was, in effect, that they held certain funds of the judgment debtor, but did not know whether they belonged to him personally, or as a representative. The complaint positively averred that the money belonged to him individually: Held, that the answer stated no defense, and that judgment was properly entered for plaintiff on the pleading.-SWEENEY V. SCHLESSINGER, Mont., 45 Pac. Rep. 213.

47. GIFT-Parol Gift of Land.-Equity protects and enforces a parol gift equally with a parol contract of the sale of land, where possession is taken in pur suance of the gift, improvements made, and the donee changes his situation or condition upon the faith of the gift.-FLANIGAN V. WATERS, Kan., 45 Pac. Rep. 56.

48. HIGHWAY - Damages.-The measure of damages to abutting property from the grading of a highway, when done by private landowners along the route, by authority and under supervision of the county, is the same as where the grading is done by the county.GROVER V. CORNET, Mo., 35 S. W. Rep. 1143.

runs

49. HIGHWAY Dedication.-Where road a across private property, and is used by the public as a common road without interruption for 50 years, the owner acquiescing in such use, a dedication of the ground on which the road runs to the use of the public for such purpose will be presumed.-WOOLARD V. CLYMER, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 1086.

50. HOMESTEAD - Mortgage by Husband.-Under Act March 18, 1887, providing that the conveyance of a homestead must be executed and acknowledged by both the husband and the wife, a mortgage on a homestead in which the wife, acknowledges merely the relinquishment of her rights of dower is invalid.-SHATTUCK V. BYFORD, Ark., 35 S. W. Rep. 1107.

51. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Right to Wife's Lands.-Defendant's wife, at the time of marriage, owned an un. divided interest in land. Upon partition, the land was sold, and was bought by defendant, who gave his wife a note for her interest: Held, that the giving of the note would not be deemed a waiver of defendant's marital rights in the land, in the absence of any clear