the policy, unless its execution is denied by plea verified by affidavit, as required by 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 1798, ch. 110, § 33.-FIREMEN'S INS. Co. v. BARNSCH, Ill., 44 N. E. Rep. 285.

48. INSURANCE-Mortgage Clause-Construction.-To a fire insurance policy was attached a "mortgage clause," making the loss payable to a named mortgagee of the insured property, and providing that the insurance should not be invalidated by any act or neg lect of the mortgagor or owner of the insured property: Held, (1) that the mortgage clause was an independent contract between the insurance company and the mortgagee; (2) that no act or omission of the mortgagor, whether the same occurred at the time of the issuance of the policy, or prior or subsequent thereto, invalidated said insurance policy.-HANOVER FIRE INS. Co. v. BоHN, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 774.

49. INSURANCE — Mortgaged Personal Property.-Defendant's agents, who were also engaged in banking, issued a fire policy covering certain property on which they, as bankers, held a chattel mortgage: Held, that this was sufficient notice to the company to support the presumption that the condition in the policy that it should be void if the subject of the insurance was personal property incumbered by mortgage was waived.-McDONALD V. FIRE ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 719.

50. JUDGMENT - Collateral Attack.-That the affirmance of a judgment against a school district was bad by reason of collusion of the parties does not justify a collateral attack of the judgment, the remedy being by timely proceeding to set aside the order of affirmance.-EDMUNDSON V. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DIST. OF JACKSON, Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 671.

51. JUDGMENT -Res Judicata.-A privy in estate, so as to be bound by a judgment affecting real estate to which he was not a party, is one whose title must be derived from a party bound by the judgment. A claimant of land under the homestead donation laws is not concluded by judgments against prior claimants, holding the land to be owned by a private person under a former grant; the State, through whom such settler claims, not being bound by the judgment.-COLE. MAN V. DAVIS, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 103.

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53. LANDLORD AND TENANT Surrender - Offer.Where, a year before the expiration of a lease for a term of years, the lessees wrote the lessor that, by reason of business reverses, they were unable to furnish hands and teams to work the leased premises, and advised him that, as it was early in the season, he could rent it out to some one else, and lose nothing by reason of their failure, and the lessor did not reply, but soon afterwards took charge of the place, and induced a subtenant to take up a rent note he had executed to the lessees, and execute a new note direct to him for the rent, and gave no notice to the lessees that he was managing the place on their account, or that he expected them to make good any deficiency in the rent, it constituted an offer on the part of the lessees to surrender the premises, and an acceptance thereof by the lessor.-WILLIAMSON V. CROSSETT, Ark., 36 S. W. Rep. 27.

54. MARRIED WOMAN-Mortgage-Estoppel of Wife. -Rev. St. 1894, § 6964 (Rev. St. 1881, § 5119), declares contracts of suretyship of married women void, and section 6972, Rev. St. 1894 (section 5127, Rev. St. 1881), provides that married women, in exercising their powers to contract, shall be bound by estoppel in pais like other persons: Held, that where a married woman complies with all the statutory requirements to obtain

a loan from the school fund, and joins with her husband in a mortgage of land held by them as tenant by entireties to secure it, and the auditor, without any objection from her, paid the money to her husband, she was estopped from claiming that the mortgage was given to secure money to pay her husband's debts, and therefore void as a contract of suretyship.-TRIMBLE V. STATE, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 260.

55. MASTER AND SERVANT - Appliances-Negligence. -Where an action against a railroad company by an employee for injuries is based on negligence of an engineer and defective appliances, and the undisputed evidence shows that the engineer is a fellow-servant of plaintiff, the submission to the jury of the issue of negligence, based on the acts of the engineer, will necessitate a reversal.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. WARNER, Tex., 36 8. W. Rep. 118.

56. MASTER AND SERVANT — Contract of Employment. -In an action by an employee to recover pay for time lost during the term of service, the burden is on plaintiff to prove that such time was to be paid for by the terms of the contract of employment; otherwise, the employer is entitled to recoup himself for a material loss of the services of the employee.-WILSON V. SMITH, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 134.

57. MASTER AND SERVANT-Negligence-Defective Appliances.-A master does not insure his servants against defective appliances. The rule is that he is bound to use such care as the circumstances reasonably demand to see that the appliances furnished are reasonably safe for use, and that they are afterwards maintained in such reasonably safe condition.-LINCOLN ST. RY. Co. v. Cox, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 740.

58. MECHANICS' LIENS-Affidavit- - Description.-Section 2, ch. 54, Comp. St. 1895, construed, and held, the description of the real estate on which materials furnished by a subcontractor have been used in erecting an improvement is a necessary part of the affidavit required to be filed by such subcontractor in order to entitle him to a lien.-DREXEL V. RICHARDS, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 742.

59. MORTGAGE Recording Sufficiency.-The fact that the register, in recording a mortgage, transcribed the surname of one other than the grantors in the granting clause and in the description of the land, will not invalidate the registry, where the mortgage was otherwise correctly transcribed, and shows that the register made a clerical mistake in so transcribing the names, and it appears that the admission to probate and the order of registration were all duly made, and the mortgage was indexed in the name of the grantors. -ROYSTER V. LANE, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 796.

60. MORTGAGES

Foreclosure Sale.-The provisions of the statute requiring the sheriff to deduct from the real value of lands levied upon the amount of the liens and incumbrances prior to that of the mortgage which the property is ordered sold to satisfy, being for the sole benefit of the plaintiff, the defendant, owner of the equity, cannot be heard to object to the confirmation of the sale because such liens and incumbrances were not deducted in making the appraisement."AMERICAN INV. Co. v. MCGREGOR, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep.

785.

61. MORTGAGES-Merger.-A mortgagee assigned an undivided half interest in the mortgage and the notes secured thereby. The assignees purchased the mortgaged lands, and assumed the payment of the secured indebtedness: Held, that the assignees' interest in the debt secured was merged in the legal title, and that the lands in whole remained liable as security for the debt due the mortgagee.-EHRMAN V. ALABAMA MINERAL LAND Co., Ala., 20 South. Rep. 112.

62. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-Streets-Prescription. -Evidence that a street was platted over plaintiff's land 25 years before suit, that it was used for public travel; that subsequent sales of adjacent lands were made with reference to such street as a boundary; and that 10 years before suit the city authorized the use o

the street by a street railroad, shows a prescriptive right to use the land as a street.-WARING V. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, Ark., 36 S. W. Rep. 24.

63. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -Action to Recover Taxes Paid. An action to recover alleged illegal taxes paid to a city sounds in tort, and, where the city charter provides that no action for a tort shall lie against it unless a statement of the claim shall have been presented to the council within 90 days after the happening of the tort, a complaint for the recovery of taxes which does not allege the presentation of such statement is demurrable.-FLIETH V. CITY OF WAUSAU, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 731.

64. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - Powers. Where a railroad company, by permission of a city, constructs its road on land outside the city limits, intended eventually to be an extension of a street, the city cannot, after the land is brought within the city limits, by ordinance, interfere with rights which had vested in the company before the extension of the city limits, not derived from the city government; and such rights are unaffected by an ordinance requiring the company to remove its track.-JOHNSON V. OWENSBORO & N. RY. Co., Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 8.

65. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Suit against a City.Code, § 757, providing that no person shall sue any city unless the claim is first presented to be audited and allowed, and the authorities neglect to act upon it or misallow it, applies only to claims arising on contract, and not to claims for unliquidated damages for personal injuries.-SHIELDS v. TOWN OF DURHAM, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 794.

66. NEGLIGENCE-Dangerous Premises.-While it is the duty of the master to keep his premises in a safe condition, so as not to endanger the life or limbs of the servant, yet the servant will be denied relief against the master for injuries arising out of the unsafe condition of his premises, if with ordinary prudence the servant could have avoided the injuries.-MCCARTHY V. WHITNEY IRON WORKS CO., La., 20 South. Rep. 171. 67. NEGLIGENCE Proximate and Remote Cause.While plaintiff, with another employee, was standing on the station platform, helping to unload a large box from a freight car, the conductor, who was within the car, pushing on the box, stepped into a hole, which had been burned through the floor of the car, thereby losing his hold on the box, and plaintiff, being unable to bear the weight so suddenly cast upon him, fell, and was injured by the falling box: Held, that the hole in the car floor was not the proximate cause of the injury.-LOUISVILLE, ETC. RY. Co. v. SOUTHWICK, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 263.

68. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Demand.-Where the maker of a note, prior to its maturity, abandons his place of business, if he has a residence in the place which is known, or may be with reasonable diligence ascertained, a presentment and demand at the old place of business in insufficient.-REINKE V. WRIGHT, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 737.

69. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-Illegal Consideration. -Plaintiff, with full knowledge of the facts, sold furniture for use in a house of prostitution, under a contract providing for monthly payments, and that the purchaser should use the furniture in her house; title to remain in the vendor until the price was paid: Held, that the contract, and notes given in accordance therewith, were void, being based upon an illegal con

promissory note cannot furnish a defense to such note when it is admitted by defendants that such note was duly executed by them.-MILLER V. GUNDERSON, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 769.

72. PARTNERSHIP-Evidence.-Where it is sought to hold the defendant liable as a member of a partnership firm, the mere statements of one who claimed to be acting for and as a member of such firm are not competent to establish the disputed partnership relation.-WEIR V. ILLINOIS NAT. BANK OF SPRINGFIELD, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 992.

73. PARTNERSHIP-Negotiable Instruments-Ratification.-General authority to a partner, after dissolution, to close up the partnership indebtedness by executing notes in the firm name, does not authorize him to bind his late copartner by stipulating in such notes to pay attorney's fees and to waive exemptions.BROWN V. BAMBERGER, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 114.

74. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT - Authority of Agent.Where on the issue as to the ostensible authority of an agent to receive payment of a mortgage for his principal, arising from the negligence of the principal in holding the agent out as having such authority, the facts, though not disputed, are such that reasonable minds might draw different conclusions therefrom, the issue is properly left to the jury.-REID V. KELLOGG, S. Dak., 67 N. W. Rep. 687.

75. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Notice to Agent.-In an action against a school committee, brought by the assignee of a contract to recover the balance due thereon, defendant alleged that the balance had been paid to a creditor of the assignor in garnishment proceedings. It appeared that long prior to the garnishment the assignor had notified the chairman of the defendant committee that the contract had been assigned to plaintiff: Held that, the chairman being an agent of defendant, notice to him was sufficient to fix defend. ant's liability to the assignee.-ANNISTON NAT. BANK V. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF TOWN OF DURHAM, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 792.

76. PROCESS-Service.-While a ministerial officer is not obliged to serve process in his hands, when he has knowledge from other sources that the court or officer issuing it was without jurisdiction of the person against whom it is directed, he will, nevertheless, be justified in executing it according to its command, if regular in form, and the want of jurisdiction does not appear upon its face.-HENLINE V. REESE, Ohio, 44 N. E. Rep. 269.

77. PUBLIC LANDS-Grant for Railroad Purposes.-A grant of land by congress to a State in aid of railroad construction is a grant in præsenti; and the title of the beneficiary, when the lands are earned and selected, relates back to the date of the grant. The federal government cannot subsequently give title to lands covered by such grant, as against the State or its grantees.-PAIGE V. KOLMAN, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 699. 78. PUBLIC LANDS-Riparian Rights.-The title of the grantee from the federal government of land bordering on a non-navigable lake, meandered in the original survey, does not extend to the center of the lake. -FULLER V. SHEDD, Ill., 44 N. E. Rep. 286.

79. QUIETING TITLE-Action.-One in possession of lands under a bond for title, and claiming to be the owner, cannot maintain an action to quiet title, since it is required, by St. § 11, that plaintiff in such case

an engine against cars standing near a crossing which they knew was used by children going to and from school, so as to drive them upon the crossing and cause them to run over a child who was with due care attempting to cross, the company was liable.-GULF, C. & S. F. RY. Co. v. WEST. Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 101.

62. RAILROAD COMPANY-Consolidation.-A complaint against a railroad company, alleging that defendant acquired by purchase and assignment all the property and franchises of another road, is insufficient to charge defendant with liability for a tort committed by such other road prior to the purchase and assign. ment, since it fails to show a consolidation of defend. ant with such other road, under Rev. St. §§ 1833 or 1788, or otherwise, in which case alone defendant would be liable. -PENNISON V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. Co., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 702.

In Laws

83. RAILROAD COMPANY - Fires-Notice. 1893, ch. 202, requiring a notice in writing to be given to a railway company of a claim for damages occasioned by fire set by a locomotive, within one year after the event causing such damage, the provision that "such notice may be given in the manner required for the service of summons in a court of record" is permissive only, and a delivery of the notice to a general of ficer of the corporation, or any agent having a general authority to act for it in respect to the subject-matter to which the notice relates, is sufficient.-ATKINSON V. CHICAGO & N. W.RY. Co., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 703.

84. RAILROAD COMPANY-Fires-Notice.-Under Laws 1893, ch. 202, providing that no action can be maintained against a railway company for damages to property by fire from a locomotive unless notice of the claim be given, an amendment should not have been allowed demanding damages for injuries to a tract of land not included in the original notice.-DONOVAN V. CHICAGO & N. W. RY. Co., Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 721.

85. RAILROAD COMPANY-Negligence.-Though a person is lying helpless on a railroad track, his negli gence is not deemed concurrent where, by the exercise of ordinary care, the company's servants could have seen him in time to prevent an injury by the proper use of the appliances at their command.LLOYD V. ALBEMARLE & R. R. Co., N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 805.

86. RAILROAD COMPANY- Street Railways-Contributory Negligence.-Plaintiff, a regular repairer of city crossings, knowing that defendant's cars passed along the street at frequent intervals, placed a plank on the top of crossing sleepers to level them, one end so near the track as to come in contact with passing cars; and, standing with his back toward approaching cars, he leaned over the end near the track to see whether the sleepers were level. His hearing was good. He only became aware of the car's approach when close on him, and then jumped to the other side of the plank, and the car knocked the plank against his ankle and injured it: Held, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.-EDDY V. CEDAR RAPIDS & M. C. RY. Co., Iowa, 67 N. W. Rep. 676.

$7. RAILROAD COMPANIES-Contributory Negligence. -One who for years was accustomed to walk on the tracks of the defendant railway company through its switchyard, with the knowledge of the company, and knew the position of the frogs and switches, and who was killed, at night, by a train, on account of his foot catching in an unblocked frog, was not, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence.-LEE V. INTERNATIONAL & G. N. R. Co., Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 63.

88. RAILWAY COMPANIES - Negligence-Fires.-An instruction authorizing the jury to find defendant liable if it negligently allowed combustible material to collect upon its right of way, and negligently set fire thereto, and negligently allowed it to escape, is not error prejudicial to defendant because of the failure of evidence as to setting the fire, since the effect of the instruction is to impose an additional burden on the plaintiff.-BALTIMORE & O. R. Co. v. COUNTRYMAN, Ind., 44 N. E. Rep. 265.

89. REFERENCE- Award of Costs.-Referees acting under an order of reference made during the pendency of an action can award costs, though the order of reference is silent as to such power.-MCLAUGHLIN V. OLD COLONY R. Co., Mass., 44 N. E. Rep. 252.

90. REFERENCE Power of Referee.-A referee appointed under Rev. St. § 2864, subd. 2, "to take an account between the parties, and report the same to the court," has no power to pass on and determine the basic issues in the case, and his powers cannot be enlarged by implication or consent of the parties.-BEST V. PIKE, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 697.

91. RELEASE-Mistake.-A sheriff who, though complaining that he was under the statute entitled to a certain amount per day for keeping prisoners, in deference to the opinion of the attorney general and county judge to the contrary, and the refusal of the county to pay such sum, presents his bill to the county for a less sum, and is paid the same, cannot afterwards recover of the county the difference.-XIMENES V. WILSON COUNTY, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 127.

92. REMOVAL OF CAUSES.-A cause cannot be removed from a State to a federal court simply because during the litigation a construction of the federal constitution becomes necessary.-GALVESTON, H. & S. A. RY. Co. v. STATE, Tex., 36 8. W. Rep. 111.

93. RES JUDICATA.-Where, in trespass to try title, the pleadings put in issue the question of rents and profits, the fact that no evidence in support of the claim for rents was offered, until after the trial, when it was rejected on the ground that it came too late, does not show that the court refused to pass upon such claim, or that it was abandoned, so as to prevent the judgment, which merely awarded possession to plaintiff, and was silent as to the claim for rents, from being res judicata as to the claim for rents.-RACKLEY V. FOWLKES, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 77.

94. SALE-Conditional Sale - Waiver.-Where goods are sold, to be paid for on delivery, an absolute and unconditional delivery of the goods by the vendor to the vendee without exacting payment passes title and waives the condition. Therefore, where corn was sold to be paid for on delivery, and it was placed, with the vendor's knowledge and consent, into bins of the vendee, and there mingled with a mass of corn belong. ing to the vendee, the vendor lost his right to reclaim the corn for non-payment.-KINGSLEY V. MCGREW, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 787.

95. SALE Prospective Products of Mill.-A contract of sale of the future products of a mill for a certain period, at a specified price, in consideration of advancements by the vendee to pay for the raw material and certain operating expenses, is valid.-WILLIAMS V. CHAPMAN, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 810.

96. SALE-Warranty-Notice of Defects.-A warranty on the sale of a threshing machine provided that "if, in one week from the time of starting, it shall not per form" as warranted, "the purchaser agrees to notify" the vendor and his agent, named: Held, that the warranty must be construed as providing that if, after a week's trial, the machine did not do the work it was warranted to do, notice should be given within a reasonable time, and not necessarily within the week.GAAR, SCOTT & Co. v. STARK, Tenn., 35 S. W. Rep. 149. 97. TAXATION-Abatement.-Where the assessor's notice requires property owners to bring in lists of their real and personal estates, one who, in good faith, omits to mention a piece of real estate of which the assessors had a description on their books, is not deprived of his right to ask for an abatement of the personal property tax.-WRIGHT V. CITY OF LOWELL, Mass., 44 N. E. Rep. 249.

98. TAXATION-Assessment - Sale. When property has been seized and sold in a suit to which the owner was not a party, and the purchaser sells the same to another, and it is assessed in the name of the latter, and sold at tax sale, the assessment and sale are null and void.-MARTIN V. SOUTHERN ATHLETIC CLUB, La., 20 South. Rep. 181.

99. TAXATION-License-Brokers.-A person engaged in selling on commission in a city merchandise by sample for his several principals, having an office where his samples are exhibited, is a local commercial broker, though he makes special arrangements in advance with those by whom he is employed, and is their sole representative in his city.-STRATFOrd v. CITY COUNCIL OF MONTGOMERY, Ala., 20 South. Rep. 127.

100. TAXATION-Tax Title-Mistake of Officer.-If an owner of land in good faith applies to the proper offi. cer for the purpose of paying the taxes thereon, and is prevented by the mistake or fault of such officer, the attempt to pay is considered the legal equivalent of actual payment, and title to the land will not pass by its subsequent sale for such tax; but this rule has no application where the officer applied to is not the one authorized to receive the tax.-EDWARDS V. UPHAM, Wis., 67 N. W. Rep. 728.

101. TOWNS-Distribution of Water.-A town which has acquired the franchise, property, rights, and priv. ileges of a water company, under St. 1892, ch. 310, which provides (section 5) that the company may dis tribute water through the town, and make contracts with any fire district therein, or with any individual or corporation, to supply water for any purpose, may deliver water to a mill corporation therein, though its mill property, which is on a continuous parcel wholly in its occupation, lies partly within the town and partly within an adjoining city, and the water is distributed by the corporation, throughout its premises, on both sides of the boundary line between the town and city.-CITY OF LAWRENCE V. TOWN OF METHUEN, Mass., 44 N. E. Rep. 247.

102. TRIAL- Evidence in Rebuttal Discretion. Where, in an action for personal injuries, the case as made by plaintiff shows contributory negligence, it is not an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow plaintiff to testify for the first time to rebut the showing of contributory negligence, which was made more manifest by the evidence of defendant.-WINTERTON V. ILLI NOIS CENT. R. Co., Miss., 20 South. Rep. 157.

103. TRUST-Resulting Trusts.-A resulting trust in land does not arise in favor of a person lending to the purchaser thereof money with which to pay a portion of the purchase price.-HITT V. APPLEWHITE, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 161.

104. TRUST - Revocable Trusts-Validity.-That insured, who held a policy on his life payable to his ad. ministrators, executors, or assigns, assigned it to a third person, as collateral security for a small loan, with directions, in case of insured's death without having repaid the money, to collect the policy, and divide the proceeds, after deducting the amount of the loan, between certain persons, is sufficient, on the death of insured without revoking the trust, to create in favor of such persons a valid trust, as against the administrator of insured. HISERODT V. HAMLETT, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 143.

105. TRUSTS-Trustee - Estoppel.-In an agreement for the organization of a corporation and for the purchase of lands, it was provided that title to the lands should be taken in the name of defendant's ancestor, to be held in trust for the corporation, and to be conveyed to it when organized. The corporation was organized, defendant's ancestor becoming a stockholder and an officer: Held, that the relations of defendant's ancestor to the corporation estopped him from denying the legality of the organization in order to avoid the trust.-TUCKASEEGEE MIN. Co. v. GOOD. HUE, N. Car., 24 S. E. Rep. 797.

106. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Action for Price.-The rights and liabilities of parties to a parol agreement for the conveyance of real property are not necessarily reciprocal. One who enters into possession of land under a parol promise by the owner to convey, the latter subsequently fully performing by the tender of a good and sufficient deed, may be liable in an action

for the purchase price, although such possession be not of itself such part performance as would entitle him to an action for specific performance of the contract.-STEPHENS V. HARDING, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 746. 107. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Demand for Deed-Certain inquiries, from time to time, as to when a deed would be delivered, and requests that the same be de livered, held not to amount, under the circumstances, to a demand for the same, so as to entitle the vendee, who had acquiesced in delay, to rescind for failure to execute and deliver such deed.-MCNAMARA V. PENGILLY, Minn., 67 N. W. Rep. 661.

108. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Lien.-Where a grantor holds his grantee's notes for the purchase price of lands, secured by a vendor's lien, and a subsequent grantee assumes the payment of the notes, the taking of possession by the original grantor, after an election to rescind the contract and make the premises a homestead, is a release of the grantee's obligations on the notes.- MAYS V. SANDERS, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 108.

109. VENDOR AND PURCHASER Rescission.-On the rescission of a contract for the sale of land for default of the vendor, the vendee is entitled to a lien on the vendor's interest in the land for repayment of the amount paid on the contract, though not in possession.-BULLITT V. EASTERN KENTUCKY LAND CO., Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 16.

110. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Sale of Land-Rescission. Misrepresentations as to the location, quality, and value of real estate, by a vendor, are sufficient grounds for rescission, when relied upon by the vendee, and he is unacquainted with its value and condition, and has been prevented by the fraud of the vendor from making an examination of the property. -STOCHL V. CALEY, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 783.

111. WILLS Election by Widow.-Where, after renouncing the will, the widow is assigned dower in property, part of which was specially devised to others, such devisees, after her death, are entitled to contribution out of the residuary estate. -TREASY V. TREASY, Ky., 36 S. W. Rep. 3.

112. WILLS-Legacies.-Testator devised the income of his entire estate to his wife for life; the estate upon her death to be distributed among certain legatees, and the balance, if any, to go to certain of the legatees to whom specific legacies had been given. The wife elected to take under the law: Held, that payment of the legacies should not be postponed until the death of the widow, so as to thereby increase the share of the residuary estate to the extent of the income of the legacies during the widow's life.-TRUSTEES OF CHURCH HOME FOR FEMALES AND INFIRMARY FOR SICK V. MORRIS, Ky., 36 8. W. Rep. 2.

113. WITNESS-Examination.-Where, in an action on a bill or note, the defendant is examined with respect to the genuineness of the signature alone, he should not on cross-examination be required to state his opinion touching collateral or incidental matters based upon a comparison of the disputed signature with others.-NORFOLK NAT. BANK V. JOB, Neb., 67 N. W. Rep. 781.

114. WITNESS-Transaction with Decedent.-The fact that the grantor in a deed is dead does not render inadmissible testimony of his delivery of the deed in an action by the grantee for the recovery of the land against one claiming under a subsequent deed from the decedent, where in the later deed the decedent warranted specially only; and his estate cannot be held liable thereon for a failure of the title.-HORNE V. NUGENT, Miss., 20 South. Rep. 159.

115. WRONGFUL ATTACHMENT-Damages.-Where, in an action for wrongful attachment, it appears that plaintiff had conveyed his entire mercantile business to a trustee for the benefit of certain creditors, damages for injuries to his mercantile credit are not recoverable.-R. F. SCOTT GROCER CO. v. KELLY, Tex., 36 S. W. Rep. 160.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., AUGUST 21, 1896.

An Illinois circuit judge has declared unconstitutional and void the State law requiring the national flag to be displayed over every school house. The case came before him in the form of a motion to quash indictments found against certain school trustees and other officials for failing to execute the law. The legislature had made such violation of the law a misdemeanor, and therein, so the court holds, had exceeded its powers. The decision hinged on this point. There was no question of the right of the State to order the flag down on any of its buildings at such times and in such a manner as it saw fit. The effect of this decision, if affirmed, will be to make patriotism, in so far as it consists in flinging the flag to the breeze, optional.

Two recent cases wherein the courts arrive at opposite conclusions suggest the interesting question as to the extent of the liability of a public treasurer. Does the bond ordinarily required of such an official make his liability greater than that imposed by the common law on all fiduciaries? In State v. Copeland, 34 S. W. Rep. 427, on a bond with the usual conditions for faithful performance of duty and for paying over the public money as required, etc., it was held by the Supreme Court of Tennessee that the official was not liable for a loss not due to any negligence on his part. There is nothing in such a bond to increase the common law liability. In reaching this conclusion the court is strongly influenced by considerations of public policy, especially by the fear that the better class of men will not accept office when doing so involves the assumption of so great a liability. In Fairchild v. Hedges, 44 Pac. Rep. 125, 42 Cent. L. J. 418, the Supreme Court of Washington (one judge dissenting) held that a county treasurer is liable on the undertaking in his bond for money deposited in a bank that fails, though due care was exercised in its selection. While the court thinks this view is in accord with sound public policy, it rests the decision on the terms of the bond. The two main points on which a difference of opinion is to be found in the

authorities are illustrated by these cases. As a matter of fact the difference between the courts, upon the question arises largely out of considerations of public policy. + also post p. 189.

An English court has recently held that the proprietor of a house licensed to sell intoxicating liquors is guilty of an offense under the licensing act, if his servant, during his absence and against his orders, sells to a drunken person; since the act of the servant is within the general scope of his employment. Commissioners, etc. v. Cartman, 1 Q. B. 655. This view while it is in accord with the weight of authority in this country is repudiated by many respectable courts. The cases in the United States wherein the view of the English court is upheld are Edgar v. State, 45 Ark. 356, 1885; Mogler v. State, 47 Ark. 110, 1886; Loeb v. State, 75 Ga. 258, 1885; Boatright v. State, 77 Ga. 717, 1886; Snider v. State, 81 Ga. 753, 1888; McCutchen v. People, 69 Ill. 601, 1873; Noecker v. People, 91 Ill. 494, 1879; Fahey v. State, 62 Miss. 402, 1884; Teasdale v. State (Miss.), 3 South. Rep. 245, 1887; State v. Kittelle (N. C.), 15 S. E. Rep. 103, 1892; State v. Denoon, 31 W. Va. 122, 1888. The leading cases opposed to the doctrine are Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398; State v. McCance, 110 Mo. 398; State v. Weber, 111 Mo. 204; Anderson v. State, 22 Ohio St. 305. The case of State v. McCance, supra, clearly exposes the fallacy of the argument upon which the doctrine rests. To say that a master should be held criminally responsible for the act of the servant solely upon the ground that the act is within the general scope of his employment, as the English case puts it, seems both harsh and illogical. Though the servant is employed to sell liquor he is not employed to make illegal sales.

NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS.

SLANDER MISJOINDER OF PARTIES DEFENDANT-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-That a wife cannot be joined in an action for slanderous words spoken by the husband, that an action cannot be maintained against two persons jointly for uttering and publishing slanderous words, because the words of one are not the words of another, and that though the hus