페이지 이미지
PDF
ePub

the British Government, (on which they always afterward acted,) that the British law was also sufficient for its intended purpose, in all cases in which the necessary evidence of the facts could be obtained, a sufficient account has been given in the Annex (B) to the British Counter Case.

The reply of Mr. Seward, (2d March, 1863,) when informed of the conclusion thus arrived at by the Cabinet, has been referred to in an earlier portion of this argument." It remains," he said, " for this Government only to say, that it will be your duty to urge upon Her Majesty's Government the desire and expectation of the President, that henceforward Her Majesty's Government will take the necessary measures to enforce the execution of the law as faithfully as this Government has executed the corresponding statutes of the United States." The substantial agreement of the provisions of the British law with the law of the United States, on this subject, was repeatedly afterward admitted and referred to.

On the 9th April, 1863, Mr. Dayton wrote from Paris to Mr. Seward: "I told M. Drouyn de Lhuys our Foreign-Enlistment Act was the same as that of England;"2 to which Mr. Seward replied, (24th April, 1863:) “You have done the country a good service in explaining, in your conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the manner in which we have heretofore maintained our neutrality in foreign wars, by enforcing our enlistment laws, which are in all respects the same as those of Great Britain." 93

On the 11th July, 1863, (after the trial of the Alexandra, and with reference to the view of the British Foreign-Enlistment Act, then taken by the Lord Chief Baron Pollock--a view in which Her Majesty's Government never acquiesced, and on which they never afterward acted,) Mr. Seward wrote:

I may safely protest, on behalf of the United States, against the assumption of that position by the British nation, because this Government, with a Statute exactly similar to that of Great Britain, does constantly hold itself able and bound to prevent such injuries to Great Britain. The President thinks it not improper to suggest, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, the question whether, on appeal to be made by them, Parliament might not think it just and expedient to amend the existing Statute in such a way as to effect what the two Governments actually believe it ought now to accomplish. In case of such an appeal, the President would not hesitate to apply to Congress for an equivalent amendment of the laws of the United States, if Her Majesty's Government should desire such a proceeding, although here such an amendment is not deemed necessary.

On the 10th September, 1863, Mr. Adams reported to Mr. Seward, with expressions of much satisfaction, a speech then recently made by Earl Russell at Dundee :

You will not fail to observe the greatly increased firmness of his language; and more especially his intimation that new powers may be solicited from Parliament, if hose now held should prove insufficient. This is, at least, the true tone.

On the 16th of the same month, Mr. Adams (with reference to the iron-clad rams at Birkenhead, which were soon afterward seized by Her Majesty's Government) wrote to Earl Russell :

Your Lordship will permit me to remind you that Her Majesty's Government cannot justly plead the inefficiency of the provisions of the Enlistment law to enforce the duties of neutrality in the present emergency as depriving them of the power to prevent the anticipated danger. It will doubtless be remembered that the proposition made by you, and which I have had the honor of being the medium of conveying to my Government, to agree upon some forms of amendment of the respective Statutes

Appendix to the Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 669.

2 Ibid., p. 587.

3 Ibid., p. 262.

4 Ibid., p. 670.

5 Ibid., p. 673.

of the two countries, in order to make them more effective, was entertained by the latter, not from any want of confidence in the ability to enforce the existing Statute, but from a desire to co-operate with what then appeared to be the wish of Her Majesty's Ministers. But, upon my communicating this reply to your Lordship and inviting the discussion of propositions, you then informed me that it had been decided not to proceed any further in this direction, as it was the opinion of the Cabinet, sustained by the authority of the Lord Chancellor, that the law was fully effective in its present shape.1

There were other parts of the letters (not necessary to be further alluded to) which led Earl Russell to reply in the following terms, (September, 25, 1863:)

There are passages in your letter of the 16th, as well as in some of your former ones, which so plainly and repeatedly imply an intimation of hostile proceeding toward Great Britain on the part of the Government of the United States, unless steps are taken by Her Majesty's Government which the law does not authorize, or, unless the law, which you consider as insufficient, is altered, that I deem it incumbent upon me, in behalf of Her Majesty's Government, frankly to state to you that Her Majesty's Government will not be induced by any such consideration either to overstep the limits of the law or to propose to Parliament any new law, which they may not, for reasons of their own, think proper to be adopted. They will not shrink from any consequences of such a decision.

To which Mr. Adams, on the 29th September, 1864, rejoined:

I must pray your Lordship's pardon if I confess myself at a loss to perceive what portions of my late correspondence could justify the implications to which you refer. So far from intimating "hostile proceedings toward Great Britain, unless the law, which I consider as insufficient, is altered," the burden of my argument was to urge a reliance upon the law as sufficient, as well from the past experience of the United States as from the confidence expressed in it by the most eminent authority in this kingdom.3

In November and December, 1863, dangers on the side of Canada led to a revival of the question, whether some legislation, similar to that of the United States in 1838, might not be useful for the prevention of those dangers; and a law for that purpose was soon after enacted by the Canadian Parliament, as has been already mentioned.

Nothing further passed upon this subject between the two Go vernments before the conclusion of the war.

1 Appendix to Case of the United States, vol. i, p. 673. 3 Ibid., p. 675.

4

2 Ibid., p. 674.

Ibid., pp. 675, 676.

ANNEX (B.)—FRENCH TRANSLATION OF THE THREE RULES IN ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON.

The French Translations, both of the Case of Her Majesty's Govern ment and of the Case of the United States, (unofficially provided for the convenience of the Arbitrators,) have given the text of the three Rules in Article VI of the Treaty, with some variations of rendering, which (unless corrected) might possibly give occasion to misconceptions of the exact sense of parts of those Rules. It has, therefore, been thought expedient here to subjoin, in parallel columns, an accurate copy of the original English text and a revised French Translation:

RULES.

A neutral Government is boundFirst. To use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use.

Secondly. Not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men.

Thirdly. To exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.

REGLES.

Un Gouvernement neutre est tenu1. De faire les dues diligences pour prévenir la mise en état, l'armement en guerre ou l'équipement, dans sa juridiction, de tout vaisseau qu'il est raisonnablement fondé à croire destiné à croiser ou à faire la guerre contre une puissance avec laquelle ce Gouvernement est en paix; et de faire aussi même diligence pour empêcher le départ bors de sa juridiction de tout navire destiné à croiser ou à faire la guerre, comme il est dit ci-dessus, ce navire ayant été spécialement adapté, en tout ou en partie, dans les limites de sa dite juridiction, à des usages belligérants.

2. De ne permettre ni souffrir que l'un des belligérants fasse usage de ses ports ou de ses eaux comme d'une base d'opérations navales contre l'autre, ni pour renouveler ou augmenter ses munitions militaires ou son armement, ou s'y procurer des recrues.

3. D'exercer les dues diligences dans ses propres ports et eaux, et à l'égard de toutes personnes dans les limites de sa juridiction, afin d'empêcher toute violation des obligations et devoirs précédents.

The following is the translation, above referred to, of the Rules, as stated in the American Case, printed in parallel columns with a second translation, which will be found at page 513 of the first Part of the "Choix de Pièces Justificatives," furnished by the United States:

Translation taken from the Case of the United Translation taken from the "Choix de Pièces
States.
Justificatives" of the United States.

RÈGLES.

Un Gouvernement neutre est obligé1. À faire toutes les diligences nécessaires pour s'opposer dans les limites de sa juridiction territoriale à ce qu'un vaisseau soit mis en mesure de prendre la mer, à ce qu'il soit armé ou équipé, quand ce Gouvernement a des motifs suffisants pour pen

RÈGLES.

Un Gouvernement neutre est tenuPremièrement. De faire toutes les diligences nécessaries pour éviter qu'il soit armé ou équipé, dans sa juridiction, aucun vaisseau qu'il serait fondé à croire disposé à croiser ou à faire la guerre contre une puissance avec laquelle il est en paix; et

ser que ce vaisseau est destiné à croiser ou à faire des actes de guerre contre une puissance avec laquelle il est lui-même en paix. Ce Gouvernement doit faire également toutes les diligences nécessaires pour s'opposer à ce qu'un vaisseau destiné à croiser ou à faire des actes de guerre, comme il est dit ci-dessus, quitte les limites de sa juridiction territoriale dans le cas où il y aurait été spécialément adapté, soit en totalité, soit en partie, à des usages belligérants.

2. Un gouvernement neutre ne doit ni permettre ni tolérer que l'un des belligérants se serve de ses ports ou de ses eaux comme d'une base d'opération navale contre un autrebelligérant ; il ne doit ni permettre ni tolérer non plus que l'un des belligérants renouvelle ou augmente ses approvisionnements militaires, qu'il se procure des armes ou bien encore qu'il recrute des hommes.

3. Un Gouvernement neutre est obligé de faire toutes les diligences requises dans ses ports et dans ses eaux, en vue de prévenir toute violation des obligations et devoirs ci-dessus énoncés; il agira de même à l'égard de toutes les personnes qui se trouvent dans sa juridiction.

d'user de la même diligence pour empêcher que des vaisseaux destinés à croiser ou à faire la guerre, comme il est dit ci-dessus, sortent de sa juridiction, s'ils y ont été, en tout ou partie, adaptés spécialement à l'usage de la guerre.

Secondement. Il est tenu de ne permettre ni souffrir qu'aucun des belligérants se serve de ses ports ou de ses eaux pour en faire la base d'opérations navales contre l'autre, ou dans le but soit de renouveler ou augmenter les approvisionnements militaires ou les armes, soit de recruter des hommes.

Troisièmement. D'exercer la surveillance nécessaire dans ses propres ports et dans ses eaux, comme aussi sur tout individu dans sa juridiction, pour prévenir toute violation des obligations et des droits qui précèdent.

ANNEX C.-REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE BOARD OF TRADE.

In accordance with the request of the Board of Trade, we have examined the Revised List of Claims presented by the United States Agent on the 15th of April last, and have to offer the following observations on them in continuation of our First Report:

The aggregate amount of claims contained in the Revised Statement is $25,547,161. It is composed of a claim of $5,808.066, for increased insurance premiums; a claim of $479,033, which is styled "miscellaneous ;" and a claim of $19,260,062, for losses sustained in respect of the vessels destroyed by the cruisers.

As regards the claim for "increased insurance premiums," it is a claim for alleged indirect losses, with which we have no concern. It may not, however, be unworthy of notice that the claim has been increased from $1,120,795, in the Former Statement, to $5,808,066 in the Revised Statement, between the respective dates of the 4th of October and the 15th of March.

As regards the before-mentioned "miscellaneous" claim, it is to be found at p. 290 of the Revised Statement, and consists of the following items:

1. A claim of $11,788, which is described as follows: "For detention of ship at Philadelphia, unable to procure freight by reason of the depredations of the Alabama and other insurgent cruisers."

2. A claim of $15,761 for the detention of another ship, which is described in exactly the same way as the last claim.

3. A claim of $55,000 "for loss of vessel captured by insurgent cruisers V. H. Joy and Music (sailing under letters of marque) near the mouth of the Mississippi."

4. A claim of $95,000" for expenses and loss on account of the breaking up of the regular voyage of the bark Almina, the ship Daylight, and the ship Julia G. Tyler."

5. A claim of $300,032 for damages, breaking up business of "dispatch-line of China packets."

6. A claim of $1,452 by John Burns, Manchester, England, for his deceased son Joseph Burns, "for loss of one hundred and eightieth share in catchings of the whale-ship Hedaspe, of New Bedford, which he (the claimant) states was sunk by the Alabama with all hands on board." As regards the first, second, fourth, and fifth of these claims, it is manifest at once, from the above-mentioned description of them, taken from the Statement itself, not merely that the damages, which are not and cannot be attributed in any definite degree to any one or more of the Confederate cruisers, are of far too remote a character to be allowed, but also that these claims are, from their very nature, entirely and essentially claims for indirect losses, with which we have nothing to do.

As regards the third claim, there is no doubt that it must have been inadvertently inserted, for the cruisers V. H. Joy and Music therein referred to are not comprised in the list of cruisers mentioned in the United States Case or Counter Case, and are not stated to have been in any way connected with any act or default on the part of the British Government.1

The same consideration affects the claims connected with the cruisers Boston and Sallie in the "Former Statement," (see p. 63.)

« 이전계속 »