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with which they stand charged by the bill. In that event, of rse, the bill will be dismissed as to those who are not implicated. on a review of the whole case as presented by the partial record ore us, we think that the ends of justice would best be promoted affirming the order of the court below, and by remanding the case, t it may proceed in due and regular course to a final hearing on the rits.

CONSPIRACY—INDICTABLE ACTS-LABOR ORGANIZATIONS- State 4. in Pelt et al., Supreme Court of Vorth Carolina, 49 Southeastern porter, page 177.-An indictment against A. Van Pelt and four sociates, members of a union of carpenters in Rowan County, was ·ld, together with a bill of particulars filed therewith, not to charge i offense. From this ruling in the superior court of Rowan County, le State appealed, with the result that the finding of the lower court as sustained.

The facts as charged, and they were not disputed, were that three nembers of the union referred to visited one C. A. Rice, a lumber ealer, and notified him that he could not be considered a friend to union labor if he retained in his employment nonunion men. Rice had such men in his service, being under contract with them for as much as a year in advance, and he declined to discharge them and to agree to employ union men only. Thereupon a card was published in a daily newspaper in the town of Salisbury, stating that at a meeting of the carpenters and joiners' union the said C. A. Rice was declared unfair, and so listed, and that no union carpenter would work any material from his shop after a date named.

The indictment charged the defendants with the purpose “as much as in them lay unlawfully and feloniously to ruin ” the said Rice, and to "prevent and hinder him from using, exercising, and carrying on the said trade and business in as full, ample, and beneficial a manner as he was used and accustomed to."

In a lengthy opinion, concurred in in memoranda by the other members of the court, Judge Connor discussed the law of conspiracy, and of the right of workingmen to organize for purposes of mutual benefit, and announced the decision of the supreme court as follows:

The proposition is that the defendants conspired for the purpose of injuring the prosecutor in his trade and business, and that it is unlawful for them to do so. It can not be that every conspiracy to injure one in his trade and business, without reference to the means to be employed, is criminal. A carpenter or joiner has, by his apprenticeship, study, and experience, acquired skiil and knowledge in his trade. His capital consists in his physical strength and his intellect trained and directed by his skill and experience. It is the use of this which, in a sense, he offers for sale. In what respect, for the purpose of securing the best prices for his labor on the best terms, do his rights

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differ from the man who has cotton for sale, the product of his capital--land and labor-or the man who has money to invest in mercantile or manufacturing enterprise? Each of them enters into the field of competition. Each finds that organization with others engaged in the same field of labor or investment will secure better results and fairer treatment from those with whom he deals. There is no evil or harm in organization per se. Every copartnership, corporation, jointstock company, and other association of labor or capital is a recognition of this truth.

Judge Caldwell, in Ames ?. U. Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 62 Fed. 14, says: ** Organized labor is organized capital. It is capital consisting of brains and muscle.

* If it is lawful for the stockholders and oflicers of a corporation to associate and confer together for the purpose of reducing the wages of its employees, or for devising other means for making their investment more profitable, it is equally lawful for organized labor to associate, consult, and confer with a view to maintain or increase wages.' (Thomas 2. Cin., N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 62 Fed. 803; People v. Radt (Gen. Sess.) 71 N. Y. Supp. 846.) It is said: “One may refuse to deal with a firm because of a belief that it does not give honest compensation for labor, and may ask his friends or the public to do the same thing, and the conduct may do injury to the public without thereby becoming illegal.” Id.

There is no complaint that the conduct of the defendants was intended to injure nonunion men. This case has no such element in it, and we do not wish to be understood as expressing any opinion in regard to it. The question has been before other courts. There is a painful absence of harmony in the decisions. Suppose, however, that it be conceded that the defendants did notify the prosecutor that, unless he discharged nonunion men with whom he had contracted, etc., what was to be the result to him if he refused! He was to be considered as unsympathetic with union labor. This falls far short of intimidation or coercion. It will be noted that there is no charge that these defendants were members of any secret or other organization, or that they had the power or threatened to control the conduct of large numbers of men. This alleged conspiracy is contined to the five defendants. The counsel for the prosecutor in their brief say: " It is perfectly true that defendants had a right to refuse to work material from Rice's shop; that they had a right to put him on their unfair list.” The criminality, they say, consists in the intent or purpose with which these things are done. This, they say, is a question for the jury. It is not easy to see how it is a question for the jury when the defendants admit the purpose, etc.

If that which they did is lawful, if they had a perfect legal right to do it-- we are unable to perceive how the publication renders it unlawful. It being properly conceded that it was not unlawful--that is, for the purpose of this discussion, criminalfor the defendants to declare Mr. Rice unfair,” and to refuse to work his material, we can find nothing criminal in the publication made of their opinion or purpose.

Does the fact that the defendants intended to induce persons who might otherwise purchase material from Mr. Rice to refrain from doing so make their conduct unlawful? This brings us back to the original question. Persons who might wish to buy material from Mr. Rice had no legal claim on the services of the defendants. They were nder no obligation to work the material purchased from him. There

re in saying that they would not do so they deprived such persons i no legal right. They could not have maintained an action for damyes against the defendants for refusing to work such material or for iving so. How, then, in a legal sense, can he be said to be injured ? t is said that the purpose of the defendants in making the publicaion was to induce persons to refrain from purchasing material for ear of incurring the ill will of the defendants. This certainly is not inlawful. (Bowen 1. Matheson, 14 Allen, 499.) If courts were to naintain actions upon such grounds, society would soon be converted nto an array of hostile litigants. As is well said by Judge Black in Tenkins 1. Fowler, 24 Pa., 308:/-Malicious motives make a bad act vorse, but they can not make that wrong which in its own essence is awful.

Any transaction which would be lawful and proper f the parties are friends can not be made the foundation of an action nerely because they happen to be enemies. As long as a man keeps himself within the law by doing no act which, violates it, we must leave bis motive to Him who searches the heart."

It is very doubtful whether industrial conditions, or relations between employer and employees, have been improved by prosecutious for criminal conspiracy. As we have seen, in England the subject has received the most careful attention of enlightened statesmen, resulting in the passage of wise statutes. It is asked, May not a man conduct his business in his own way?' And undoubtedly he may. For any unlawful interference with this right he has a remedy, either civil or criminal, as such interference may justify. The question is asked, May not men organize to promote their common interests, and, when such interests conflict with other interests, resort to lawful and peaceful means to secure the best results? It is clear that they may. Where, then, is the line which separates conduet which is lawful from that which is unlawful? The answer comes from Chief Justice Shaw, one of the wisest and most learned of American jurists: “If it is to be carried into effect by fair or honorable or lawful means, it is, to say the least, innocent: if by falsehood or force, it may be stamped with the character of a criminal conspiracy." / We would not be misunderstood. Capital, either in the form of noney or other property, or in the form of skill, experience, intelligence, and strength, may combine for lawful purpose. When, in either form, or under whatever guise it seeks or conspires to effectuate its purpose, however lawful, by means of violence to person or property, or by fraud, or other criminal means, or when, by such means, it conspires to prevent any person from conducting his own business in his own way, or from employing such persons as he may prefer, or by preventing any person from being employed at such wages or upon such terms as he may prefer, the courts will be prompt to declare and firm to administer the law to punish the guilty and protect the injured. What acts will constitute such unlawful means it is impossible to define. As all other questions arising out of the struggle of political, social, or industrial forces, they must be decided as they are presented.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSUMPTION OF RISK COOPERATING Cause--Sirois v. J. E. Henry & Sons, Supreme Court of Nero Ilampshire, 59 Atlantic Reporter, page 936.–J. B. Sirois sued the firm above named to recover damages for injuries received while employed by the defendants in repairing a bucket elevator in their mill. To perform his duty Sirois was required to have his head and arms inside the casing of the elevator. When he wished the elevator shifted so as to get access to the different buckets he signaled to an assistant who repeated the signal to a man in charge of the operating clutch.

While Sirois was thus engaged two steam fitters came into the same room to make other repairs, the two sets of workmen being mutually ignorant of each others' presence and of the danger that might ensue from a confusion of signals. In the course of their work one of the steam fitters signaled to the other in such a way that Sirois's assistant mistook the signal as being addressed to him, and directed the man at the clutch to move the elevator, with the result that Sirois received the injuries for which the suit was brought. Damages were allowed in the superior court of the State, from which an appeal was taken to the supreme court, where the judgment of the court below was affirmed.

In announcing the opinion of the court Judge Bingham, speaking for the court, said in part:

Notwithstanding the plaintiff admitted that he knew other men besides those associated with him in repairing the carrier were at work making repairs in the mill on the day of the accident, his evidence tended to prove that he did not know any of them were at work in the digester room, or that their work was of a nature calling for the use of signals which might be mistaken for his. Hence it can not be said as a matter of law that the plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from such a cause. It was for the jury to say whether he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, and appreciated the danger, and assumed the risk of injury therefrom.

That the work in which the plaintiff was engaged at the time he received his injuries was dangerous, and of such a nature as to require reasonable rules and instructions for the guidance of the plaintiff and his associates in the performance of their duties, can not be doubted. The defendants did not contest this question at the trial. Their contention there was that adequate instructions were given the men, and, had they been followed, that the accident would not have happened. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended and introduced evidence tending to prove that no instructions were given.

The judge then reviewed the evidence as set forth in the statement of facts given above, and concluded:

From this evidence the jury could find that the defendants were negligent in not informing the plaintiff of this new and unknown danger, and in failing to make some reasonable provision for the conduct of the work in view of this added peril. If the evidence warranted a finding that the middleman was negligent in not first ascertaining whether the plaintiff was out of the carrier before giving the signal to start, so that the defendants' negligence was not the sole cause of the accident, nevertheless the jury would be warranted in finding that their negligence was a cooperating cause, for which they would be responsible, the plaintiff being in the exercise of due care.

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS— PowerS-BY-LAWS-RIGHTS OF MEMBERSFlaherty 1. Portland Longshoremen's Benorolent Society et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 59 Atlantic Reporter, page 58.-Jeremiah H. Flaherty sued the above-named society, an incorporated body of which he was a member, to prevent the employment of a physician by the organization. The supreme judicial court of Cumberland County dismissed the bill brought by Flaherty, who thereupon appealed to the supreme judicial court of the State, by which the decision of the court below was reversed, and an injunction issued to prevent the employment of the physician under a salary payable from association funds.

The facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court, which was delivered by Judge Savage, and which is reproduced herewith:

The Portland Longshoremen's Benevolent Society is a corporation created under the laws of Maine. Its business is conducted under a code of by-laws somewhat inartificially drawn. Its charter is not made a part of the record, but its object, as disclosed by the by-laws, is to “ bind its members together as one man that we may be better able to protect our interests, regulate our wages, and attend to such other business as may from time to time come before us." Membership is limited to a single class of laborers. Sick benefits are provided for. It is, in short, a corporation benevolent and protective. One of its by-laws provides that “the funds of this society shall be appropriated for no other purpose than that necessarily incurred for the maintenance of wages, burying the dead, and other incidental expenses;" and another, that resolutions adopted at any general or special meeting of this society for any special purpose shall be as binding on its members as if they were embodied in its by-laws.” No provision is made in the by-laws for a physician of the society, but for some years before this controversy arose a physician had been employed by vote of the society, and paid a stipulated annual salary.

At a meeting of the society held October 6, 1903, a committee was appointed to bring in the lowest terms that a competent physician will serve the society for one year.” At a meeting a week later the committee reported the sealed proposals of three physicians, which being opened, it was found that the proposal of Doctor Conneen was the lowest. Discussion ensued, some claiming that the physician should be elected by ballot, and not appointed; but the president ruled that the lowest bidder was entitled to the position, and accordingly appointed Doctor Conneen. Afterwards the society, by vote, instructed the recording secretary to notify the previous physician that his seryices would end October 15, 1903, and to notify Doctor Conneen of his appointment as physician. At the next meeting of the society "the minutes of the last meeting were read and approved."

The plaintiff (Flaherty), a member of the society in good standing, brought this bill, in behalf of himself and of all other members who might desire to become plaintiffs, to restrain the society and its officers from paying any of the moneys of the corporation to Doctor Conneen as a salary under the foregoing appointment as physician. A temporary injunction was issued. After hearing, the sitting justice below dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill. The plaintiff appealed

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