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The inquiries addressed to the school-teachers adduced the fact that the greater number of families under consideration consisted of 4 persons, and this number was chosen as constituting a typical family and the report based on that computation.
The approximate monthly consumption of food by such a family was considered to be about 50 kilograms (110.23 pounds) of bread, 10 kilograms (22.05 pounds) of beef, 4 kilograms (8.82 pounds) of lard, 6 dozen eggs, 34 liters (35.93 quarts) of milk, and 22 kilograms (48.5 pounds) of potatoes. The drink consumed was reckoned, according to locality, at 44 liters (46.49 quarts) of wine, 80 liters (84.54 quarts) of beer, or 100 liters (105.67 quarts) of cider. This amount being fixed, the varying cost in different localities was reported, from which a classified summary was prepared as follows:
ESTIMATED COST PER MONTH OF FOOD AND DRINK IN VARIOU'S COMMUNES, CLASSI
FIED ACCORDING TO POPULATION.
L'Industrie du Chiffon à Paris. Office du Travail, Ministère du
Commerce, de l'Industrie, des Postes et des Télégraphes. 1903.
vi, 110 pp.
Under this head are presented the results of an investigation made into the ladustry of ragpicking in Paris and its suburbs. The different chapters discuss the conditions of labor, the products of the industry, the economic condition of the ragpickers and of the masters and dealers, the influence of the regulations controlling the cleaning of the streets and the disposition of the paper collected, and the organization and sanitary and moral condition of the persons considered.
The industry is an old one in Paris, having been the object of special police ordinances as early as the seventeenth century. There are two classes of workmen, the collectors who go upon the streets and secure a product from the sale of which they derive their support, and the employees of the masters who purchase and sort the collected material, selling each class of products to the dealers. Subdivisions are made of the former group, as night workers, collectors who have fixed beats or places of resort, wandering ragpickers, workers on the city rubbish carts, etc.
Gathering at night was most common and profitable under the old custom of depositing rubbish on the streets at nightfall, to be gathered up on the following day, but since the passage of laws requiring the use of receptacles into which sweepings and domestic refuse must be put not more than one hour before the time for the city carts to make their tours of collection but little of this kind of work is possible. This period was fixed for a time at one-fourth of an hour, but the ragpickers demanded and secured the modification that allows one hour for their operations.
Collectors who obtain the favor of the janitor of a house by assisting in the handling of the refuse and the placing of it in boxes secure a sort of local right that is not only respected in behalf of the one securing it, but is also made the object of barter and sale between the collectors. The price of a “place” or beat in a good section of the city may amount to 100 or 150 francs ($19.30 or $28.95), or in exceptional cases to as much as 400 francs ($77.20).
The city allows a fixed compensation amounting to 1.35 francs (26 cents) per day for three hours service to a class of collectors who assist the drivers of the city carts in their labors. These collectors watch the rubbish as it is emptied and also go upon the carts in their search for such matter as they may be able to make profitable to themselves.
The number of persons occupied in the industry is not easily determined, partly because the business is one in which one may engage as an adjunct to some other employment with which he prefers to be enumerated, and partly because it is difficult to determine how far the members of a ragpicker's family are engaged with him in the prosecution of his work. An industrial census of 1896 gave the number at 4,959 in Paris and its suburbs, including collectors, sorters, and dealers. An estimate based on the work accomplished gives approximately the same number in 1902, while an organization of the masters reports 22,500 and two organizations of the workmen report 19,200 and 27,700, respectively, as the number of persons employed in the collecting and sorting of the various materials handled. An ordinance of 1872 required enrollment and the procuring of a badge. Under this law 5,900 persons presented themselves as ragpickers. This was in the period when practically all collecting was done at night.
The total amount of material collected by all classes of gatherers is estimated at about 117,400 tons. The receipts of the workmen are approximately 3,500,000 francs ($675,500), besides the value of the articles which they use, while the various manipulations and transportations effect a final contribution of raw material to various industries amounting in value to 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 francs ($1,514,000 or $1,737,000). The daily income of the various classes of workers varies from 1.25 to 4 francs (24 to 77 cents).
The necessity of immediately securing cash returns for his day's work and the lack of facilities for sorting compel the gatherer to turn the results of his labors over to the buyer without the advantage of classification or of choosing his purchaser. Dealers refuse to buy of those who will not bring all their products to them, and they often have claims also for money advanced. Efforts at cooperative selling associations and at the formation of unions have been made with a view to releasing the gatherers from this dependence, but none of these have effected anything more than temporary results. There were in existence, however, at the date of the publication of this report some recently formed associations which are thought to give promise of greater permanence.
Among patron or master ragpickers an organization was formed in 1890, and another in 1900, the latter restricted to Paris, while the former is of wider geographical scope.
The table of materials used by the dealers, found in the collections of the rågpickers, includes rags for paper, woolen rags for raveling, silk, bones, glass, metals, shoes, etc. Profits are reported to be decreasing for various reasons, among others the use of wood pulp for paper making, the prohibition against the use of printed paper for wrapping articles of food, the importation of rags, the diminution in market value of various collected articles, and a form of competition by charitable institutions and dealers in secondhand goods.
DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.
[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]
DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY—INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICYACTION BY EMPLOYEE- Connolly v. Bolster et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 72 Northeastern Reporter, page 981.—In this case Connolly, who was an employee of one Bell, sought to recover on a judgment against his employer for an injury received while in the latter's service. Bell had disappeared, and the action was against Bolster, as attorney for the company which had issued a policy of insurance in Bell's favor, securing him against loss under his liability as an employer.
In the superior court of Suffolk County the insurance company had demurred to the bill and the demurrer was sustained, whereupon Connolly appealed to the supreme judicial court of the State with the result that the decree of the court below was affirmed. Further facts necessary to an understanding of the case are set forth in the opinion of Judge Loring, speaking for the court, from whose remarks the following is quoted:
The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to maintain this bill to reach and apply the debt due from the insurance company to his employer, Bell, first, on the ground that, on the true construction of the policy, the insurance company is indebted at law to his employer in the amount of the judgment which he has recovered against him; and, secondly, that, if the debt is not due at law, his employer has a right in equity to maintain a bill against him for exoneration, and to compel the company to satisfy the judgment directly. On the first ground the plaintiff relies on the case of Sanders 1. Frankfort Ins. Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655. In that case relief was given under similar circumstances on the ground that, as matter of construction of a policy having the same terms, payment of a judgment by the assured was not a condition precedent to a right of action on the policy where the insurance company had undertaken the defense of the claim. By the policy here under discussion, and construed by the court in Sanders r. Frankfort Ins. Co., the company "agrees to indemnify” the assured “against loss from common-law or statutory liability for damages on account of bodily injuries” to employees, caused by the negligence of the assured, “subject to the following special and general agreements.” The second, third, and eighth clauses of the general agreements are the material ones. The second and third and the material part of the eighth clauses are as follows:
“(2) If thereafter, any suit is brought against the assured to enforce a claim for damages on account of an accident covered by this policy immediate notice thereof shall be given to the company, and the company will defend against such proceeding, in the name and on behalf of the assured, or settle the same at its own cost, unless it shall elect to pay to the assured the indemnity provided for in clause A of special agreements as limited therein.
(3) The assured shall not settle any claim, except at his own cost, nor incur any expense, nor interfere in any negotiation for settlement or in any legal proceeding without the consent of the company previously given in writing, but he may provide at the time of the accident such immediate surgical relief as is imperative. The assured when requested by the company shall aid in securing information and evidence and in effecting settlement, and in case the company calls for the attendance of any employee or employees as witnesses at inquests and in suits the assured will secure his or their attendance making no charge for his or their loss of time."
"8) No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue.”
The conclusion that payment of the judgment recovered by the employee was not a condition precedent to an action on the policy was reached in Sanders v. Frankfort Ins. Co. on these grounds: The word “defend," in the second clause, means to protect and secure against attack—“in short, to successfully defend”—and therefore included an obligation on the part of the company to pay the judgment if the case defended resulted in a judgment against the assured. That the second clause of the general agreements, so construed, was not consistent with the eighth clause of the general agreements, which stipulates, in terms, that “No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue.” That, if the eighth clause is construed to cover cases of which the insurance company has assumed the defense, it is inconsistent with the second clause, so construed, and consequently the eighth clause must be construed not to cover those cases, but to be confined to cases of which the insurance company has not assumed the defense. We are of opinion, however, in the first place, that the word "defend," in the second clause, is to have its natural import; that it means here what it means when counsel are retained to defend an action; and that it is not to be extended beyond that, and to mean to "successfully defend.” In the second place, the second clause is an obligation in addition to the obligation to indemnify the assured against loss, and not a clause qualifying the main obligation of the policy to “indemnify” (against loss” from liability for damages on account of bodily injuries to employees caused by negligence of the assured. The object of this second clause is plain, when taken in connection with the third. It is plainly inserted as an additional obligation and privilege for the protection of the insurance company, on the