the results of his labors over to the buyer without the advantage of classification or of choosing his purchaser. Dealers refuse to buy of those who will not bring all their products to them, and they often have claims also for money advanced. Efforts at cooperative selling associations and at the formation of unions have been made with a view to releasing the gatherers from this dependence, but none of these have effected anything more than temporary results. There were in existence, however, at the date of the publication of this report some recently formed associations which are thought to give promise of greater permanence.

Among patron or master ragpickers an organization was formed in 1890, and another in 1900, the latter restricted to Paris, while the former is of wider geographical scope.

The table of materials used by the dealers, found in the collections. of the ragpickers, includes rags for paper, woolen rags for raveling, silk, bones, glass, metals, shoes, etc. Profits are reported to be decreasing for various reasons, among others the use of wood pulp for paper making, the prohibition against the use of printed paper for wrapping articles of food, the importation of rags, the diminution in market value of various collected articles, and a form of competition by charitable institutions and dealers in secondhand goods.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLICYACTION BY EMPLOYEE-Connolly v. Bolster et al., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 72 Northeastern Reporter, page 981.-In this case Connolly, who was an employee of one Bell, sought to recover on a judgment against his employer for an injury received while in the latter's service. Bell had disappeared, and the action was against Bolster, as attorney for the company which had issued a policy of insurance in Bell's favor, securing him against loss under his liability as an employer.

In the superior court of Suffolk County the insurance company had demurred to the bill and the demurrer was sustained, whereupon Connolly appealed to the supreme judicial court of the State with the result that the decree of the court below was affirmed. Further facts necessary to an understanding of the case are set forth in the opinion of Judge Loring, speaking for the court, from whose remarks the following is quoted:

The plaintiff claims that he is entitled to maintain this bill to reach and apply the debt due from the insurance company to his employer, Bell, first, on the ground that, on the true construction of the policy, the insurance company is indebted at law to his employer in the amount of the judgment which he has recovered against him; and, secondly, that, if the debt is not due at law, his employer has a right in equity to maintain a bill against him for exoneration, and to compel the company to satisfy the judgment directly. On the first ground the plaintiff relies on the case of Sanders . Frankfort Ins. Co., 72 N. H. 485, 57 Atl. 655. In that case relief was given under similar circumstances on the ground that, as matter of construction of a policy having the same terms, payment of a judgment by the assured was not a condition precedent to a right of action on the policy where the insurance company had undertaken the defense of the claim. By the policy here under discussion, and construed by the court in Sanders . Frankfort Ins. Co., the company "agrees to indemnify" the assured "against loss from common-law or statutory liability for damages on account of bodily injuries" to employees, caused by the negligence of the assured, "subject to the following special and general

agreements." The second, third, and eighth clauses of the general agreements are the material ones. The second and third and the material part of the eighth clauses are as follows:

"(2) If thereafter, any suit is brought against the assured to enforce a claim for damages on account of an accident covered by this policy immediate notice thereof shall be given to the company, and the company will defend against such proceeding, in the name and on behalf of the assured, or settle the same at its own cost, unless it shall elect to pay to the assured the indemnity provided for in clause A of special agreements as limited therein.

"(3) The assured shall not settle any claim, except at his own cost, nor incur any expense, nor interfere in any negotiation for settlement or in any legal proceeding without the consent of the company previously given in writing, but he may provide at the time of the accident such immediate surgical relief as is imperative. The assured when requested by the company shall aid in securing information and evidence and in effecting settlement, and in case the company calls for the attendance of any employee or employees as witnesses at inquests and in suits the assured will secure his or their attendance making no charge for his or their loss of time."

"(8) No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue."

The conclusion that payment of the judgment recovered by the employee was not a condition precedent to an action on the policy was reached in Sanders v. Frankfort Ins. Co. on these grounds: The word "defend," in the second clause, means to protect and secure against attack-"in short, to successfully defend" and therefore included an obligation on the part of the company to pay the judgment if the case defended resulted in a judgment against the assured. That the second clause of the general agreements, so construed, was not consistent with the eighth clause of the general agreements, which stipulates, in terms, that "No action shall lie against the company as respects any loss under this policy, unless it shall be brought by the assured himself to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue." That, if the eighth clause is construed to cover cases of which the insurance company has assumed the defense, it is inconsistent with the second clause, so construed, and consequently the eighth clause must be construed not to cover those cases, but to be confined to cases of which the insurance company has not assumed the defense. We are of opinion, however, in the first place, that the word "defend," in the second clause, is to have its natural import; that it means here what it means when counsel are retained to defend an action; and that it is not to be extended beyond that, and to mean to "successfully defend." In the second place, the second clause is an obligation in addition to the obligation to indemnify the assured against loss, and not a clause qualifying the main obligation of the policy to indemnify" "against loss" from liability for damages on account of bodily injuries to employees caused by negligence of the assured. The object of this second clause is plain, when taken in connection with the third. It is plainly inserted as an additional obligation and privilege for the protection of the insurance company, on the

assumption that it is for the pecuniary interest of the company to be given the conduct of and to defend the action which is to fix its liability, and the amount to be paid when liable, rather than to leave that matter to be dealt with by the several persons insured, respectively. This does not result in the necessity of writing into clause 2 the qualifying words "until final judgment," as the plaintiff contends, for, when final judgment is rendered, ordinarily all defense is at an end. Nothing remains but a writ of review or a writ of error, and, if such a proceeding were necessary, it might well be held to be covered by the obligation to defend. But when the defense is ended, and, in spite of the defense, judgment is rendered against the insured, there is nothing to do but pay. Making payment of a judgment against the defendant is no part of a covenant to defend the action. Whether the insurance company is bound to pay the judgment depends upon the terms of its agreement to indemnify the assured against loss, and the eighth clause, in terms, provides that no action shall lie for "any loss under this policy," unless brought by the assured "to reimburse him for loss actually sustained and paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment after trial of the issue." In the case at bar, Bell has not paid the judgment recovered by the plaintiff, and therefore has no claim against the insurance company.

We add, only because the plaintiff has argued to the contrary, that the policy here in question is not to be construed in the same way as a policy which insures against the liability of the employer, and does not contain clause 2 of the general agreements. For the same reason it is necessary to point out that to pay a judgment under clause 2 is not to settle any claim," within clause 3, and so there is no inconsistency between the two clauses.

It is proper to point out that, if the plaintiff is right in his construction of the policy, his remedy would have been to attach the debt due by trustee process in an action at law.

No argument has been made in support of the second contention stated in the plaintiff's brief. The contention can not be sustained.

It remains to speak of the plaintiff's prayer to have a receiver appointed to pay the judgment due to the plaintiff, and so complete Bell's right against the defendant. The statute authorizing a plaintiff to reach and apply (Rev. Laws, c. 159, sec. 3, cl. 7) deals with the defendant's property which can not be attached at law. It is not a statute authorizing the court to complete inchoate rights, so as to create property which could then be the subject of trustee process in an action at law.

EMPLOYERS'

LIABILITY RAILROAD COMPANIES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION-CONSTRUCTION-Norfolk and Western Railway Company v. Cheatwood's Administratrix, Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, 49 Southeastern Reporter, page 489.-Judgment had been awarded the plaintiff against the company named for negligently causing the death of W. J. Cheatwood, an engine hostler in its employ, the case having been heard in the corporation court of the city of Radford. From this judgment the company appealed, with the result that the judgment of the lower court

was affirmed. No point of particular interest was involved, other than a ruling on the construction of section 162 of the constitution of the State and of section 1294k of the code of 1904 (ch. 322, Acts of 1901-2). These sections provide that "knowledge by any railroad employee injured of the defective or unsafe character or condition of any machinery, ways, appliances, or structures shall be no defense to an action for injury caused thereby."

On the construction to be placed on this language, Judge Cardwell, for the court, said:

This provision of the constitution was taken verbatim from the constitution of the State of Mississippi, and when adopted by our late constitutional convention it had been construed by the supreme court of Mississippi in the case of Buckner v. R. & D. R. R. Co., 72 Miss. 873, 18 South. 449, in which case a servant was injured by defective machinery and his contributory negligence. It was in that case claimed that the constitution of Mississippi abrogated the defense of contributory negligence, but the court held otherwise, and, after quoting the constitutional provision, said: "The effect of this is not to destroy the defense of contributory negligence by a railroad company, but merely to abrogate the previously existing rule that knowledge by an employee of the defective or unsafe character or condition of the machinery, ways, or appliances shall not, of itself, bar a recovery. The law was that knowledge by an employee of defective appliances which he voluntarily used precluded his recovery for an injury thus received. The constitution destroys that rule, and the mere fact that the employee knew of the defect is not a bar to recovery; but knowledge by an employee of defects is still an element or factor, and a very important one, in determining whether, with the knowledge he had, he used that degree of caution required in his situation with reference to the appliances causing his injury. The constitution did not have the effect to free employees of railroad companies from the exercise of ordinary caution and prudence. It does not license recklessness or carelessness by them, and give them a claim to compensation for injuries thus suffered. They, like others not employees, must not be guilty of contributory negligence, if they would secure a right of action for injuries."

Under the rule laid down by this court in N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Old Dominion Baggage Co., 99 Va. 111, 37 S. E. 784, 50 L. R. A. 722, the construction placed on that clause in our constitution by the Mississippi court must be adopted by this court.

We are of opinion that, independently of the rule laid down in N. & W. Ry. Co. v. Old Dom. Baggage Co., supra, the construction put upon the language of the constitutional provision under consideration by the supreme court of Mississippi is a correct construction.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES-FELLOW-SERVANT LAW-LOGGING RAILROAD-McKivergan v. Alexander and Edgar Lumber Company, Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 102 Northwestern Reporter, page 332.-E. J. McKivergan was injured while in the service of the above-named company, assisting in the operation of a log