define their words, since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known and therefore the perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses in morality be not clearer than those in natural philosophy, since they are about ideas in the mind, none of which are false or disproportionate. It is easier to frame an idea which shall be the standard of the name justice, than, having seen Aristides, to frame an idea that shall in all things be exactly like him. The necessity of defining moral words is farther shown, in that it is the only way whereby the signification of most of them can be certainly known for the ideas they stand for existing together only in the mind, it is only by words enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united, that we can make known to others what their names stand for.

3. For the explaining the signification of the names of substances, both the before-mentioned ways of showing and defining are, in many cases, requisite ; for there being in each sort some leading qualities, to which we suppose the other ideas, which make up our complex idea of that species, annexed, we give the specific name to that wherein the specific mark is found. Now these leading sensible qualities make the chief ingredients in our specific ideas, and are the most invariable part in the definitions of our specific names. For though the sound man be apt to signify a complex idea made up of animality and rationality, yet the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex idea signified by the word man, as any other we find in it: for it is shape, as the leading quality, that seems more to determine that species than a faculty of reason, that appears not at first, and in some never. Now these leading quali ties can be best made known by showing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. But because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas of

substances, are powers which lie not obvious to our senses, some part of the signification will be better made known by enumerating those simple ideas than by showing the substance itself. For he that to the

color of gold shall have the ideas of ductility, fusibility, fixedness, &c. added by my enumerating them, will have a perfecter idea of gold, than he can by seeing it.

Hence we may take notice how much the foundation of our knowlege of corporeal things lies in our senses : for how spirits separate from bodies know them we have no notion at all. The extent of our knowlege or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas, limited to our ways of perception.

4. But though definitions serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without imperfection, as they stand for things for our names of substances being put to represent things, must agree with the truth of things; and we must not always rest in the ordinary complex idea received as the signification of that word, but must inquire into the properties of the things themselves. This is necessary to be done by all who search after knowlege and philosophical verity, in that children being taught words whilst they have an imperfect notion of things, apply them without much thinking, and seldom frame determined ideas to be signified by them, which custom they are apt to continue when they are men. Whence it comes to pass, that men speaking grammatically the language of their country, speak very improperly of things themselves, and in their arguments make small progress in the discovery of truth.

If men versed in physical inquiries would set down those simple ideas wherein they observe individuals of each sort to agree, this would prevent the confusion of several persons applying the same name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less ac

quainted with the qualities of things which come under one denomination. But men dispute in words, the meaning of which is not agreed between them, out of a mistake that the significations of common words are certainly established, and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false; no names of complex ideas having so determined significations, that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas; nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowlege of any thing but by the necessary ways of attaining it; and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound, there being no other way, without such a declaration, certainly to know it.

5. If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, yet in all discourses, wherein one man pretends to instruct another, he should use the same word constantly in the same sense. But after all, the provision of words is so scanty in respect to the infinite variety of thoughts, that men, notwithstanding their utmost caution, will be often forced to use the same word in different senses; yet the import of the discourse will, if there be no designed fallacy, lead an intelligent reader into the true meaning of it; but where that is not sufficient to guide the reader, then it concerns the writer to explain his meaning, and show in what sense he there uses the term.

SINCE the mind hath no immediate object of thought but its own ideas, it is evident that our knowlege is only conversant about them. Knowlege seems to me to consist in the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas for when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive that these two ideas do not agree? And when we know that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, what do we more but perceive their equality to two right ones ?1

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The placing of certainty, as Mr. Locke does, in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, the bishop of Worcester suspects may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith which he has endeavored to defend to which Mr. Locke answers: Since your lordship hath not, as I remember, shown, or gone about to show, how this proposition, viz. that certainty consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, is opposite or inconsistent with that article of faith which your lordship has endeavored to defend; it is plain, it is but your lordship's fear, that it may be of dangerous consequence to it, which, as I humbly conceive, is no proof that it is any way inconsistent with that article.

'Nobody, I think, can blame your lordship, or any one else, for being concerned for any article of the Christian faith; but if that concern (as it may, and as we know it has done) makes any one apprehend danger where no danger is, are we, therefore, to give up and condemn any proposition, because any one, though of the first rank and magnitude, fears it may be of dangerous consequence to any truth of religion, without showing that it is so?

such fears be the measures whereby to judge of truth and falsehood, the affirming that there are antipodes would be still a heresy; and the doctrine of the motion of the earth must be rejected, as overthrowing the truth of the Scripture; for of that

To understand this more distinctly, we may reduce it to four sorts:-1. identity, or diversity; 2. relation;

dangerous consequence it has been apprehended to be, by many learned and pious divines, out of their great concern for religion. And yet, notwithstanding those great apprehensions of what dangerous consequence it might be, it is now universally received by learned men, as an undoubted truth; and writ for by some, whose belief of the Scripture is not at all questioned; and particularly, very lately, by a divine of the Church of England, with great strength of reason, in his wonderfully ingenious New Theory of the Earth.

The reason your lordship gives of your fears, that it may be of such dangerous consequence to that article of faith which your lordship endeavors to defend, though it occur in more places than one, is only this, viz. That it is made use of by ill men to do mischief, i. e. to oppose that article of faith which your lordship hath endeavored to defend. But, my lord, if it be a reason to lay by any thing as bad, because it is, or may be, used to an ill purpose, I know not what will be innocent enough to be kept. Arms, which were made for our defence, are sometimes made use of to do mischief; and yet they are not thought of dangerous consequence for all that. Nobody lays by his sword and pistols, or thinks them of such dangerous consequence as to be neglected or thrown away, because robbers, and the worst of men, sometimes make use of them to take away honest men's lives or goods. And the reason is, because they were designed, and will serve, to preserve them. And who knows but this may be the present case? If your lordship thinks, that placing of certainty in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas, be to be rejected as false, because you apprehend it may be of dangerous consequence to that article of faith; on the other side, perhaps others, with me, may think it a defence against error, and so (as being of good use) to be received and adhered to.

I would not, my lord, be hereby thought to set up my own, or any one's judgment against your lordship's. But I have said this only to show, whilst the argument lies for or against the truth of any proposition, barely in an imagination that it may be of consequence to the supporting or overthrowing of any remote truth; it will be impossible, that way, to determine of the truth or falsehood of that proposition. For imagination will be set up against imagination, and the stronger probably will be against your lordship; the strongest imaginations being usually in the weakest heads. The only way, in this case, to put it past doubt, is to show the inconsistency of the two propositions; and then it will be seen, that one overthrows the other; the true, the false

one.

Your lordship says, indeed, this is a new method of certainty. I will not say so myself, for fear of deserving a second reproof from your lordship, for being too forward to assume to myself the honor of being an original. But this, I think, gives