produce thought: knowlege will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing to produce. Divide matter into as minute parts as you will, vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please, it will operate no otherwise on other bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did before this division. The minutest particles of matter knock, impel, and resist one another, just as the greater do, and that is all they can do; so that if we will suppose nothing eternal, matter can never begin to be. If we suppose bare matter without motion eternal, motion can never begin to be. If we suppose only matter and motion eternal, thought can never begin to be: for it is impossible to conceive that matter, either with or without motion, could have originally, in and from itself, sense, perception, and knowlege; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception, and knowlege, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter, and every particle of it. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it, and actually have, at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist, it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be matter.

If therefore it be evident that something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being : for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all being, should produce a positive being

or matter.

This discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowlege of God. For it will hence follow, that all other knowing beings, that have a beginning, must depend on him, and have no other ways of knowlege or extent of power, than what he gives them;

and therefore if he made those, he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe, all inanimate bodies, whereby his omniscience, power, and providence will be established; and from thence all his other attributes necessarily follow.

CHAPTER XI.

Of our Knowlege of the Existence of other Things.

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The knowlege of our own being we have by intuition the existence of a God, reason clearly makes known to us, as has been shown the knowlege of the existence of any other thing, we can have only by sensation; for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory; nor of any other existence, but that of God, with the existence of any particular man ; no particular man can know the existence of any other being, but only, when by actually operating on him, it makes itself be perceived by him. The having the idea of any thing in our mind, no more proves the existence of that thing, than the picture of a man evidences his being in the world, or the visions of a dream make thereby a true history. It is therefore the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the existence of other things, and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us, which causes that idea in us, though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it; for it takes not from the certainty of our senses, and the ideas we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced.

This notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as intuition and demonstration, deserves the name of knowlege, if we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right, concerning the existence

of those objects that affect them. But besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, we have other concurrent reasons; as,

1. It is plain those perceptions are produced in us by exterior causes affecting our senses, because those that want the organs of any sense never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way.

2. Because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in our minds: when my eyes are shut, I can at pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory; but if I turn my eyes towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or the sun then produces in me: which shows a manifest difference between those ideas laid up in the memory, and such as force themselves on us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some exterior cause, whose efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will

or no.

Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself, between actually looking on the sun, and contemplating the idea he has of it in his memory; and therefore he hath certain knowlege, that they are not both memory or fancy; but that actual seeing has a cause without.

3. Add to this, that many ideas are produced in us with pain, which we afterwards remember without the least offence. Thus the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is received in our minds, gives us no disturbance; which when felt was very troublesome; and we remember the pain of hunger, thirst, headache, &c. without any pain at all; which would either

never disturb us, or else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but ideas floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad.

4. Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report, concerning the existence of sensible things without us: he that doubts when he sees a fire, whether it be real, may, if he please, feel it too; and, by the exquisite pain, he will be convinced that it is not a bare idea or phantom.

If, after all this, any one will be so sceptical as to distrust his senses, and to question the existence of all things, or our knowlege of any thing; let him consider that the certainty of things existing in rerum natura, when we have the testimony of our senses for it, is not only as great as our frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our faculties being not suited to the full extent of being, nor a clear comprehensive knowlege of all things, but to the preservation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life; they serve our purpose well enough if they will but give us certain notice of those things that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that sees a candle burning, and has experimented the force of the flame by putting his finger in it, will little doubt that this is something existing without him, which does him harm, and puts him to pain, which is assurance enough; when no man requires greater certainty to govern his actions by, than what is as certain as his actions themselves: so that this evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleasure or pain, that is, happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment either of knowing or being.

In fine, when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea, we are assured that there is something at that time really existing without us.

But this knowlege extends only as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no farther. My seeing a man a minute since, is no certain argument of his present existence; since there is no necessary connexion of his existence a minute since, with his existence now.

As when our senses are actually employed about any object, we know that it does exist; so by our memory we may be assured, that heretofore things that affected our senses have existed: and thus we have the knowlege of the past existence of several things; whereof our senses having informed us, our memories still retain the ideas: and of this we are past all doubt, so long as we remember well.

As to the existence of spirits, our having ideas of them, does not make us know that any such things do exist without us; or that there are any finite spirits; or any other spiritual beings but the Eternal God. We have ground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with assurance, that there are such creatures but our senses not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular existence; for we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing, by the idea we have of such beings, than, by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist.

Hence we may gather, that there are two sorts of propositions, one concerning the existence of any thing answerable to such an idea; as that of an elephant, phoenix, motion, or angel; viz. whether such a thing does any where exist: and this knowlege is only of particulars, and not to be had of any thing without us, but only of God, any other way than by our.

senses.

Another sort of proposition is, wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our abstract ideas,