this to me, or else I see nothing. If I know not this, how great soever my assurance is, it is groundless: whatever light I pretend to, it is but enthusiasm.

In all that is of divine revelation, there is need of no other proof, but that it is from God: for he can neither deceive nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that any proposition in our minds is a truth revealed to us by God? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the evidence it pretends to. For men thus possessed boast of a light, whereby they say they are brought into the knowlege of this or that truth. But if they know it to be a truth, they must know it to be so either by its own self-evidence or by the rational proofs that make it out to be so. If they know it to be a truth either of these two ways, they in vain suppose it to be a revelation. For thus all truths, of what kind soever, that men uninspired are enlightened with, come into their minds. If they say they know it to be true, because it is a revelation from God, the reason is good: but then it will be demanded, how they know it to be a revelation from God? If they say by the light it brings with it, I beseech them to consider whether this be any more, than that it is a revelation because they strongly believe it to be true. For all the light they speak of, is but a strong persuasion of their own minds that it is a truth, which is a very unsafe ground to proceed on, either in our tenets or actions.

True light in the mind is nothing else but the evidence of the truth of any proposition: and if it be not self-evident, all the light it can have is from clearness of those proofs on which it is received. To talk of any other light in the understanding, is to put ourselves in the dark, or in the power of the prince of darkness. For if strength of persuasion be the light which must guide us, how shall any one distinguish between the delusions of Satan, and the inspirations of the Holy Ghost?

He therefore that will not give up himself to delusion and error, must bring this guide of his light within to the trial. God, when he makes the prophet, does not unmake the man. He leaves his faculties in their natural state, to enable him to judge of his inspirations, whether they be of divine original or no. If he would have us assent to the truth of any proposition, he either evidences that truth by the usual methods of natural reason, or else makes it known to be a truth which he would have us assent to by his authority; and convinces us that it is from him, by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken in. Reason must be our last judge and guide in every thing. I do not mean that we must consult reason, and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles, and if it cannot, that then we may reject it: but consult it we must, and by it examine, whether it be a revelation from God or no : and if reason finds it to be revealed from God, reason then declares for it, as much as for any other truth, and makes it one of her dictates. Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration, if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions whereby to judge of them : if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves, inspirations and delusions, truth and falsehood, will have the same measure, and will not be possible to be distinguished.

Thus we see the holy men of God, who had revelations from God, had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their own minds, to testify to them that it was from God. They had outward signs to convince them of the Author of those revelations. And when they were to convince others, they had a power given them to justify the truth of their commission from Heaven; and by visible signs to assert the divine authority of the message they were sent with. Moses saw the bush burn without being consumed, and heard a

voice out of it. God, by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent, assured him likewise of a power to testify his mission, by the same miracle repeated before them to whom he was sent. This, and the like instances to be found among the prophets of old, are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing, or persuasion of their own minds, a sufficient evidence, without any other proof, that it was from God, though the Scripture does not every where mention their demanding or having such proofs.

I do not deny that God can, or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths, or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it. But in such cases too we have reason and the Scripture, unerring rules, to know whether it be from God, or no. Where the truth embraced is consonant to the revelation in the written word of God, or the action conformable to the dictates of right reason, or holy writ, we run no risk in entertaining it as such; because, though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God, extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth. Where right reason or Scripture is express for any opinion or action, we may receive it as of divine authority; but it is not the strength of our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp. The bent of our own minds may favor it as much as we please; that may show it to be a fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an offspring of heaven and of divine original.

CHAPTER XX.

Of wrong Assent or Error.

Error is a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. The reasons whereof may

be reduced to these four: 1. want of proofs; 2. want of ability to use them; 3. want of will to use them ; 4. wrong measures of probability.

1. Want of proofs: by which, I do not mean only the want of those proofs which are not to be had, but also of those proofs which are in being, or might be procured. The greatest part of mankind want the conveniences and opportunities of making experiments and observations themselves, or of collecting the testimonies of others, being enslaved to the necessity of their mean condition, whose lives are worn out only in the provisions for living. These men are, by the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible ignorance of those proofs, on which others build, and which are necessary to establish those opinions; for, having much to do to get the means of living, they are not in a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries.

It is true that God has furnished men with faculties sufficient to direct them in the way they should take, if they will but seriously employ them that way, when their ordinary vocations allow them leisure. No man is so wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no spare time at all to think on his soul, and inform himself in matters of religion, were men as intent on this, as they are on things of lower concernment. There are none so enslaved to the necessity of life, who might not find many vacancies that might be husbanded to this advantage of their knowlege.

Besides those already mentioned, there are others, whose largeness of fortune would plentifully enough supply books and other requisites for discovering of truth, but they are cooped in close by the laws of their countries, and the strict guards of those whose interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest,knowing more, they should believe the less in them. This is generally the case of all those who live in places where

care is taken to propagate truth without knowlege, and more are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of their country, and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do empirics' pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work.

2. Want of ability to use them. There be many who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary proofs and testimonies. These cannot discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie; nor follow that which in itself is the most probable opinion. It is certain, that there is a wide difference in men's understandings, apprehensions, and reasonings, to a very great latitude, so that one may, without doing injury to mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between some men and others, in this respect, than between some men and some beasts: but how this comes about is a speculation, though of great consequence, yet not necessary to our present purpose.

3. For want of will to use them. Some, though they have opportunities and leisure enough, and want neither parts nor learning, nor other helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the knowlege of several truths that lie within their reach; either on the account of their hot pursuit of pleasure, constant drudgery in business, laziness and oscitancy in general, or a particular aversion for books and study; and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favor those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives, designs, interests, &c., as many men forbear to cast up their accounts, who have reason to fear that their affairs are in no very good posture.

How men, whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings, can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance, I cannot tell but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls, who