CHAPTER II.

No innate Principles in the Mind.

It is the opinion of some that there are certain innate principles, which every man brings with him into the world. It would be a sufficient refutation of this

at last come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of in our reasoning. You (i. e. the author of the, Essay) say in that chapter about the existence of God, you thought it most proper to express yourself in the most usual and familiar way, by common words and expressions. I would you had done so quite through your book; for then you had never given that occasion to the enemies of our faith to take up your new way of ideas, as an effectual battery (as they imagined) against the mysteries of the Christian faith. But you might have enjoyed the satisfaction of your ideas long enough before I had taken notice of them, unless I had found them employed about doing mischief.'

To which our author replies, Your lordship fears that the term ideas may be dangerous, because it has been made use of in arguing against what your lordship defends; for you cannot be fearful of the things signified by the term, inasmuch as they are but the objects of our minds in thinking; and to expect that any one should reason against your lordship without the use of ideas, is to expect that he should reason without thinking.

'But whether it be the name or the thing, from which your lordship apprehends danger, it seems an extraordinary mode of reasoning to write against a book, in which the term 'idea' is not used to a bad purpose, only because it is used against your lordship by others: for I do not see how your lordship's writing against my notions of ideas can hinder your opponents from doing mischief with them.

"Your lordship may be tired of the sound of the word, but you must have a better opinion of the articles of our faith than to think that they can be overturned by a breath formed into any sound whatever. Names are arbitrary, and no one term is more opposed to truth than another;-propositions may be made against truth, and no word is exempt from being used in such propositions; the fault is not in the word, but in those who improperly use it. And when, on my saying that I scarcely use the word 'idea' in my chapter on the Existence of God, your lordship wishes that I had done so through my book, I must consider that your lordship compliments me in wishing my book to be suited to vulgar apprehension; not that you see any harm in the use of the word instead of notion,' with which you say it agrees in signification; for this would be to make your lordship write only against an impropriety of speech. I acknowlege your lordship's con

supposition, to show that men, by their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowlege they have without the help of any such original principles: for as it

descension in spending so much valuable time on the subject, and would, to please your lordship, substitute some other term, could I find one equally appropriate. But I do not see how the word idea' is better or worse, because it has been made use of for bad purposes, for the same may be said of the words 'Scripture,' reason,'' distinct,' clear,' &c. Nay, the very name of God himself will not escape; for all have been made use of to bad purposes. Should I, indeed, leave the word out of the book altogether, and every where substitute the word 'notions,' might not that word also be used for the purposes of mischief? This I am sure of, that the truths of Christianity cannot be beaten down or endangered by any sound whatever.- My new way of ideas,' or my way by ideas,' is an expression of frequent occurrence in your lordship's letter, and may comprehend my whole essay; for as it treats of the understanding, which is the faculty of thinking, it must of necessity treat of ideas, which are the objects of the mind in thinking; and if it be new, it is but a new history of an old thing; for men have always performed the actions of thinking, reasoning, &c. as they do now, though whether the same account has been given of the process I know

not.

'Were I as well read as your lordship, I should have been safe from your reprimand for thinking my way of ideas new for want of looking into other men's thoughts, which appear in their books. I agree with your lordship, that many things may seem new to one that converses only with his own thoughts, which really are not so: but if in spinning them out of his own thoughts they seem new to him, he is the inventor, though another may have thought the same before him; for invention consists not in thinking first, but in not borrowing the thoughts from others. The Chinese had the art of printing before it was known in Europe, but it was subsequently invented in Europe, and not borrowed from the Chinese. How little I affect the honor of originality may be seen in the following words, noticed by your lordship, when, speaking of certainty, I say, I think I have shown in what it is that certainty consists, which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me, heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.' I spoke of it as new only to myself; and yet if I had assumed to myself the honor of an original, I should have your lordship for a guarantee in that point, who are pleased to write against it as something new.

Truly my book has had most unlucky stars,-to displease your lordship for its novelty, and to subject me to censure for having said what others have said before. As to the way your lordship thinks I should have taken to prevent the having it thought my own invention, when it was common to me with

would be impertinent to suppose the idea of colors innate in a creature who has senses to discern them, so would it be unreasonable to attribute to the impressions of nature those truths which our faculties are fitted to attain. But because censure follows the search of truth when it leads out of the common road, I shall set down, for my excuse, the reasons that made me doubt the truth of that opinion.

It is commonly taken for granted, that there are certain principles in which all mankind agree, and therefore that these principles are innate. But the universal agreement of mankind in any principles would not prove them to be innate, if any other way could be shown by which men may come to that agreement. The argument, however, is against the doctrine of innate principles, for there are none to which men give a universal assent. To begin with speculative principles; the maxims, 'Whatever is, is,' and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' have the reputation of being universally received; yet so far are they from having universal assent, that there are many to whom they are un

others, it so happened that I could not look into the thoughts of other men, as your lordship recommends; for their language in books is but the result, and not the progress, of their minds. I could look into nobody's understanding but my own to see how it wrought. My book is a copy of my own mind, and I publish it because I think that the intellectual faculties operate alike in most men; but if some have different ways of thinking, reasoning, or arriving at certainty, I would humbly request that they would show us the way of their nobler flights, and their shorter or surer way to certainty, than by observing the agreement or disagreement of ideas.

'Your lordship adds, 'But now it seems nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas.' The new way of ideas and the old way of speaking intelligibly are the same, and they consist, 1. in using no words but what are the signs of some determinate object of the mind in thinking; 2. in using the same word steadily for the same object; 3. in joining these words grammatically; and, 4. in uniting sentences in a coherent discourse. Thus only can a man preserve himself from the suspicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call these objects of his mind, which his words do or should stand for, ' ideas' or no.'

known. It is evident that children and idiots have no apprehension or thought of them; and it seems a contradiction to say that truths are imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not; for imprinting, if it means any thing, is making certain truths to be perceived. If children and idiots have minds with those impressions on them, they must perceive them; but it is evident that they do not; therefore there are none such. If it be said that a notion may be imprinted on the mind, which it was never yet conscious of, it may be also said that every proposition that the mind is capable of assenting to, is imprinted and innate, and that many truths are imprinted which the mind never did and never shall know, for a man may die in ignorance of much that he was capable of knowing. So that if a capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all that a man ever comes to know will be considered innate; and this, though an improper way of speaking, asserts nothing which any one denies. If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, there can be no difference in the original of any truths, for all must be innate or adventitious. To be in the understanding, is to be understood; so that to assert that any thing is in the understanding, and not understood, is to say that any thing is and is not in the understanding. If therefore the two propositions, Whatever is, is,' and 'It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' are innate, children cannot be ignorant of them.

To avoid this, it is answered that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason, which signifies, either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these inscriptions come to be known, or that reason assists in the discovery of them. If it be meant that by the use of reason men discover them, and that this proves them to be innate, then it follows that whatever truths reason can discover to us are in

nate, and, of consequence, all the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems deduced from them, must be innate, being all discoveries made by reason.

But how can reason be necessary to discover innate principles, when reason itself is but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from known principles ? We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or its exercise, to make our understanding see what is originally imprinted in it. So that to make reason discover those truths is to make it discover what a man knew before; and if men have those impressed truths originally, but are ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is to say that men know them and know them not at the same time.

It will perhaps be said that mathematical truths are not assented to as soon as they are proposed, but have need of reasonings and proofs to gain our assent; while the other, or innate truths, are assented to as soon as they are understood. But this reply contradicts the assertion that the use of reason is necessary to discover them; and they who thus answer will not affirm that a knowlege of the maxim, ‹ that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,' is a deduction of reason. For reason is search, and requires pains and application; and how can it be supposed that what was imprinted by nature as the guide of reason should need the use of reason to discover it?

6

Those who will attend to the operations of the understanding will find that a ready assent to some truths depends not on native inscription or the use of reason, but on a distinct faculty of the mind. If, therefore, by saying that men assent to these when they come to the use of reason, be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowlege of them, it is false; and if true, would not prove them to be in

nate.