the contract contained in the charter of the Planters' bank (Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679.) The tax ordinance of the city of Charleston, S. C., of 1871, withholding the tax to the city in paying the interest on its bonds, impaired the contract in the bonds. (Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432, 1877.) The North Carolina constitution of 1868, exempting a debtor's property from levy, impaired the obligation of prior contracts. (Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 1877.) The act of Tennessee of 1875, repealing the act of 1873, impaired the obligation of prior contracts, (Memphis v. U. S., 97 U. S. 293, 1877.) The Tennessee constitution of 1865, forbidding the receipt of bills of a bank of Tennessee for taxes, as applied to notes issued during the rebellion, impaired the bank charter. (Keefe v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454, 1878.) The revenue law of Illinois of 1872 impaired the charter of the North Western University for the exemption of its property from taxation. (University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, 1878.) The act of Virginia of 1876, as to deduction of taxes from coupons on its bonds presented for payment, impaired the obligation of the contract. of the state with the bondholders, when applied to coupons separated from bonds issued under the funding act of 1871. (Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672, 1880.) The act of Louisiana of 1876, as to taxation in New Orleans, impaired the obligation of prior contracts. (Wolff v. N. O., 103 U. S. 358, 1880.) The act of Wisconsin of 1872, in regard to recovering interest upon interest, impaired the obligation of prior contracts. (Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668, 1881.) The act of Louisiana of 1876, limiting taxation, impaired the obligation of the contract concerning the consolidation debt. (La. v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 1881.) The taxing laws of Louisiana for New Orleans impaired the contract in the charter of an asylum exempting it from taxation. (Asylum v. N. O., 105 U. S. 362, 1881.) The ordinance of the city of Savannah taxing the property of the A. & G. R. R. beyond the limit fixed by its charter,

impaired the contract contained therein. (Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 563, 1882.) The constitution of Louisiana of 1879 impaired the contract made by the state, by the act of 1874. (Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 1882.) The Virginia acts of 1872, and 1882, as to the fund from which taxes might be paid, impaired the state contract in the funding act of 1871. (Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 1882.) The act of Louisiana of 1877, repealing a provision of the revised statutes, impaired the obligation of prior judgments. (Nelson v. St. Martin, 111 U. S. 716, 1883.) The acts of Virginia of 1882, and 1884, impaired the state's contract in the funding act of 1871. (Virginia Coupon cases, 114 U. S. 269, 1884.) The act of Virginia of 1867, in regard to liabilities under contracts or wills executed between 1862 and 1865, impaired the obligations of those contracts. (Effinger v. Kenny, 115 U. S. 566, 1885.) The ordinance of New Orleans of 1881, authorizing the Louisiana Light Company to furnish New Orleans with gas, impaired the charter contract with the New Orleans Gas Company. (N. O. Gas Light Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 550, 1885.)

The New Orleans ordinance of 1882, granting one Rivers the right to lay pipes in the streets to carry water from the Mississippi to the St. Charles hotel, impaired the charter of the New Orleans Water-works Company. (N. 0. Water Works v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 1885.) The act of Kentucky of 1872, incorporating the Citizens Gas Company to lay pipes and furnish gas in Louisville, impaired the contract of the Louisville Gas Company. (Louisville Co. v. Citizens Co., 115 U. S. 683.) The act of Louisiana of 1880, laying a tax upon the stock of the Louisiana Lottery Company, impaired its charter. (N. O. v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265, 1886.) The act of Missouri of 1879, repealing the tax law of 1871, as applied to pre-existing debts, impaired their contracts. (Seibert v. U. S., 129 U. S. 192, 1888.) A statute of Tennessee, subjecting the property of a railroad corpora

tion to taxation, impaired the obligation of the contract contained in an exemption clause of the company's charter. (Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Tenn., 153 U. S. 486, 1893.)

It is obvious from a consideration of the above cases, coming down to 1893, that the status of the college case remains unchanged. And it is remarkable how many of the cases relate to taxation.

We have further to consider that the doctrine of the college case necessarily implies that a legislature, making a grant or contract, has the power to make it on behalf of the state. The legislature of the state confers franchises under the power delegated by the people. The present able chief justice of New Hampshire, in an article entitled "A New View of the College Case," 6 Harvard Law Review, pages 161 and 213, adverts particularly to the fact that by the ancient law, upon the dissolution of a private corporation. its debts were extinguished, and its real property reverted to the grantors and the personal property vested in the state, and that this doctrine has been changed by modern adjudications. It is now held that a court of equity will lay hold of the property and administer it for the creditors and stockholders, and that the contracts of the dissolved body survive and may be enforced in equity against any property possessed by the corporation. (Broughton v. Pensacola, 93 U. S. 268, 1876.) The above article presents the theory that the college case was decided in view of that ancient doctrine, and that both the state and the federal courts were wrong in their view of the case; that the state decision to the effect that a part of the legal title and fiduciary right and duty could be conveyed by the legislature from twelve trustees to nine others, was wrong, and that the conveyance by the legislature was an infringement of right of property and contract, reserved by the 2d, 12th, 15th, 20th, 23d, and 37th articles of the New Hampshire bill of rights, and was not, moreover, a proper exercise of legislative power.

The latter point I conceive to be wrong, and will refer to it further on. The first point is well taken, but the decision on this point was not subject to be reviewed by the federal court. Marshall's decision, says the above article, appears to rest, to some extent, upon the idea that a repeal of the charter would lead to a destruction of the college property, as a fund for educational purposes. The article then declares that the idea of a contract discovered by Judge Marshall is not well founded, and enters upon an extremely ingenious discussion upon the subject. I agree on this point; but the discussion is not profitable in considering the question of the actual status and tendency of the case. The article then goes on to say that the college charter contains no exemption from repeal, and no allusion to the subject, or to the question of a suspension of the legislative power of repeal then vested in parliament, and subsequently in the New Hampshire senate and house. The article further says that "the constructive suspension of repealing power was an effort to avert a danger that did not exist by setting up a void contract that was not made." Suppose this to be so (and the argument is strong), it does not affect the question which we are called upon to consider. The most valuable part of the article is that considering whether the true construction of the state constitution is that the people of New Hampshire conferred upon their legislative agents a contractual authority to deprive those agents and their principals of the whole, or any part, of the sovereign right of legislation.

Can the legislature promise that certain parts of the power delegated to it shall never be exercised, or shall not be exercised during a specific time? If the capacity to surrender the repealing power is held to exist in the legislature, what language shall be deemed to afford sufficient evidence of a legislative intent to make such surrender? The rule is that the surrender must be expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken. It is said by many able

tribunals and judges that the legislature cannot give up the power of taxation, any more than the police power, or the power of eminent domain. The above article holds. that the charter of the college is silent on the subject of a relinquishment of governmental power, and that no contract on the subject can be implied. In other words, the article, in reality, takes up the argument of the Charles River Bridge case as the true rule of charter construction, and holds that charters, like that of the college, and like the ordinary railroad charters, are not surrenders of the legislative power of amendment and repeal; and that the delegation of the law-making power by the state to an endless series of legislatures, does not authorize them to destroy the power which is continuously and perpetually vested in them. Accordingly the article holds that there is no need of any reservation of the power of repeal, alteration, or amendment to prevent an implied surrender of that power.

But it would appear that the true doctrine on this subject is that of C. J. Shaw, that where the legislature intends to and does grant an exclusive franchise, and restrains succeeding legislatures from making any grant or contract, inconsistent with it, the exclusive grant is not beyond the power of the legislature and void.

Concerning this power Shaw said (B. & L. R. R. v. S. & L. R. R., 2 Gray 1, 1854) that in addition to the lawmaking power, the legislature, as the representative of the whole people, possesses authority to control and regulate public property and public rights, to grant lands and franchises, to stipulate for purchase, and obtain all such property, privileges, easements, and improvements as may be necessary or useful to the public; to bind the community by their contracts therefor; and generally to regulate all public rights and interests. He says that the established government of the state, acting by the legislature for the time being, must determine whether it is best to provide