owners, consignees, bailees and other persons having a special property in, or temporary possession of, cargo on board either ship (y), indorsees of bills of lading (≈), persons entitled under Lord Campbell's Act to recover damages for relatives killed (a), or persons on board either ship who are hurt in the collision. The general rule as to the person entitled to sue upon the contract of carriage is, that the person who employed the carrier, usually the consignee, is the proper plaintiff (b). The indorsee of a bill of lading, even though the cargo has been sold (c); bailees, and other persons having a special property in the ship or cargo, can recover in Admiralty (d) as well as at law. The consignee or assignee of a bill of lading can, where no owner or part owner of the ship is domiciled in England or Wales at the time of the action being instituted, proceed against the ship in Admiralty for damage to goods carried into any port in England or Wales (e) caused by the fault of the master or crew (ƒ). In such an action he can recover for loss of cargo in a collision for which the carrying ship was wholly or partly in fault. To enable him to maintain the action it seems that it is necessary that the property in the goods should have passed to him (g). There is (y) Addison on Torts, 4th ed., 919. (2) The Marathon, 40 L. T. N. S. 163. (a) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; see below, p. 115. A posthumous child may recover for the loss of its father: The George and Richard, L. R. 3 A. & E. 466. (b) See Maude and Pollock on Shipping, 4th ed., 360, seq.; 18 & 19 Vict. c. 111. As to the shipowner's liability as carrier, see infra, p. 275. (c) The Marathon, 40 L. T. N. S. no maritime lien in such a injured ship had been transferred to a foreigner, whereby the ship was forfeited to the State: The Nabob, Brown Ad. 115. (e) As to the meaning of this term, see The Bahia, Br. & L. 61; The Pieve Superiore, L. R. 5 P. C. 482; The Dantzic, Br. & L. 102. (f) 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 6; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 16. (g) See The Freedom, L. R. 3 A. & E. 495, following The St. Cloud, Br. & L. 4; The Norway, Br. & L. 377. But the contrary was held by Sir R. Phillimore, though the facts did not render a decision upon the point necessary; see The Figlia Maggiore, L. R. 2 A. & E. 106; The Nepoter, ibid. 375. These cases were not cited in The Freedom. Whether passenger or owner of goods on board wrongdoing ship can recover. of actions. case (h), though the Act gives a right of action against the ship. There is some doubt whether a person on board a ship which is herself in fault can recover at common law (i). The better opinion is that such a person is not prevented by the fault of his own ship from recovering from the owners of the other (). There seems no doubt that in Admiralty he could recover; and it has been expressly held that owners of cargo on board a ship in fault can recover against the other, if she is also in fault (7). Actions by It seems that part owners of the injured ship might part owners; consolidation recover damages for their respective losses in successive actions (m). But the defendant would be entitled to have the other co-owners added as plaintiffs, so that he should not be vexed by more than one action. If a part owner dies after the collision and before action brought, the right of action survives to the other part owners (n). Where two or more actions are brought by different plaintiffs in respect of the same collision (o), the actions may be consolidated (p). But it appears that the present practice of the Admiralty Division is not to force consolidation upon unwilling plaintiffs (7). Nor will consolidation be ordered where the actions are in personam, and in one of them service of the writ has not been effected (»). Doctrine of common em ployment. A servant cannot recover against his employer for injury (h) The Pieve Superiore, L. R. 5 P. C. 482. (i) Thorogood v. Brian, 8 C. B. 115; Cattlin v. Hills, ibid. (k) Smith's Lead. Cas. 8th ed., 316; but see Armstrong v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co. L. R. 10 Ex. 47. (1) The Milan, Lush. 388; The City of Manchester, 40 L.T. N. S. 591. (m) Addison v. Overend, 6 T. R. 766; Sedgworth v. Overend, 7 T. R. 280. (n) See Rex v. Collector of Customs, 2 M. & S. 225; Martin v. Crompe, 1 Ld. Raymond, 340. (0) See The Falk, 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 592; The Alne Holme, 47 L. T. N. S. 307, 309; The Cumberland, 5 L. T. N. S. 496, for instances of such actions. (p) Rules of Sup. Ct. 1883, Ord. XLIX. r. 8. As to consolidation of an action in a County Court with one in the Admiralty Division see The Stork and The Never Despair, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 211. (9) See The William Hutt, Lush. 25; The Jacob Landstrom, 4 P. D. 191; The Vildosala, 4 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 228. As to conduct of the consolidated action, see The Never Despair, 53 L. J. Ad. 30. (r) The Helenslea, 7 P. D. 57. sustained in the course of his employment through the negligence of a fellow-servant (s). It seems, therefore, that the ship's officers and crew cannot recover against the ship-owner for injury suffered in a collision caused by one of themselves (t), except, perhaps, where the wrong-doer is the captain (u). But a compulsory pilot is not a servant of the ship-owner, and the rule above stated does not prevent him from recovering against the owner (a). (s) Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1; Chitty on Contr. 10th ed. 537; see Wilson v. Merry, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 326. The Employers' Liability Act, 1880, does not apply to seamen or apprentices to sea service, or, it seems, to an officer; see 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42, s. 8; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90, ss. 10, 13. (t) Leddy v. Gibson, 11 Sess. Cas. 3rd ser. 304. (u) Ramsay v. Quinn, Ir. Rep. 8 C. L. 322. (x) Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125. CHAPTER IV. What damages may be recovered; general rule. Restitutio in integrum. DAMAGES-COSTS. THE wrong-doer in a collision is liable for all the reasonable consequences of his negligence. This is the general principle, and where the damages claimed are in respect of loss or injury to ship or goods occurring at, or immediately after, the collision, there is little difficulty in applying the rule. But where the loss, though consequent upon and connected with the defendant's negligent act, was not immediately caused by it, there is often great difficulty in determining whether damages in respect of such loss can be recovered as having been caused by the negligence. The question is closely connected with that discussed in a former chapter as to the legal consequences of negligence. Assuming that there is a good cause of action, there is a difficulty in many cases of determining the measure of damages, and the proper items to be taken into account in estimating them. As similar facts giving rise to similar claims for damages are constantly recurring in collision actions, it will be convenient to collect the decisions upon this subject. The general rule was thus stated by Dr. Lushington in The Clarence (a) -"The party who has sustained a damage by collision is entitled to be put, as far as practicable, in the same condition as if the injury had not been suffered." This appears to be the meaning of the phrase (a) 3 W. Rob. 283, 285. used in some of the cases that the sufferer is entitled to restitutio in integrum (b). The owner of a ship wrongfully injured in a collision is Cost of entitled to have her fully and completely repaired; and if repairs. the necessary consequence of this is, that the value of the ship is increased, so that the owner receives more than an indemnity for his loss, he is entitled to that benefit. No deduction is made from the damages recoverable on account of the increased value of the ship, or the substitution of new for old materials (c). In this respect the owner of a ship injured by collision is in a different position from an owner claiming his indemnity under the ordinary marine policy of insurance (d). the ship, if she is lost. On freight, if freight was being earned. If the ship is totally lost the owner is entitled to recover Interest on her market value at the time of the collision (e), with the value of interest from the day of the collision if the ship was not earning freight. If she was earning freight he is entitled to the estimated value of the ship at the end of her voyage, together with the freight she would have earned, less the costs of completing the voyage, and interest on the whole from the probable end of the voyage. If payment is made before that time an allowance is made for discount. If, however, the plaintiff's loss exceeds the amount of the defendant's statutory liability, interest runs from the date of the collision, whether freight was being earned or not (ƒ). (b) E. g. by Dr. Lushington in The Inflexible, Swab. 200; The Clyde, Swab. 23; The Ironmaster, Swab. 441; The Columbus, 3 W. Rob. 158; The Gazelle, 2 W. Rob. 279, 280; cited by Sir R. Phillimore in The Halley, L. R. 2 A. & E. 3, 7; and see 1 P. D. 471. (e) The Pactolus, Swab. 173; The Gazelle, 2 W. Rob. 279; and see The Star of India, 1 P. D. 466, 471. (d) As to the rule of " one-third new for old "in insurance cases, see Lohre v. Aitchison, 3 Q. B. D. 558; on app., 4 App. Ca. 755. (e) The Clyde, Swab. Ad. 23; (f) For a full statement by Sir |