porated into the United States without an amendment to the Constitution; and, third, that the opinion which prevailed was that, although the treaty might stipulate for incorporation and citizenship under the Constitution, such agreements by the treaty-making power were but promises depending for their fulfillment on the future action of Congress. In accordance with this view the territory acquired by the Louisiana purchase was governed as a mere dependency, until, conformably to the suggestion of Mr. Jefferson, it was by the action of Congress incorporated as a territory into the United States and the same rights were conferred in the same mode by which other territories had previously been incorporated, that is, by bestowing the privileges of citizenship and the rights and immunities which pertained to the Northwest Territory.

Florida was ceded by treaty signed on February 2, 1819. (8 Stat. 252). Whilst drafted in accordance with the precedent afforded by the treaty ceding Louisiana, the Florida treaty was slightly modified in its phraseology, probably to meet the view that under the Constitution Congress had the right to determine the time when incorporation was to rise. Acting under the precedent afforded by the Louisiana case Congress adopted a plan of government which was wholly inconsistent with the theory that the territory had been incorporated. General Jackson was appointed governor under this act, and exercised a degree of authority entirely in conflict with the conception that the territory was a part of the United States, in the sense of incorporation, and that those provisions of the Constitution which would have been applicable under that hypothesis were then in force. It will serve no useful purpose to go through the gradations of legislation adopted as to Florida. Suffice it to say that in 1822 (3 Stat. 654) an act was passed, as in the case of Missouri, and presumably for the same reason, which, whilst not referring to the Northwest Territory ordinance, in effect endowed the inhabitants of that territory with the rights granted by such ordinance.

This treaty also, it is to be remarked, contained discriminatory commercial provisions incompatible with the conception of immediate incorporation arising from the treaty, and they were enforced by the executive officers of the government.

The intensity of the political differences which existed at the outbreak of hostilities with Mexico, and at the termination of the war with that country, and the subject around which such conflicts of opinion centered probably explains why the treaty of peace with Mexico departed from the form adopted in the previous treaties concerning Florida and Louisiana. That treaty, instead of expressing a cession in the form previously adopted, whether intentionally or not I am unable, of course, to say, resorted to the expedient suggested by Attorney General Lincoln to President Jefferson, and accomplished the cession by changing the boundaries of the two countries; in other

words, by bringing the acquired territory within the described boundaries of the United States. The treaty, besides, contained a stipulation for rights of citizenship; in other words, a provision equivalent in terms to those used in the previous treaties to which I have referred. The controversy which was then flagrant on the subject of slavery prevented the passage of a bill giving California a territorial form of government, and California after considerable delay was therefore directly admitted into the Union as a State. After the ratification of the treaty various laws were enacted by Congress, which in effect treated the territory as acquired by the United States, and the executive officers of the government, conceiving that these acts were an implied or express ratification of the provisions of the treaty by Congress, acted upon the assumption that the provisions of the treaty were thus made operative, and hence incorporation had thus become efficacious.

Ascertaining the general rule from the provisions of this latter treaty and the practical execution which it received, it will be seen that the precedents established in the cases of Louisiana and Florida were departed from to a certain extent; that is, the rule was considered to be that where the treaty, in express terms, brought the territory within the boundaries of the United States and provided for incorporation, and the treaty was expressly or impliedly recognized by Congress, the provisions of the treaty ought to be given immediate effect. But this did not conflict with the general principles of the law of nations which I have at the outset stated, but enforced it, since the action taken assumed, not that incorporation was brought about by the treaty-making power wholly without the consent of Congress, but only that as the treaty provided for incorporation in express terms, and Congress had acted without repudiating it, its provisions should be at once enforced.

Without referring in detail to the acquisition from Russia of Alaska, it suffices to say that that treaty also contained provisions for incorporation and was acted upon exactly in accord with the practical construction applied in the case of the acquisitions from Mexico as just stated. However, the treaty ceding Alaska contained an express provision excluding from citizenship the uncivilized native tribes, and it has been nowhere contended that this condition of exclusion was inoperative because of the want of power under the Constitution in the treaty-making authority to so provide, which must be the case if the limitation on the treaty-making power, which is here asserted, be well founded. The treaty concerning Alaska, therefore, adds cogency to the conception established by every act of the government from the foundation-that the condition of a treaty, when expressly or impliedly ratified by Congress, becomes the measure by which the rights arising from the treaty are to be adjusted.

The demonstration which it seems to me is afforded by the review

which has preceded is besides sustained by various other acts of the government which to me are wholly inexplicable except upon the theory that it was admitted that the government of the United States had the power to acquire and hold territory without immediately incorporating it. Take, for instance, the simultaneous acquisition and admission of Texas, which was admitted into the Union as a State by joint resolution of Congress instead of by treaty. To what grant of power under the Constitution can this action be referred, unless it be admitted that Congress is vested with the right to determine when incorporation arises? It cannot be traced to the authority conferred on Congress to admit new States, for to adopt that theory would be to presuppose that this power gave the prerogative of conferring statehood on wholly foreign territory. But this I have incidentally shown is a mistaken conception. Hence, it must be that the action of Congress at one and the same time fulfilled the function of incorporation; and this being so, the privilege of statehood was added. But I shall not prolong this opinion by occupying time in referring to the many other acts of the government which further refute the correctness of the propositions which are here insisted on and which I have previously shown to be without merit. In concluding my appreciation of the history of the government attention is called to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which to my mind seems to be conclusive. The first section of the amendment, the italics being mine, reads as follows: "Sec. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." Obviously this provision recognized that there may be places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States but which are not incorporated into it, and are hence are not within the United States in the completest sense of those words.

Let me now proceed to show that the decisions of this court, without a single exception, are absolutely in accord with the true rule as evolved from a correct construction of the Constitution as a matter of first impression and as shown by the history of the government which has been previously epitomized. As it is appropriate here, I repeat the quotation which has heretofore been made from the opinion, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, in American Insurance Co. v. Canter, (1 Pet. 511,) where, considering the Florida treaty, the court said (p. 542):

"The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or on such as its new master shall impose.'

In Fleming v. Page the court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice

Taney, discussing the acts of the military forces of the United States while holding possession of Mexican territory, said (9 How. 614):

"The United States may extend its boundaries by conquest or treaty, and may demand the cession of territory as the condition of peace in order to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they have suffered or to reimburse the government for the expense of the war. this can be done only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority."

But

In Cross v. Harrison, (16 How. 164,) the question for decision, as I have previously observed, was as to the legality of certain duties, collected both before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace, on foreign merchandise imported into California. Part of the duties collected were assessed upon importations made by local officials before notice had been received of the ratification of the treaty of peace and when duties were laid under a tariff which had been promulgated by the President. Other duties were imposed subsequent to the receipt of notification of the ratification, and these latter duties were laid according to the tariff as provided in the laws of the United States. All the exactions were upheld. The court decided that prior to and up to the receipt of notice of the ratification of the treaty, the local government lawfully imposed the tariff then in force in California, although it differed from that provided by Congress, and that subsequent to the receipt of notice of the ratification of the treaty the duty prescribed by the act of Congress which the President had ordered the local officials to enforce could be lawfully collected. The opinion undoubtedly expressed the thought that by the ratification of the treaty in question, which, as I have shown, not only included the ceded territory within the boundaries of the United States, but also expressly provided for incorporation, the territory had become a part of the United States, and the body of the opinion quoted the letter of the Secretary of the Treasury which referred to the enactment of laws of Congress by which the treaty had been impliedly ratified. The decision of the court as to duties imposed subsequent to the receipt of notice of the ratification of the treaty of peace undoubtedly took the fact I have just stated into view and, in addition, was unmistakably proceeded upon the nature of the rights which the treaty conferred. No comment can obscure or do away with the patent fact, namely, that it was unequivocally decided that if different provisions had been found in the treaty, a contrary result would have followed. Thus, speaking through Mr. Justice Wayne, the court said (16 How. 197):

"By the ratification of the treaty California became a part of the United States. And, as there is nothing differently stipulated in the treaty with respect to commerce, it became instantly bound and privileged by the laws which Congress had passed to raise a revenue from duties on imports and tonnage."

It is then, as I think, indubitably settled by the principles of the law of nations, by the nature of the government created under the Constitution, by the express and implied powers conferred upon that government by the Constitution, by the mode in which those powers have been executed, from the beginning, and by an unbroken line of decisions of this court, first announced by Marshall and followed and lucidly expounded by Taney, that the treaty-making power cannot incorporate territory into the United States without the express or implied assent of Congress, that it may insert in a treaty conditions against immediate incorporation, and that on the other hand when it has expressed in the treaty the conditions favorable to incorporation, they will, if the treaty be not repudiated by Congress, have the force of the law of the land, and therefore by the fulfillment of such conditions cause incorporation to result. It must follow, therefore, that where a treaty contains no conditions for incorporation, and, above all, where it not only has no such conditions but expressly provides to the contrary, that incorporation does not arise until in the wisdom of Congress it is deemed that the acquired territory has reached that state where it is proper that it should enter into and form a part of the American family.

Does, then, the treaty in question contain a provision for incorporation, or does it, on the contrary, stipulate that incorporation shall not take place from the mere effect of the treaty and until Congress has so determined? is then the only question remaining for consideration.

The provisions of the treaty with respect to the status of Porto Rico and its inhabitants are as follows:

"Article II.

"Spain cedes to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the Island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones."

"Article IX.

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

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