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opinions just delivered the case of Neeley v. Herilde, 180 U. 8. 119, is cited in support of the proposition that the provision of the Foraker act here involved was consistent with the Constitution. If the contrary had not been asserted I shoidd have said that the judgment in that case did not have the slightest bearing on the question before us. The only inquiry there was whether Cuba was a foreign country or territory within the meaning not of the tariff act but of the act of June 6th 1900, 31 Stat. 656, c. 793. We held that it was a foreign country. We could have not held otherwise, because the United States, when recognizing the existence of war between this country and Spain, disclaimed "any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof," and asserted "its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its people." We said: "While by the act of April 25th 1898, declaring war between this country and Spain, the President was directed and empowered to use our entire land and naval forces, as well as the militia of the several States to such an extent as was necessary, to carry such act into effect, that authorization was not for the purpose of making Cuba an integral part of the United States, but only for the purpose of compelling the relinquishment by Spain of its authority and government in that Island and the withdrawal of its forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. The legislative and executive branches of the Government, bj7 the joint resolution of April 20th 1896, expressly disclaimed any purpose to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over Cuba 'except for the pacification thereof,' and asserted the determination of the United States, that object being accomplished, to leave the government and control of Cuba to its own people. All that has been done in relation to Cuba has had that end in view, and, so far as this court is informed by the public history of the relations of this country with that Island, nothing has been done inconsistent with the declared object of the war with Spain. Cuba is none the less foreign territory, within the meaning of the .act of Congress, because it is under a Military Governor appointed by and representing the President in the work of assisting the inhabitants of that Island to establish a government of their own, under which, as a free and independent people, they may control their own affairs without interference by other nations. The occupancy of the Island by troops of the United States was the necessary result of the war. That result could not have been avoided by the United States consistently with the principles of international law or with its obligations to the people of Cuba. It is true that as between Spain and the United States—indeed, as between the United States and all foreign nations—Cuba, upon the cessation of hostilities with Spain and after the Treaty of Paris was to be treated as if it were conquered territory. But as between the United States and Cuba, that Island is held in trust for the inhabitants of Cuba to whom it rightfully belongs, and to whose exclusive control it will be surrendered when a stable government shall have been established by their voluntary action." In answer to the suggestion that, under the modes of trial there adopted, Neely, if taken to Cuba, would be denied the rights, privileges and immunities accorded by our Constitution to persons charged with crime against the United States, we said that the constitutional provisions referred to "have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country." What use can be made of that case in order to prove that the Constitution is not in force in a territory of the United States acquired by treaty, except as Congress may provide, is more than I can perceive.

There is still another view taken of this case. Conceding that the National Government is one of enumerated powers to be exerted only for the limited objects defined in the Constitution, and that Congress has no power, except as given by that instrument either expressly or by necessary implication, it is yet said that a new territory, acquired by treaty or conquest, cannot become incorporated into the United States without the consent of Congress. What is meant by such incorporation we are not fully informed, nor are we instructed as to the precise mode in which it is to be accomplished. Of course, no territory can become a State in virtue of a treaty or without the consent of the legislative branch of the Government; for only Congress is given power by the Constitution to admit new States. But it is an entirely different question whether a domestic "territory of the United States," having an organized civil government, established by Congress, is not, for all purposes of government by the Nation, under the complete jurisdiction of the United States and therefore a part of, and incorporated into, the United States, subject to all the authority which the National Government may exert over any territory or people. If Porto Rico, although a territory of the United States, may be treated as if it were not a part of the United States, then New Mexico and Arizona may be treated as not parts of the United States, and subject to such legislation as Congress may choose to enact without any reference to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution. The admission that no power can be exercised under and by authority of the United States except in accordance with the Constitution is of no practical value whatever to constitutional liberty if, as soon as the admission is made—as quickly as the words expressing the thought can be uttered—the Constitution is so liberally interpreted as to produce the same results as those which flow from the theory that Congress mago outside of the Constitution in dealing with newly acquired territories, and give them the benefit of that instrument only when and as it shall direct.

Can it for a moment be doubted that the addition of Porto Rico to the territory of the United States in virtue of the treaty with Spain has been recognized by direct action upon the part of Congress? Has it not legislated in recognition of that treaty and appropriated the money which it required this country to pay?

If, by virtue of the ratification of the treaty with Spain, and the appropriation of the amount which that treaty required this country to pay, Porto Rico could not become a part of the United States so as to be embraced by the words "throughout the United States," did it not become "incorporated" into the United States when Congress passed the Foraker act? 31 Stat. 77, c. 191. What did that act do? It provided a civil government for Porto Rico, with legislative, executive and judicial departments; also, for the appointment by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States, of a "governor, secretary, attorney general, treasurer, auditor, commissioner of the interior and a commissioner of education." §§ 17-25. It provided for an executive council, the members of which should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. § 18. The governor was required to report all transactions of the government in Porto Rico to the President of the United States. § 17. Provision was made for the coins of the United States to take the place of Porto Rieau coins. § 11. All laws enacted by the Porto Rican legislative assembly were required to be reported to the Congress of the United States, which reserved the power and authority to amend the same. § 31. But that was not all. Except as otherwise provided, and except also the intej'nal revenue laws, the statutory laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, are to have the same force and effect in Porto Rico as in the United States. § 14. A judicial department was established in Porto Rico, with a judge to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and coDsent of the Senate. § 33. The court, so established, was to be known as the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, from which writs of error and appeals were to be allowed to this court. § 34. All judicial process, it was provided, "shall run in the name of the United States of America, ss: the President of the United States." § 16. And yet it is said that Porto Rico was not "incorporated" by the Foraker act into the United States so as to be part of the United States within the meaning of the constitutional requirement that all duties, imposts and excises imposed by Congress shall be uniform "throughout the United States."

It would seem, according to the theories of some, that even if Porto Rico is in and of the United States for many important purposes, it is yet not a part of this country with the privilege of protesting against a rule of taxation which Congress is expressly forbidden by the Constitution from adopting as to any part of the "United States." And this result comes from the failure of Congress to use the word "incorporate" in the Foraker act, although by the same act all power exercised by the civil government in Porto Rico is by authority of the United States, and although this court has been given jurisdiction by writ of error or appeal to re-examine the final judgments of the District Court of the United States established by Congress for that territory. Suppose Congress had passed this act: "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress assembled That Porto Rico be and is hereby incorporated into the United States as a territory," would such a statute have enlarged the scope or effect of the Foraker act? Would such a statute have accomplished more than the Foraker act has done? Indeed, would not such legislation have been regarded as most extraordinary as well as unnecessary?

I am constrained to say that this idea of "incorporation" has some occult meaning which my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some mystery which I am unable to unravel.

In my opinion Porto Rico became, at least after the ratification of the treaty with Spain, a part of and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in respect of all its territory and people, and that Congress could not thereafter impose any duty, impost or excise with respect to that Island and its inhabitants which departed from the rule of uniformity established by the Constitution.

True copy.

Test:

Clerk Supreme Court, U. S.

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