ÆäÀÌÁö À̹ÌÁö
PDF
ePub

You will have observed that in my present lecture I have been endeavouring to decide how much we, as theologians, must hold fast and insist upon in the interpretation of the Hexameron, and, on the other hand, how much we may concede. When two parties wish to arrive at a clear understanding, it is always best that both should name the points on which under any circumstances they will think it necessary to insist, and also mention those on which they are ready to give way. With these preliminaries it is easy to see whether an understanding is possible or not.

In re Theology versus Natural Science, therefore, the following propositions may, after the previous discussions, be made on the part of theology:

1. Religious truths are imparted to us in the Bible; they are stated decidedly, and we believe them as decidedly; in the interpretation of Scripture on these points, in rebus fidei et morum, we can consent to be guided only by the rules of hermeneutics; and we must refuse to admit any suggestion from any kind of profane science whatsoever.

2. It is not the object of the Bible to give us information about natural or any other profane science; and it was not the object of inspiration to place the Biblical historian in a better scientific position.

3. The Bible speaks of the events, phenomena, and laws of nature in the same way as the ordinary man, whose language is formed by what he sees; the Bible, therefore, does not claim to speak scientifically and correctly of these things, but only to express itself intelligibly.

4. In the Hexameron, dogmatic truths are mixed up

with physical elements-(1) holds good with reference to the dogmatic; (2) with reference to the physical elements. The dogmatic statements are unequivocal and decided; the non-dogmatic statements are there, not for their own sake, but because of the dogma; their meaning is clear so long as it is of importance to the dogma, after that it becomes vague and ambiguous. With reference to these things, exegesis insists on nothing, and is willing to consider any of the conclusions of natural science with tolerance and goodwill.

5. Speaking in behalf of theology in general, and exegesis in particular, we are firmly persuaded that an honest and lasting union with natural science will surely be attained if the followers of the latter will, for their part, meet us with equal candour and placability.

IV.

THE TASK OF NATURAL SCIENCE.

IN the third lecture I have shown how far we are justified in expecting teaching on scientific subjects from the Bible, and in this way I have prepared the ground for a general settlement of the relation between Biblical revelation and natural science; we must now consider the other side of the question, and ascertain how far profane knowledge, putting aside religion, is able to give us an explanation of natural facts. In this discussion I am treading on strange ground, and I therefore do not feel myself so much at home as in theological questions. But this disadvantage will not, I hope, have any bad results. What we have now to do is to define the limits of each science, and on that point we shall, I trust, be able to agree. Those who are learned in natural science can tell us how much they claim for themselves; and we know how much we theologians may concede, and how far we may allow them to go. Considering the placable and yielding spirit which animates theology, as was shown in the last lecture, and the wide concessions which it can make without giving up any of its principles, the demands made by science must indeed be immoderate if an agreement is found to be impossible.

In deciding what things belong entirely to natural science, you will admit that I am warranted in quoting

principally, although not exclusively, from those savants who either betray no wish to defend the Bible or revelation in their writings, or are hostile to them.

The aim of natural science, as Humboldt' expresses it, is to comprehend the general relations of material phenomena, and to contemplate nature as a whole moved and animated by internal forces. It is therefore concerned with the visible world, with the phenomena which we see, hear, or perceive in any way, and with material things as they appear to us. These things and phenomena are verified, ordered, and, as it were, catalogued, by natural science; it compares them with one another, combines them, and then uses them in order to find out the laws by which they are governed and from which they come; and it is thus enabled to trace back the complicated phenomena to simple elements and principles. Humboldt describes the discovery of laws as "the final object of human inquiry in empirical science," and he defines the "physical description of the world" as thought contem

1 Kosmos, i. p. 81.

[ocr errors]

2 "The method of induction consists of perception, i.e. the accidental apprehension of accidentally presented facts; observation, i.e. intentional apprehension of accidentally presented facts; experiment, i.e. observation of purposely produced facts; and lastly, experience, i.e. synthesis of the facts as they appear in regular forms (the simple fact is not yet an experience). By the help of these, the laws of nature which govern the facts may be deduced by arrangement, analysis, conclusion, and other logical means, by employing mathematics and the formulæ, i.e. the metaphysical principles which have been laid down, mostly by Newton, as axioms of natural science."-Schleiden, Der Materialismus, p. 20. "Conscientiously to ascertain facts by observation is all-important to accurate scientific investigation. The true scientific investigator does not indeed hesitate to recognise the single facts in their connection; on the contrary, his endeavour is to bring individual phenomena under the law, and for this purpose he makes use of hypothesis, which,

D

1

plating as a natural whole the phenomena given by experience." There is no doubt that in our century natural science has made immense progress towards the solution of this problem. "It is a well-known fact that, from the days of Newton to our times, there have been more scientific discoveries, there has been produced, for mankind in general, a more accurate and extensive acquaintance with the system of nature, than

centuries had before produced; nay, I may say, than had been obtained from the very commencement of civilisation. Indeed, if we except his great discoveries, especially those that relate to astronomy and light, we may even see that in the course of little more than our lifetime there have been greater discoveries made, and the field of science has been more enlarged, than it had been-certainly since the revival of letters-perhaps even during many and many ages before.' But no one who is well acquainted with the natural sciences would assert that they have as yet either reached their limit or attained their object. They have not yet been able entirely to solve their first problem, the investigation of the actual facts.

[ocr errors]

However wonderful are the discoveries which have

however, only signify for him a universal point of view under which many single cases of observation may be brought, and is valuable only as such. But he never adopts an explanation of the fact which is not founded on observation; he never makes a subjective hypothesis explain objective facts. This is much more the way of the so-called natural philosophy, which is as hostile as possible to strict natural science." Michelis, Der Materialismus, p. 21. Cf. F. Bessell, Die Beweise für die Bewegung der Erde. Berlin 1871. Pp. 6-15.

1 Kosmos, i. 31, 32; Eng. tr. p. 33.

Sermons, Lectures, and Speeches delivered during his Tour in Ireland. Cardinal Wiseman. Dublin 1859. P. 247.

« ÀÌÀü°è¼Ó »