lar reasoning of these decisions as well as the separate language and history of the two Amendments. See Boyd v. United States, supra; Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra; Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591; VIII Wigmore on Evidence, Third Ed. pp. 276-304, 368. Nothing this Court has said with regard to the Fourth Amendment requires that we now open the door which the Fifth Amendment in 1791 closed to compelled self-incrimination.

I would reverse the judgment.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join in this opinion.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ET AL. V. CITY OF JERSEY CITY ET AL.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 767. Argued May 2, 3, 1944.-Decided May 29, 1944. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorized a fare increase from 8 cents to 9 cents. Upon finding that collection of the 9-cent fare was impracticable, the Commission modified its order so as to authorize a fare of 11 tokens for $1.00 or a cash fare of 10 cents. The Commission later reopened the proceeding, but only to consider the propriety and lawfulness of the modification of its original order. Upon further findings, the Commission authorized a fare of 11 tokens for $1.00 or a cash fare of 10 cents. A petition of the Price Administrator for modification of the reopening order "in order that the said record be brought up to date" was denied. Upon review of a decree setting aside the Commission's orders, held:

1. The Commission's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. P. 512.

2. Findings of the Commission so supported are conclusive. P. 512.

3. The Commission's denial of a rehearing of the whole case was not an abuse of its discretion and did not amount to unfairness such as would vitiate its orders. Pp. 514, 519.

4. It was the duty of the Commission to give full effect to wartime conditions and the stabilization legislation. P. 519.

Opinion of the Court.

322 U.S.

5. Upon the record, it can not be concluded that the Commission failed to give proper weight to stabilization considerations or that it ignored the Price Administrator's contentions as to inflationary tendencies of rate increases. P. 520.

6. The determination of the weight to be given to stabilization considerations in relation to other factors was for the Commission, not the courts. P. 522.

7. The Stabilization Act of 1942 did not give the Price Administrator standing superior to that of other litigants to ask the courts to override the normal discretion of the Commission in granting or refusing rehearings. Following Vinson v. Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U. S. 489. P. 523.

54 F. Supp. 315, reversed.

APPEAL from a decree of a district court of three judges which enjoined enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. E. M. Reidy, with whom Mr. Daniel W. Knowlton was on the brief, for the Interstate Commerce Commission; and Mr. John F. Finerty, with whom Messrs. John E. Buck and Thomas A. Halleran were on the brief, for the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co., appellants.

Mr. Charles Hershenstein, with whom Mr. Charles A. Rooney was on the brief, for Jersey City; and Mr. David F. Cavers, with whom Messrs. Richard H. Field, Harry R. Booth, Robert S. Keebler, and Herbert Sharfman were on the brief, for the Economic Stabilization Director, appellees.

Solicitor General Fahy and Mr. Chester T. Lane filed a memorandum on behalf of the United States, urging affirmance.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a direct appeal by the Interstate Commerce Commission, whose orders the District Court of New Jersey has set aside, and by the Hudson & Manhattan Railroad

503

Opinion of the Court.

Company, whose rates are subject to the enjoined orders. Respondents are the City of Jersey City and the Price Administrator, who intervened under powers duly delegated to him pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 19421 and the Inflation Control or Stabilization Act of 1942.2

The Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Company owns about 8.5 miles of electric railway, of which all but 0.63 mile is underground. It has two double-track lines, one of which, known as the "uptown line," connects Hoboken, New Jersey, with Christopher Street, New York, by two parallel tunnels under the Hudson River, and runs uptown under Sixth Avenue from Christopher Street to a terminal at 33rd Street. The other line, known as the "downtown line," crosses under the river by two parallel tunnels between Exchange Place, Jersey City, and Hudson Terminal, New York. It also extends westwardly in Jersey City to Journal Square, where connection is made with the Pennsylvania Railroad. The uptown and downtown lines are connected on the New Jersey side by means of a line paralleling the Hudson River. In conjunction with the Pennsylvania Railroad the Hudson & Manhattan operates a joint rapid-transit service between Hudson Terminal and Newark. It carries only passengers.

The present controversy has its roots in a rate case precipitated by the Company's effort to establish a 10cent fare on its downtown line in 1937.3 After full hear

1 Act of January 30, 1942, c. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S. C. App., Supp. II, § 901 et seq.

2 Act of October 2, 1942, c. 578, 56 Stat. 765, 50 U. S. C. App., Supp. II, § 961 et seq.

3 Prior to 1920, the Hudson & Manhattan's rates had been 5 cents on the downtown line and 7 cents on the uptown line. In that year the railroad proposed a flat fare of 8 cents, but the Commission fixed the fares at 10 cents for the uptown line and 6 cents for the downtown line. Local Fares of Hudson & Manhattan Railroad Co., 58 I. C. C. 270. Those fares continued in effect until the 1937 proceedings began, when the railroad sought to make the fare 10 cents on both lines.

Opinion of the Court.

322 U.S.

ings the Interstate Commerce Commission fixed an 8-cent fare effective July 25, 1938. The 10-cent fare was denied chiefly on the ground that, while the Company might be entitled to the revenue, such a fare would decrease its patronage, and the Commission believed that an 8-cent fare would produce more revenue. Commissioners Miller and Mahaffie dissented from denial of the 10-cent fare on such grounds, holding it had been "amply justified" as "reasonable and lawful for the services performed." This Court held such grounds of denial to be sustained by evidence and to be within the Commission's discretion. Hudson & Manhattan R. Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 98. The 8-cent fare remained in effect until the carrier on June 27, 1942 filed a petition in the same proceeding for further hearing, alleging changed conditions and increased costs in support of a 10-cent fare on the downtown line. Protests were filed by the City of Jersey City and the Hudson Bus Corporation. The Commission opened the proceeding and extensive hearings were held in September of 1942. Counsel for the Price Administrator appeared, stating that it was not his intention to offer evidence but that he reserved the right to make any motions and to file appropriate briefs. The hearings were concluded on September 19, 1942.

The Inflation Control Act of 1942, passed on October 2d, contained a proviso that "no common carrier or other public utility shall make any general increase in its rates or charges which were in effect on September 15, 1942, unless it first gives thirty days notice to the President, or such agency as he may designate, and consents to the timely intervention by such agency before the Federal, State or municipal authority having jurisdiction to consider such increase." § 1. Thereafter the Price Admin

* 227 I. C. C. 741. The 10-cent fare on the uptown line continued in effect.

503

5

Opinion of the Court.

istrator asked permission to and did file a brief opposing any increase in the rates. On January 25, 1943, the hearing examiner recommended that the Commission find the rate of 10 cents on the downtown lines to be just and reasonable. Exceptions were filed by Jersey City and the Price Administrator and argued by counsel for each, and on June 8, 1943 the Commission made its decision. It reviewed the increases in operating costs since the 8-cent rate had been fixed and the need of the railroad for additional revenue "in order to meet increased operating expenses and the interest on its bonds." It increased the downtown fare from 8 cents to 9 cents, effective for duration of the war and six months thereafter, with permission to any of the parties to bring to the attention of the Commission additional facts if the revenue results should prove materially different from the Commission's estimate. The Commission's opinion considered the arguments of the Price Administrator against any increase, but said, "It seems to us that an increase of 1 cent in respondent's downtown fare is unlikely to have any inflationary effect, and that the effect thereof upon the cost of living, while a factor to be given consideration, will be so slight, a maximum of about 12 cents a week and 52 cents a month per passenger, as to be negligible. We believe, therefore, that the increased fare herein approved will not be in conflict with the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended." Three Commissioners dissented, holding that the Company had established its right to a 10-cent fare.

A month later the railroad filed a petition for reconsideration. Among other things, it alleged that it could

5 By Executive Order No. 9250, 7 Fed. Reg. 7871, the President designated the Director of Economic Stabilization to receive notice of proposed rate increases pursuant to the statute. In the ensuing proceedings in this case the Director was represented by the Price Administrator.