694 Opinion of the Court. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522; Eagle Glass & Mfg. Co. v. Rowe, 245 U.S. 275. Moreover, this Court in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, held that labor unions might be made parties defendant in suits for damages under the Sherman Act by service of process on their officers. Both common law rules and legislative enactments have granted many substantive rights to labor unions as separate functioning institutions. In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., supra, 385-386, this Court pointed out that "the growth and necessities of these great labor organizations have brought affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection, which their members have found necessary. Their right to maintain strikes, when they do not violate law or the rights of others, has been declared. The embezzlement of funds by their officers has been especially denounced as a crime. The so-called union label, which is a quasi trademark to indicate the origin of manufactured product in union labor, has been protected against pirating and deceptive use by the statutes of most of the states, and in many states authority to sue to enjoin its use has been conferred on unions. They have been given distinct and separate representation and the right to appear to represent union interests in statutory arbitrations, and before official labor boards." Even greater substantive rights have been granted labor unions by federal and state legislation subsequent to the statutes enumerated in the opinion in that case." "Outstanding examples of federal legislation enacted subsequent to the Coronado case giving recognition to union personality are the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. § 151, the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U. S. C. § 151, and the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. § 101. The Anti-Racketeering Act, 48 Stat. 979, 18 U. S. C. § 420a-e, excepts certain types of Opinion of the Court. 322 U.S. These various considerations compel the conclusion that respondent could not claim the personal privilege against self-incrimination under these circumstances. The subpoena duces tecum was directed to the union and demanded the production only of its official documents and records. Respondent could not claim the privilege on behalf of the union because the union did not itself possess such a privilege. Moreover, the privilege is personal to the individual called as a witness, making it impossible for him to set up the privilege of a third person as an excuse for a refusal to answer or to produce documents. Hence respondent could not rely upon any possible privilege that the union might have. Hale v. Henkel, supra, 69-70; McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90. Nor could respondent claim the privilege on behalf of himself as an officer of the union or as an individual. The documents he sought to place under the protective shield of the privilege were official union documents held by him in his capacity as a representative of the union. No valid claim was made that any part of them constituted his own private papers. He thus could not object that the union's books and records might incriminate him as an officer or as an individual. It is unnecessary to determine whether or not respondent was a member of the union in question, for in either event he could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination under these facts. It is likewise immaterial whether the union was subject to the provisions of the statute in relation to which the grand jury was making activity by labor unions, thereby recognizing them as entities capable of violating the Act. The War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, 50 U.S. C. App. § 1501, evidences a similar recognition. See, in general, 1 & 2 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940), Part V. For references to and discussions of recent state labor legislation, see id., Part VI; Smith and DeLancey, "The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 Michigan Law Rev. 987. 694 Opinion of the Court. its investigation. The exclusion of the union from the benefits of the purely personal privilege does not depend upon the nature of the particular investigation or proceeding. The union does not acquire the privilege by reason of the fact that it is not charged with a crime or that it may not be subject to liability under the statute in question. The union and its officers acting in their official capacity lack the privilege at all times of insulating the union's books and records against reasonable demands of governmental authorities. The judgment of the court below must be reversed and that of the District Court affirmed. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concur in the result. DECISIONS PER CURIAM, ETC., FROM APRIL 11, 1944, THROUGH JUNE 12, 1944.* No.-. EX PARTE OLIVER GOBIN; and No.. EX PARTE NOEL GAINES. April 24, 1944. Applications denied. No.-. KELLEY V. UNITED STATES. April 24, 1944. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of certiorari is denied. -. No. TRICE V. WRIGHT, WARDEN. April 24, 1944. The motion for leave to file petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. No. 874. DONOVAN, ADMINISTRATOR, v. KANSAS CITY. Appeal from the Supreme Court of Missouri. May 1, 1944. Per Curiam: The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Thomas v. City of Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 356-57; Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U. S. 182, and cases cited. Messrs. John G. Madden, Armwell L. Cooper, Cyrus Crane, Frank W. McAllister, William J. Carroll, Ralph M. Russell, and James E. Burke for appellant. Mr. Wm. E. Kemp for appellee. Reported below: 352 Mo. 431, 179 S. W. 2d 108. No., original. JONES, GOVERNOR, EX REL. LOUISIANA ET AL. v. BOWLES, PRICE ADMINISTRATOR. May 1, 1944. The motion for leave to file the complaint is denied for want of jurisdiction of this Court to entertain it *Decisions on applications for certiorari, post, pp. 718, 726; rehearing, post, p. 766; cases disposed of without consideration by the Court, post, p. 766. |