arise on another visit by the same or a different man-of-war. It is also the duty of the visiting commander to record on a principal paper notice of the blockade of any port which the neutral may be likely to approach.

1596. If reasonable suspicion remain after such search as the circumstances will permit, the ship is to be arrested and sent into the most convenient port of the belligerent for further examination before the officers appointed to conduct the preliminary inquiry, there to be subjected to further examination of her papers, her master, officers, and crew, and the cargo which she contains. Unless reasonable ground for suspicion remains, she must be discharged with a proper certificate of the investigation, and with reasonable compensation for the delay, inconvenience, and damage to which she has, without any fault of her own, been exposed.

1597. If reasonable ground of suspicion remain, she is to be brought under the jurisdiction of the prize court for further examination, and if found guilty to be condemned. The owners of the ship, and the owners of the cargo, are there entitled to appear to maintain their right to their property, and to resist the captor's claim. The ship as well as her cargo is to be deemed innocent until guilt is proved. Unless that is proved, she must be released from her arrest with full indemnity for the delay, inconvenience, damage, costs, and expenses to which, except by her own improper conduct, she has been exposed. If she is guilty, she and her cargo are wholly, or partially, according to the guilt of which they are convicted, to be condemned.

1598. Condemnation converts detention into capture from the moment when she was detained; until condemnation, although she is popularly said to have been captured, she is under arrest. When we come to treat of recapture, we shall have to make some further observations on this intermediate state.

1599. This is the law of nations; we shall have to consider to some extent how far it has been violated, how far it has been observed.

1600. We will, for want of better designations, use the words cruiser to designate the belligerent vessel which exercises the right of visitation, and merchantman to describe the vessel which is to be honoured with the visit, and captive to describe her when taken into custody, and captor to distinguish the cruiser which has taken her under his care.

These

1601. The attempt of the merchantman to escape, by false flag or by flight, warrants increased suspicion, and, as a consequence, pursuit. The production of ambiguous papers warrants further examination, the destruction of papers or the production of false papers increases the suspicion, the combination of these circumstances renders suspicion more intense. The vicinity of the ship to the port of a belligerent creates suspicion when the port is under blockade. and other circumstances, especially information which the cruiser may have previously received, warrant detention and a more or less vigilant search. But they do not warrant arrest without further search or inquiry. The information may itself be false, the fictitious papers may be for purposes unconnected with the belligerent, the vicinity to the port may be in her route to a legitimate destination, or she may have been driven out of her course by stress of weather, or for necessary supplies.

1602. Though her cargo contain military stores, however formidable, the merchantman is entitled to proceed, whatever may be the information which the cruiser has previously obtained, unless he can find in her a warrant for justifiable suspicion; her flight and other circumstances already mentioned may intensify the causes of suspicion. False papers may, from their nature, unless their fabrication is reasonably explained, warrant the suspicion that the contraband is destined to the belligerent, and if the grounds of suspicion are strong, warrant her arrest.

1603. The law of nations does not require the merchantman to go unarmed; she may arm herself for defence against pirates with cannon and all the implements of war. An ex

cessive armament, especially if her build is of a martial character, may warrant the suspicion that she constitutes contraband, and, with other circumstances, that she is proceeding to the market for ships of war. But a moderate armament of itself warrants no such suspicion, and, to justify her arrest in the character of contraband, the other grounds of suspicion must be exceedingly strong.

1604. Although the cargo is innocent, and the more so if it include munitions of war, her flight and similar acts, and especially false papers, warrant grave suspicion when she is approaching a blockaded port. If she loiter in that neigh, bourhood, if she hover about the offing, unless baffled or detained by the weather, the suspicion justly grows more intense that she contemplates breaking the blockade. Such circumstances warrant arrest.

1605. The prize court has held that the very fact of a ship coming out of a blockaded port with a cargo is probable cause of detention, unless the captors were satisfied that she was entitled to leave the port. (Otto.) The right of detention must depend, not on the captor being satisfied, but on whether the information which the master affords as to the time and circumstances of the loading, is such as ought to satisfy the captor that she is a privileged ship.

1606. It may sometimes occur that, although the grounds on which the captor suspected the ship or cargo would not have justified the detention, subsequent circumstances or even statements on the part of the master afford him, in "the indulgent consideration" of the prize court, an excuse, such as material variations between the ship's papers and the depositions on the preliminary examination. Leucade.

1607. The sailing under hostile colours, though assumed some time previously, and during a war between her alleged country and another, has been held sufficient to justify detention. Caroline.

1608. It has been held that detention is not justified simply by a vessel's real being different from her ostensible

destination, nor by her sailing wide of her ostensible destination, nor by her having deceived the custom house or other national authorities, nor by her having no log, nor by unimportant defects in her papers, nor by slight variations between her papers and the depositions. Leucade.

1609. A vessel may be detained a second time for the same offence, if the release was not authorized by the decree or order of the court, or for a subsequent offence after a decree for restitution on a previous alleged offence; but captors venturing on such a detention incur a very great risk of liability for costs and damages. Odessa.

1610. When there is sufficient cause for detaining the cargo there is sufficient for detaining the ship, and when there is sufficient for detaining the ship there is sufficient for detaining the cargo, unless either can be relieved by arrangement. The captors may, and, if convenient, they should, take the vessel to the port of destination and deliver the innocent cargo. If they do so, they become entitled to the freight. Caroline. Fortuna.

1611. RESISTANCE.—We have already observed that the rights of the belligerent do not compel the merchantman to sail unarmed. But she must not employ, or even threaten to employ, her armament to resist visitation or search. Were she permitted so to use her force, merchantmen, by congregating in fleets, might defy the cruisers of the belligerents, and, as in former times on the coasts of Africa and both the Indies, carry on an extensive warfare on their own account against nations with which their country is at peace. When the right of search is admitted by her sovereign, the merchantman must submit complacently, unless she can escape by flight.

1612. The prize court condemns the ship for resistance to search as for a distinct offence, irrespective of her character in other respects and of the cargo she bears. It condemns also the portions of the cargo which belong to the owner of the ship. It does not regard mere words or remonstrance

as resistance, without a display and a serious indication of the intention to exert force; but when such intention is manifested, it condemns for resistance although no conflict occurs. But it requires that the merchant be informed by competent authority, fully and satisfactorily, that the cruiser is entitled to search; that is, not only that she is a ship of war, but that her country is actually engaged in a war. (Maria.) To this extent the prize court acts within the just limits of the law.

1613. But the prize court has proceeded far beyond these limits in violation of neutral rights.

1614. CONSTRUCTIVE RESISTANCE.-The prize court has imputed to merchantmen sailing under the convoy of the royal ship of their nation the resistance, even the meditated resistance, of the guardian of their fleet. In doing so it violated the law of nations; for, inasmuch as the merchants acted under the authority of their sovereign, the responsibility rested with him. The merchants were not responsible, whether the convoy was or not justifiable. Moreover, the prize court usurped the functions of the state. By appointing the convoy, its sovereign may or may not have afforded cause The determination of that question rests, not with the prize court, but with the prince; and until war has been commenced, the prize court by interposing violates alike the international and the municipal law. If a neutral merchantman fly to the protection of the convoy of another neutral power, she is alike exempt from the jurisdiction of the prize court; the appeal must be by the belligerent government to the sovereign of the convoying ship.

of war.

1615. The neutral merchant is entitled to visit and run to the fortified ports, and to take refuge under the range of the batteries of his belligerent friend; he is equally entitled to sail with that belligerent's merchant vessels or men-ofHe is entitled to embark his wares and merchandise on board the one or the other, and the belligerent conveying them is entitled to exercise all his power of resistance

war.