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factory to the army.' They keenly resented his abuse to the Commander in Chief, and his continuance in commission probably would have produced great inconvenience.
Scarcely had Sir Henry Clinton reached New York, when a French fleet appeared off the Chesapeak, under the command of Count d'Estaing. He had been eighty-seven days in crossing the Atlantic. llad his passage been an ordinary one, he would have found Lord Howe in the Delaware, and the capture or destruction of the British fleet in that river, and probably of the army in Philadelphia, must have been the consequence. Count d'Estaing being disappointed at the D«laware, sailed along the coast to Sandy Hook. General Washington moved his army to the White Plains, that he might be in a situation to cooperate with the French Admiral against New York.
In the mean time, Sir Henry Clinton employed his whole force to strengthen his lines. The French Admiral finding an attack upon New York impracticable, a conjoint expedition was planned against Rhode Island.
At the critical moment when the success of the united action of the French and American army was reduced to a moral certainty, Count d'Estaing sailed out of the harbour of Newport to fight Lord Howe. Being overtaken by a vioIcnt storin, his fleet was greatly damaged, and he though it advisable to repair to Boston harbour to retit.
In consequence of the harbour of Newport be
ing opened to the British, General Sullivan, the commanding officer upon Rhode Island, was compelled to retreat. He and his general officers had remonstrated against Count d'Estaing leaving New port, and in the moment of disappointment and irritation at the failure of the expedition, General Sullivan in orders, used expressions, which were construed into a severe reflection
the French Admiral and other marine officers, and which they resented.
General Washington, alarmed at the probable consequences of a misunderstanding and jealousy between the French and Americans, so soon after the alliance was formed, and in the very commencement of their united operations, immediately adopted measures to prevent them. 'In letters to Generals Heath and Sullivan, he communicated the mode of conduct which he wished might in this delicate transaction be pursued.
To Heath, who commanded in Boston, he expressed his apprehension that resentment of the conduct of the Count might prevent the proper exertion to repair and victual the French fleet, and he urged Heath to counteract such prejudices.
“ It will certainly be sound policy to combat the effects, and wbatever private opinions may be entertained, to give the best construction of what has happened to the public; and at the same time, to exert ourselves to put the French fleet, as soon as possible, in a condition to defend itself, and be useful to us. The departure of the fleet from Rhode Island is not yet publicly announced here, but when it is, I intend to ascribe it to necessity produced by the damage received in the late storm. This, it appears to me, is the idea which ought to be generally propagated. As I doubt not, the force of these reasons will strike you equally with myself, I would recommend to you to use your utmost influence to palliate and soften matters, and to induce those, whose business it is to provide succours of every kind for the fleet, to employ their utmost zeal and activity in doing it. It is our duty to make the best of our misfortunes, and not suffer passion to interfere with our interest and the public good.”
To General Sullivan he mentioned “ his apprehension that should the expedition fail, in consequence of being abandoned by the French fleet, loud complaints might be made by the officers employed on it. Prudence,” he said " dictated the propriety of giving this affair the best appearance, and of attributing the withdrawing the fleet from Rhode Island, to absolute necessity. The reasons,” he added, " for this line of condnct, were too obvious to need explanation. That of inost importance was that their enemies, both internal and external, would seize the first cause of disgrist between the allies, and endeavour to convert it into a serious rupture.”
When the General received the resolution af Congress, directing him to take every measure in his power to prevent the publication of the protest entered into by General Sullivan and his officers, he communicated the resolution, and with it the following letter. “The disagreement between
army under your command, and the fleet, has given me very singular uneasiness. The contiDent at large is concerned in our cordiality, and it should be kept up by all possible means consistent with our honour and policy. First impressions, you know, are generally longest retained, and will serve to fix, in a great degree, our national character with the French. In our conduct towards them, we should remember, that they are a p spleold in war, very strict in military etiquette, and apt to take fire when others scarcely seemed warmed. Permit me to recommend, in the most particular manner, the cultivation of harmony and good agreement, and your endeavours to destroy that ill humour which may have found its way among the officers. It is of the utmost importance too, that the soldiers and the people should know nothing of this misunderstanding, or, if it has reached them, that means may be used to stop its progress and prevent its effects.”
In a correspondence with Count d'Estaing, General Washington strove to soften bis resentments, to sooth the chagrin of disappointment, and to conciliate his good affections towards the United States.
These prudent measures were attended with the most salutary effects.
With the battle of Monmouth, active operations for the campaign closed in the Middle States. On the approach of winter, the American army went into quarters in the neighbourhood of the High Lands. Being better clothed and fed than in the preceding winter, their si
tuation was greatly ameliorated, and their sufferings were comparatively nothing.
At the close of the campaign of 1778, the local situation of the hostile armies did not greatly differ from that of the commencement of the campaign of 1776, except the possession of New York by the British
This fact is impressively stated by General Washington, in a letter written to a friend. is not a little pleasing, nor less wonderful to contemplate, that after two years manæuvring, and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and the offending party in the beginning is now reduced to the use of the pickaxe and the spade for defence. The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he must be worse than an infidel, that lacks faith, and more than wicked, that has not gratitude to acknowledge his obligations.”