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tuation was greatly ameliorated, and their sufferings were comparatively nothing.

At the close of the campaign of 1778, the local situation of the hostile armies did not greatly differ from that of the commencement of the campaign of 1776, except the possession of New York by the British.

This fact is impressively stated by General Washington, in a letter written to a friend. “ It is not a little pleasing, nor less wonderful to contemplate, that after two years maneuvring, and undergoing the strangest vicissitudes, both armies are brought back to the very point they set out from, and the offending party in the beginning is now reduced to the use of the pickaxe and the spade for defence. The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he must be worse than an infidel, that lacks faith, and more than wicked, that has not gratitude to acknowledge his obligations.”

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sand men to reinforce the troops in advance. He offered the command of the whole force in front to General Lee; but he, being opposed even to partial actions with the enemy, declined the service. The Marquis La Fayette joyfully accepted the command, which his senior major general had declined. The orders given to the Marquis were similar to those which had before been given to the officers on the lines, to gain the rear and right flank of the enemy, and give him all possible annoyance. The Commander in Chief put the main army in motion, that he might be in a situation to support his parties in advance. By these movements General Lee perceived, that more importance than he had imagined was given to the division in front, and he now importunately requested the command, which before he had declined. To gratify him without mortifying the Marquis, he was detached with two additional brigades to act in front, and the command of the whole, consisting of five thousand men, of course devolved on him. He was ordered to keep his detachments constantly on their arms and ever in situation to attack.

Sir Henry Clinton perceiving the approach of a powerful force, changed the position of his army, and placed his best troops in the rear.

On the 27th, he encamped in a secure manner on the heights about Monmouth Court House. He could not be attacked in this position with the probability of success, and he was within twelve miles of strong ground, where he could not be assailed. General Washington therefore resolved to attack him as soon as he should move from his present encampment.

JUNE 28.] About five in the morning, the Coromander in Chief was informed that the front of the British army was in motion; he immediately dispatched an aid de camp to General Lee with orders to move on and attack the rear of the enemy, “ualess there should be powerful reasons to the contrary,” assuring him that the main body should seasonably move to sup

port him.

From the movements of the American army, Sir Henry expected an attack. Early on the morning of the 28th, General Knyphausen marchand with all the baggage of the British army. The grenadiers, light infantry and chasseurs, unincumbered, remained on the ground under the command of Lord Cornwallis, and with this division was Sir Henry.

Having allowed time for General Knyphausen to move out of his way, Lord Cornwallis about eight o'clock took up his line of march, and descended from the heights of Freehold into a plain of about three miles extent. General Lee made his disposition to execute the orders of the Commander in Chief. Passing the heights of Freehold, he entered the plain, and ordered General Wayne to attack the rear of the covering party of the enemy in such a manner as to halt them ; while he himself by a shorter road should gain their front, with the design to cut them off from the main body of their army.

In the mean time General Clinton perceiving that strong columns of Americans were hanging upon his flanks, and supposing that their object was to attack his baggage now passing through defiles, resolved to halt Lord Cornwallis's division and attack the Americans in his rear, with the expectation, that General Washington by this maneuvre would be induced to recall (his detachments in advance. This movement was made at the moment Lee was reconnoitring their covering party. He found this corps much stronger than he had supposed it to be, and the ground he thought unfavourable for an attack. In his rear was a morass which could be passed only by a neck of hard land, which rendered it difficult for reinforcements to reach him, and would impede his retreat should he be repulsed. He was finally induced by a movement of General Scott, to cross the ravine and regain the heights of Freehold.

During these manœuvres, some skirmishing took place. As soon as General Washington heard the firing, he directed the troops 'under his immediate command, to throw off their packs and march rapidly to the support of the division in the front. General Lee gave no information of his retrogade manœuvre to the Commander in Chief. As General Washington was approaching the scene of action in advance of his troops, he met, to his surprise and mortification, the corps of General Lee retreating before the enemy, with

, out having made any serious efforts to maintain their ground. He found General Lee in the rear

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