which, with all their efforts, the United States were ever yet able to raise.

The experience of the General taught him, that it would be as difficult to furnish the necessary supplies of provisions as to raise the men. "The

scene of our operations has hitherto been in the heart of the country furnishing our resources, which of course facilitated the drawing them out. We shall then be carrying on the war at an immense distance, in a country wild and uncultivated, incapable of affording any aid, and great part of it hostile. We cannot, in this case, depend on temporary and occasional supplies as we have been accustomed; but must have ample magazines laid up before hand. The labour and expense in forming these, and transporting the necessary stores of every kind for the use of the troops, will be increased to a degree that can be more easily conceived than described. The transportation must be a great part of the way through deserts affording no other forage than herbage; and from this circumstance our principal provisions of the flesh kind, must be salted, which greatly increase the difficulty, both of providing and transporting." Supplies upon this scale, he conceived, greatly exceeded the resources of the country, and in policy and honour, Congress could not promise to furnish them.

Serious doubts rested upon the mind of the General, whether France would execute the part of the Canada expedition assigned to her. The superiority of the British fleet was evident. The court of London would be made acquainted with

the scheme, and a superior British fleet might prevent the French squadron detached on this service, from entering the river St. Lawrence, or destroy it after its entrance, or the British garrisons in Canada might be reinforced, and rendered superior to the assailing armament.

In an expedition consisting of several distinct parts, General Washington thought it unreasonable to expect that exact co-operation among the different detachments which would be necessary for mutual support; of consequence, the divisions might be defeated in detail, and after all the expense, the expedition miscarry. The consequences of a failure, which were much to be deprecated, would be the misapplication of the French force; the ruin of the detachments employed in the expedition, and jealousy and disaffection between France and the United States.

The letter of the Commander in Chief, Congress referred to a committee. In their report, this committee admit his objections to be weighty, but still advise to the prosecution of the plan. Congress accepted the report, and again requested the General to write fully on the subject to the Marquis, and to Dr. Franklin, then the American Minister at the court of Versailles. gress probably felt themselves already pledged by their conversation with the Marquis and the French Minister, and possibly they thought that measures had already been adopted in France to carry the plan into execution.

Cont

General Washington was greatly perplexed by the perseverance of Congress in this measure. All

his objections to the plan remained in full force, and he found himself called upon to use his influence to bring the French government to adopt a scheme, of which he himself wholly disapproved, and to promise the co-operation of the American arms in a manner that he thought impracticable. To this request he thus replied:

"I have attentively taken up the report of the committee of the fifth, (approved by Congress) on the subject of my letter of the 11th ultimo, on the proposed expedition into Canada. I have considered it in several lights, and sincerely regret that I should feel myself under any embarrassment in carrying it into execution. Still I remain of opinion, from a general review of things, and the state of our resources, that no extensive system of co-operation with the French for the complete emancipation of Canada, can be positively decided on for the ensuing year. To propose a plan of perfect co-operation with a foreign power, without a moral certainty in our supplies; and to have that plan actually ratified with the court of Versailles, might be attended, in case of failure in the conditions, on our part, with very fatal effects.

"If I should seem unwilling to transmit the plan as prepared by Congress, with my observations, it is because I find myself under a necessity (in order to give our minister sufficient ground to found an application on) to propose something more than a vague and indecisive plan: which, even in the event of a total evacuation of the states by the enemy, may be rendered impracti

cable in the execution by a variety of insurmountable obstacles; or if I retain my present sentiments, and act consistently, I must point out the difficulties, as they appear to me, which must embarrass his negociations, and may disappoint the views of Congress.

"But proceeding on the idea of the enemy's leaving these states, before the active part of the ensuing campaign, I should fear to hazard a mistake, as to the precise aim and extent of the views of Congress. The conduct I am to observe in writing to our minister at the court of France, does not appear sufficiently delineated. Were I to undertake it, I should be much afraid of erring through misconception. In this dilemma, I would esteem it a particular favour to be excused from writing at all on the subject, especially as it is the part of candour in me to acknowledge, that I do not see my way clear enough to point out such a plan for co-operation, as I conceive to be consistent with the ideas of Congress, and as will be sufficiently explanatory, with respect to time and circumstances, to give efficacy to the measure.

"But if Congress still think it necessary for me to proceed in the business, I must request their more definite and explicit instructions, and that they will permit me, previous to transmitting the intended dispatches, to submit them to their determination.

I could wish to lay before Congress more minutely, the state-of the army, the condition of supplies, and the requisites necessary for carrying into execution an undertaking that may in

volve the most serious events. If Congress think this can be done more satisfactorily in a personal conference, I hope to have the army in such a situation before I can receive their answer, as to afford me an opportunity of giving my attend

ance.'

Congress indulged the General with the proposed interview, and a committee of their body was chosen to confer with him on this business and on the state of the army. His objections were found to be unanswerable, and the Canada expedition was laid aside.

To the magnificent schemes of Congress upon Canada, succeeded through United America a state of supineness and inaction. An alliance with France was received as a security for independence. In the expectation that Great Britain would relinquish the American war, that she might with her united force contend with her ancient enemy in Europe, Congress appeared not disposed to encounter the expense necessary to prepare for another active campaign. The delusive supposition that the war was over prevailed through the country, and palsied the spirit of the community. General Washington perpetually stimulated his countrymen to exertion. Uninfected with the common delusion, he believed that Great Britain would continue the American war, and in every possible way exerted himself seasonably to be prepared for the conflicts of the field. But Congress was slowly roused to attention to this important business. Their resolution empowering the Commander in Chief to recruit