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OFFENCE.

PUNISHMENT.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON-continued.

Attempting" to administer to any person any poison or other destructive thing," with intent to commit murder. (F.)

7 Wm. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85, ss. 3, 8.

Transportation for LIFE, or for not less than FIFTEEN years; or imprisonment not exceeding THREE years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement; such confinement not exceeding one month at any one time, nor three months in any one year.

EVIDENCE.

OBSERVATIONS.

as to the proof of administering, a count should be added for "attempting to administer," under section 3; see post, infra. Where a servant put poison into a coffee-pot, and when her mistress came down to breakfast, told her that she had put the coffeepot there for her, and the mistress drank off the poisoned coffee; it was ruled that, in order to constitute an administering, it is not necessary that there should be a delivery by the hand, and that this was 66 a causing to be taken" (ƒ). So also, where the defendant knowingly gave to A, to administer as a poison to B, but A neglecting to do so, it was accidentally given to B by a child; this was holden an administering by the defendant, as much as if she had given it to B with her own hands (g). It is not sufficient that the offence would have amounted to murder had death ensued; the jury must be satisfied that the prisoner had a positive intention to commit murder (h). An indictment for causing poison to be taken by A with intent to murder A, is not sustained by evidence showing that the poison, though taken by A, was intended for another person (i). Evidence of administering at different times may be given to show the intent (k). If the intent is not proved, the defendant may be found guilty of an assault under the 11th sect. of the statute, ante, p. 2.

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(a) Cadman's case, under 43 Geo. iii. c. 48, s. 1; 1 Mood. C. C.

114.

OFFENCE.

PUNISHMENT.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON-continued.

Stabbing ("stab, cut, or wound") any person with intent to commit murder. (F). 7 Wm. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85,

s. 2.

With intent to maim, etc., see post, p. 334.

Death.

May be recorded by 4 Geo. iv. c. 48, ante, p. 3.

Stab, cut, or wound.]-If a cutting be inflicted, though by an instru

ment not intended for cutting, as by a striking over the face with the claw end of a hammer; this will be a cutting within the statute(1). So also, it has been holden, where the cutting was inflicted with an iron adapted for the purpose of forcing open doors, drawers, chests, etc. (2). To constitute a wounding, the continuity of the skin must be broken(3);

(1) Atkinson's case, R. & R. 104. Since this decision, the nature of the injury, and not of the instrument is to be considered the proper test (see 2 Stark. Ev. 2 ed. 500, n.); and the authority of the cases, doubted, where it has been ruled, that a blow from a square iron bar, which inflicted a contused and lacerated wound, Adam's case, 1 Russ. 597; a similar wound on the head by a blow

from the metal scabbard of a sword, the sword being in the scabbard at the time, Whitfield's case, 1 Russ. 597; a blow with the handle of a windlass, though it made an incision, Anon. 5 Evan. Stat. p. 334, n.; was not a cutting within the act.

(2) Hayward's case, R. & R. 78; by all the Judges.

(3) Wood's case, 1 Mood. C. C. 278; 4 C. & P. 381.

EVIDENCE.

Prove that the defendant cut, stabbed, or wounded, the prosecutor as charged (see note, infra)—the intent, as ante, p. 325, (b). Rosc. Cr. Ev. 2 ed. 727; Arch. 8 ed. 446.

Prec. of Indict. Id.; Matt. C. L. App. 119.

OBSERVATIONS.

Counts charging the several intents mentioned in the 4th section of the statute (see post, p. 334) may be joined, though the punishment is different (a). The instrument or means by which the injury was inflicted need not be stated, and if stated need not be proved as laid. Where the indictment charged

a wound to have been inflicted by striking with a stick and kicking with the feet, proof that the wound was caused either by striking with a stick or kicking was holden sufficient, though it was uncertain by which of the two the injury was inflicted (b). It seems also, that it is not necessary to state in what part of the body the injury was inflicted (c). It is not necessary that the cut should be in a vital part; for the question is not what the wound is, but what wound was intended; and it is immaterial whether the injury be or be not effected (d). The three words of the section "stab, cut, or wound," should be used in the indictment; for if the indictment be for cutting only, evidence of a stabbing will not support it (e). See the cases which have decided the construction of these words, noticed at p. 328, n. As to implication of aiders and abettors in guilt of principals, see p. 331, n.; the proof of the intent, see Observations, ante, p. 327 (i). If this fail, the defendant may be convicted of an assault, under the 11th section of the statute; see ante, p. 2.

(a) Strange's case, 8 C. & P. 172. (b) Briggs's case, 1 Mood. C. C. 318; 1 Lew. C. C. 61; Erle's case, 2 Id. 133; see the rule as to indictments for murder, ante, p.275,

n.

(c) See the rule as to murder, ante, p. 278, n.

(d) Hunt's case, 1 Mood. C. C. 93; Griffith's case, 1 C. & P. 298. (e) M'Dermot's case, R. & R. 356.

there should be a separation of the whole skin; a separation of the cuticle is not sufficient (*)." Where it did not appear that the skin was broken or incised an acquittal was directed (5). So a scratch is not a wound within the statute (°). Where the skin was broken internally, but not externally, a stroke from a hammer having broken the jaw in two places, but there was not much blood; this was held a wounding (7). Where the prisoner threw a hammer at the prosecutor, which struck him on the face, and broke the skin for an inch and a half; on a case reserved, this was held a wounding (8). So where the stroke was by a bludgeon, and the skin was broken, and blood flowed (9). And the same where the

(4) M'Loughlin's case, 8 C. & P. 635, per Bosanquet, Coleridge, and Coltman, Js.

(5) Anon. cited 1 Mood. C. C. 280; see Moriarty v. Brooks, 6 C. & P. 684.

(6) Beckett's case, 1 Moo. & R. 526, per Parke, B.

(7) Leonard Smith's case, 8 C. & P. 173, per Denman, C. J., and Park, J.

(8) Withers' case, 1 Moo. C. C. 294; 4 C. & P. 446.

(9) Payne's case, 4 Id. 558.

OFFENCE.

PUNISHMENT.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON-continued.

Causing ("cause ")" by any means whatsoever to any person any bodily injury dangerous to life" with intent to commit murder. (F.)

7 Wm. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2.

Death.

May be recorded by 4 Geo. iv. c. 48, ante, p. 3.

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prisoner struck the prosecutor on the outside of his hat with an air-gun, and the hard rim of the hat wounded the prosecutor, but did not come directly in contact with his head (10). A wound from a kick is within the statute (11). But where blows from an iron instrument broke the collar bone and violently bruised the person, but did not break the skin; this was holden not a wounding (12). An instrument of some nature must have been used; as where the end of a finger (13); of a nose (14); of the prepuce of a child three years old (15) was bitten off with the teeth of the prisoners; in each case, this was holden not an offence within the statute. So where vitriol was thrown in the prosecutor's face and wounded him (16). The wound must proceed from the prisoner's Where the prosecutor in warding off an attack, lifted his hands and struck them against a knife which the prisoner held in his hand,

act.

(10) Sheard's case, 7 C.&P.846. (11) Briggs' case, 1 Moo. C. C. 318.

(12) Wood's case, 4 C. & P. 381. (13) Stevens' case, I Moo. C. C. 409.

(14) Ann Harris' case, 7 C. & P. 446.

(15) Jennings' case, 2 Lew, C.C. 130.

(16) Murrow's case, 1 Moo. C.C. 456; but see now, post, p. 338.

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