ERRATA.

Page 100, for 56 Geo. iii. c. 53, read c. 63.

140, for 9 Geo. iv. c. 9, read c. 69.

170, for 7 & 8 Geo. iv. c. 29, ss. 2, 5, read s. 25.

178, after 7 & 8 Geo. iv., insert c. 29.

179, after Webb's case, 1 Moo. C. C. 431, insert see 2 & 3 Vict.
c. 58, s. 10, as to Mines in the county of Cornwall.

220, for 7 Wm. iv. & 1 Vict. c. 87, ss. 7, 10, read 5, 10.

223, for 1 Mood. C. C. 178, read 78.

361, among the List of Statutes relating to Perjury, insert News-
papers, 6 & 7 Wm. iv. c. 76, s. 6.

ADDENDA.

ABDUCTION-page 6.]-The jury ought not to convict of this offence unless they are satisfied that the prisoner committed it from motives of lucre; but evidence of expressions used by the prisoner respecting the property of the lady, such as that he had seen the will of one of her relatives (naming him), and that she would have 2201. a-year, are important for the consideration of the jury in coming to a conclusion whether the prisoner was actuated by motives of lucre or not. If the jury negative the motives of lucre, and they are satisfied that the prisoner used force to the person of the lady in taking her away, they may find him guilty of an assault under the stat. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11, ante, p. 2. Barratt's case, 9 C. & P. 387. ARSON-page 18.]—In a case of arson it was proved that the floor near the hearth was scorched; it was charred in a trifling way; it had been at a red heat, but not in a blaze: held, that this would be a sufficient burning to support an indictment for arson. Parker's case, 9 C. & P. 45.

Where A and B were charged with setting fire to a wood, and it appeared that they set fire to a summer-house which was in the wood, and that thence the fire was communicated to the wood: held that the prisoners might be convicted on this indictment. Price's case, 9 C. & P. 729. ASSAULT-page 24, et seq.]—Upon an indictment for assaulting a policeman in the execution of his duty, it appeared that the latter had gone into a public-house where the defendant was having high words with the landlady; the defendant tried to go into a room of the house in which a guest was, and the policeman without being desired to do so, collared him, and prevented his going into the room, upon which the defendant struck the policeman, and several blows passed on both sides: held that, if the jury were satisfied that no breach of the peace was likely to be committed by the defendant on the guest in the room, it was no part of the policeman's duty to prevent the defendant from entering it; but assuming that to be so, if the defendant used more violence than was necessary to repel the assault committed on him by the policeman, the defendant would be liable to be convicted of a common assault. Mabel's case, 9 C. & P. 474. CHEATING-page 56.]-An indictment for false pretences charged in the first count, that the defendant “unlawfully did falsely pretend to one J. R., that he, the said J. T. was sent

by W. P. for an order to go to J. B. for a pair of shoes," by means of which false pretence, he did obtain from J. B. a pair of shoes of the goods and chattels of J. B., with intent to defraud J. L. of the price of the said shoes, to wit, nine shillings, of the monies of J. L. The second count charged, that he falsely pretended to J. L., that W. P. had said that J. L. was to give him, the said J. T. (the defendant), an order to go to J. B. for a pair of shoes, by means of which false pretence he did obtain from J. B. in the name of J. L., a pair of shoes of the goods of J. B., with intent to defraud J. L. of the same: held, that both these counts were bad, in arrest of judgment, as neither of them charged a sufficient false pretence, within the statute 7 & 8 Geo. iv. c. 29, s. 53. Tully's case, 9 C. & P. 227. COIN-page 60, et seq.-An indictment for uttering counterfeit coin, knowing it to be counterfeit (after a previous conviction), charged that the prisoner did utter a counterfeit half-crown to E. H., "knowing the same to be false and counterfeit:" held, that the allegation of the scienter was sufficient, and that the word "knowing" must be taken to apply to the prisoner, and not E. H., who was the last antecedent, and that the scienter must be taken to apply to the time of the uttering, although it was not stated to be "then and there." Page's case, 9 C. & P. 756; see ante, p. 68.

An indictment stated that at the assizes holden at H. on the 3d of August, 4 Wm. iv., "C. P. (the present prisoner) together with one T. P., by the name and description of C. P., late of B., etc., and T. P., late, etc., was in due form of law tried and convicted," by a certain jury duly taken, "between our said Lord the King and the said C. P. and T. P.," upon an indictment against them for uttering counterfeit coin, they having other counterfeit coin in their possession, "and thereupon it was considered by the Court there, that the said C. P. should be imprisoned for two years." The record of the conviction of C. P. stated his conviction, and the acquittal of T. P.: held, that this was no variance, and that this allegation in the indictment did not import that T. P. was convicted. Form of indictment for uttering counterfeit coin after a previous conviction. Page's case, 9 C. & P. 756; see ante, p. 68.

one

An indictment for knowingly uttering counterfeit coin, twice on the same day, charged an uttering of a counterfeit half-crown, and that the defendants on the same day, other piece of false and counterfeit [omitting the word coin] resembling, and apparently intended to resemble and pass for a piece of the Queen's current silver coin called a half-crown, unlawfully," etc., "did utter and put off to one S. A., the wife of W. G., knowing the same to be false and counterfeit:" held that the omission of the word "coin," did not render the indictment bad, as the words "false and counterfeit" might be rejected as surplusage, and the indictment would then be, "one other piece, resembling, and apparently intended to resemble, and pass for a piece of the Queen's current silver coin, called

a half-crown;" held also, that the allegation of the scienter was sufficient, and that the word "knowing" must be taken to apply to the prisoner, and not to "S. A., the wife of W. G.," who was the last antecedent, and that the scienter must be taken to apply to the time of the uttering, although it was not stated to be "then and there." Jones' case, 9 C. & P. 761.

On an indictment for a joint uttering of counterfeit coin, where both defendants are not present at the time of the uttering, the true question seems to be whether the one was so near the other as to help the other to get rid of the counterfeit coin. Ibid; see ante, p. 6. FORGERY-page 112, et seq.]—A count in an indictment for forging a request for the delivery of goods, which describes the forged instrument as a certain forged request for the delivery of goods to one J. R.," is good under the statute 2 & 3 Wm. iv. c. 122, s. 2. Robson's case, 9 C. & P. 423; see ante, p. 137. A count in an indictment for uttering a forged deed, described it as 66 a certain deed purporting to be made on the first day of March 1837, between R. W. of the one part, and D. G. of the other part, purporting to be an under-lease by the said R. W. to the said D. G., of certain lands, tenements, and premises therein mentioned, subject to the yearly payment of 81., payable on the first day of March in every year, and purporting to contain a covenant by the said D. G. with the said R. W., for the payment by the said D. G. to the said R. W. of the yearly rent of 8l.:" held good under the statute 2 & 3 Wm. iv. c. 123, s. 2. Davies' case, 9 C. & P. 427; see ante, p. 131.

If a person knew the acceptance of a bill of exchange to be forged, and uttered it as true, and believed that his bankers to whom he uttered it, would advance money on it, which they would not otherwise, that is ample evidence of an intent to defraud, and evidence upon which a jury ought to act; and a person is not the less guilty of forgery, because he may intend ultimately to take up the forged bill, and may suppose that the party whose name is forged will be no loser, and the fact that the bill has since been paid by the prisoner, will make no difference, if the offence has once been complete at the time of the uttering. Geach's case, 9 C. & P. 499; see ante, p. 120, n. (38).

Three prisoners (foreigners) were indicted for feloniously engraving and making two parts of a promissory note of the Emperor of Russia. The indictment was framed upon the statute 11 Geo. iv. & 1 Wm. iv. c. 66, s. 19. The plates were engraved by an Englishman, who was an innocent agent in the transaction. It appeared that two of the prisoners only were present at the time the order was given for the engraving of the plates, but they said they were employed to get it done by a third person, and there was some evidence to connect the third prisoner with the other two in subsequent parts of the transaction. The questions left to the jury were, 1st. whether the two who gave the order for the engraving, knew the nature of the instrument; and secondly, whether all three concurred

in the order given. The Judge (Patteson, J.) told the jury that in order to find all three guilty, they must be satisfied that they jointly employed the engraver, but that it was not necessary that all should be present when the order was given, as it would be sufficient if one first communicated to the other two, and that all three concurred in the employment of the engraver. His Lordship also said, that he was inclined to think, that if the prisoners, by means of the engraver, caused the plates to be engraved, they would be within the provisions of the statute, whether they knew the nature of the instrument engraved or not; but intimated that if it became necessary, that matter might be made the subject of further consideration. The jury found the two guilty who gave the order, and added that they considered they knew the nature of the instrument. The third prisoner was acquitted. Mazeau's case, 9 C. & P. 676; see ante, p. 122, n. HIGHWAY, obstructing-page 146.]-In an indictment for obstructing a highway "leading from the township of D. unto the town of C." by placing a gate across it, the termini D. and C. are excluded; and therefore, if it appear that the gate was put up in the township of D., the defendant must be acquitted. Botfield's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 151; see ante, p. 150, n.

Not repairing.]-On the trial of an indictment for the nonrepair of highways, entries in an ancient parish-book, produced by the churchwarden from the parish chest, were offered in evidence to shew who were the surveyors of the highways in 1707: held, that the evidence was receivable. A minute-book, kept by the magistrates' clerk, was offered in evidence, to show who had been appointed by the magistrates to be surveyors of the highways for the year 1812: held, that this evidence was not receivable without proof of a search for the original appointment under the hands and seals of the magistrates. Whether the minute-book would have been receivable as secondary evidence, if the original appointments had been lost-quære. A written resolution of a vestry meeting purported to allow to Mr. D. 50%. held, that evidence was not admissible to prove what was said by the persons who were at the meeting, with a view of showing what the 50l. were allowed for. Reg. v. Inhabitants of Pembridge, 1 Car. & Marsh, 157; see ante, 158, n. HOUSEBREAKING-page 160.]-A prisoner was indicted for breaking into the house of Elizabeth A., and stealing her goods. There was a second count laying the property of the goods in the Queen. It was shown by proof of the record that the husband of Elizabeth A. had been convicted of felony, and it was also proved, that he was still in prison under his sentence, and that the articles stolen were his, before his conviction, and had remained in the house from the time of his apprehension, and that the wife continued in the possession of the house and goods until they were stolen by the prisoner: held, that the prisoner might be properly convicted of larceny on the second count, which laid the property of the goods in