the Queen, although there had been no office found, and that he could not be convicted of housebreaking, as that part of the indictment which laid the goods and the house to be those of Elizabeth A., could not be supported. Whitehead's case, 9 C. & P. 429.

An indictment for housebreaking, after charging the breaking and entering in the usual form, charged that the prisoner took "forty-two pieces of the current gold coin of this realm, called sovereigns, of the value of 42l., in the same dwelling-house, then and there being found, then and there feloniously did steal and carry away," etc.; held good, and that the words "then and there" in the last allegation were sufficient, without the words "in the same dwelling-house" being added to them. Andrew's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 121.

LARCENY page 162.]-There is such a unity between husband and wife that ordinarily the wife cannot steal the goods of the husband, nor can an indifferent person steal the goods of the husband by the delivery of the wife; and if the wife deliver the goods of the husband to an indifferent person, for that person to convert them to his own use, this is no larceny; but if the person to whom the goods are delivered by the wife be an adulterer it is otherwise, and an adulterer can be properly convicted of stealing the husband's goods, though they be delivered to him by the wife. If no adultery has actually been committed by the parties, but the goods of the husband are removed from his house by the wife and the intended adulterer, with an intent that the wife should elope with him and live in adultery with him, this taking of the goods is, in point of law, a larceny. If a wife elope with an adulterer, who takes her clothes with them, it is a larceny; and it is as much a larceny to steal her clothes, which are her husband's property, as it would be to steal anything else that was his property. If, on the trial of a man for larceny, the jury are satisfied that he took any of the prosecutor's goods, there then being a criminal intention, or there having been a criminal act between the prisoner and the prosecutor's wife, the jury ought to convict, even though the goods were delivered to the prisoner by the prosecutor's wife; but if the jury should think that the prisoner took away the goods merely to get the wife away from her husband as a friend only, and without any reference to any connexion between the prisoner and the wife, either actual or intended, they ought to acquit. Tollett's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 112; see ante, p. 185, n.

MURDER-page 270.]-If a person do any act towards another who is helpless, which must necessarily lead to the death of that other, the crime amounts to murder; but if the circumstances are such that the person would not have been aware that the result would be death, that would reduce the crime to manslaughter, provided that the death was occasioned by an unlawful act, but not such an act as showed a malicious mind. If a woman left her child, a young infant, at a gentleman's door, or other place where it was likely to be found and taken care of, and the child

died, it would be manslaughter only; but if the child were left in a remote place, where it was not likely to be found-e. g. on a barren heath-and the death of the child ensued, it would be murder. Walter's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 164; see ante, p. 280, n.

A police-officer found N. with potatoes under his shirt, which had been very recently dug from the ground, and apprehended him. The policeman called O. to assist him; O. did so; and a rescue being attempted, O. was going away, and was struck by A., who went away, and O. was afterwards killed by other persons who attempted the rescue: held, that the police-officer had no right to apprehend N., and that the killing of O. therefore did not amount to murder; and that, on an indictment for murder, A. could not be convicted of an assault: held also, that a person charged to aid a constable, and who does so, is protected eundo, morando, et redeundo. A., B., and C. were indicted for murder: in the first count as principals in the first degree; and in the second count A. was indicted as a principal in the first degree, and B. and C. as principals in the second degree; and the grand jury ignored the first count as to B. and C., and found a true bill, on the second, against all. Semble, that B. and C. might be convicted on the second count as principals in the murder, although A. was acquitted. A count charged A. with a murder, and charged that B. and C., "at the time of the felony and murder was committed, to wit, on, etc., at, etc., were feloniously present, then and there abetting, aiding, and assisting," etc. Semble, that the word "was" may be rejected as surplusage; but whether, even rejecting that word, this be a good form of charging aiders and abettors— quære. A prisoner in a case of murder may demur; and if his demurrer be overruled, he may still plead not guilty; and semble, that he may demur and plead over to the felony at the same time. Phelps' case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 180; see ante, pp. 292, n. 299, n.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON-page 324.]—On an indictment for wounding, with intent to do grievous bodily harm, it appeared that two persons, one of whom was the prisoner, attacked and wounded the prosecutor, and robbed him; it was not proved which of the two persons inflicted the wound: held, that if the prisoner inflicted the wound on the prosecutor with intent to rob him, he having at the same time an intent to do him grievous bodily harm to effectuate such his intention of robbing, he ought to be indicted on this indictment: held also, that even if the prisoner's was not the hand that inflicted the wound, he ought to be convicted on this indictment, if the jury are satisfied that the two persons were engaged in the common purpose of robbing the prosecutor, and that the other person's was the hand which inflicted the wound. Bowen's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 149; see ante, pp. 331, n., 334. PERJURY-page 346.]-A. brought an action against B. and his partners for the price of wheat, and recovered a verdict on the bought and sold notes. B. and his partners filed a bill in

equity against A., which stated that the bought and sold notes did not contain all the terms of the contract, as it had been also agreed by parol between A. and B. that the wheat should be paid for by a draft at three months; and the prayer of the bill was, that A. should be restrained from suing out execution. A., by his answer, denied the statement in the bill, and the bill was dismissed: held that, if this denial by A. was wilfully false, it amounted to perjury: held also, that B. was a competent witness on an indictment against A. for perjury, alleged to have been committed in the answer, although A. had engaged to indemnify his partners from the expenses of the suit in Chancery. The rule that the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient to sustain an indictment for perjury, is not a mere technical rule, but a rule founded on substantial justice; and evidence confirmatory of that one witness, in some slight particulars only, is not sufficient to warrant a conviction. Yates' case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 132; see ante, pp. 357, n. 359, n. POST-OFFICE OFFENCES-page 364.]-It was proved that a Post Office letter-carrier was in the daily habit of calling at the lodge of the G. Infirmary, and there receiving letters, with a penny on each to prepay the postage; and that he took them, with the penny, to the G. Post Office; and that, during his illness, a person who had performed his duties did the like. There was no evidence of any appointment: held, in an indictment under the stat. 2 Wm. iv. c. 4, s. 1, for embezzling some of the pence thus received, that this was evidence to go to the jury that the pence were received by the prisoner by virtue of his employment as a letter-carrier. Townsend's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 178; see ante, p. 367 (a).

RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-page 386.]-In an indictment for receiving stolen tin, "ingots of tin" are properly described as so many pounds weight of tin; so it would be proper to describe a bar of iron as so many pounds weight of iron; but if an article has obtained, in common parlance, a particular name of its own, it would be wrong to describe it by the name of the material of which it is composed; thus, it would be a mis-description to describe cloth as so many pounds weight of wool, or sovereigns as so many ounces of gold. Mansfield's case, 1 Car. & Marsh. 140; see ante, p. 389, n.

THE END.

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