REPORT OF THE GENERAL OF THE ARMY. HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SIR: I now have the honor to submit this, my annual report of the Army for the past twelve months, and beg to preface it by submitting the following tabular statements and returns compiled by the AdjutantGeneral. A.-"Organization of the Regular Army of the United States, 1878," exhibiting the extreme limit in numbers of every grade and class permitted by existing laws, viz, 2,153 commissioned officers and 25,000 enlisted men. B.—“ General return, or exhibit of the actual strength of the Army of the United States June 30, 1878," exhibiting the actual numbers in service at that date, as shown by actual musters and returns, viz, 2,153 commissioned officers and 23,254 enlisted men. C1.-" Position and distribution of troops in the Military Division of the Missouri," commanded by Lieut. Gen. P. H. Sheridan; headquarters Chicago, Ill., Department of the Missouri; C2.-Department of Texas and Department of the Platte; Aggregating, in the whole Division of the Missouri, 1,131 officers and 14.052 men. D.—Position and distribution of troops in the Military Division of the Atlantic, commanded by Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock; headquarters, Governor's Island, New York; embracing Department of the East and Department of the South, aggregating in this division 395 officers and 3,188 men. E.-Position and distribution of troops in the Military Division of the Pacific, commanded by Maj. Gen. I. McDowell; headquarters, Presidio of San Francisco. Department of California, Department of the Columbia, and Department of Arizona, aggregating in the division 331 officers and 3,572 men. F.-Department of West Point, commanded by Maj. Gen. J. M. Schofield; headquarters, West Point, N. Y.; aggregating 54 officers and professors, 282 cadets, and 280 enlisted men. An examination of these returns will show the Army to be composed of five regiments of artillery, ten of cavalry, and twenty-five of infantry, of which eight regiments of cavalry and eighteen of infantry are employed in the Military Division of the Missouri; four regiments of artillery and three of infantry occupy the Division of the Atlantic, and one regiment of artillery, two of cavalry, and four of infantry are distributed to posts in the Division of the Pacific. Since my last report only one change has been made in the depart ments, viz, the discontinuance of the Department of the Gulf, and adding its territory and troops to the Department of the South. Therefore, at this time, the geographical distribution of command is into nine departments, viz: the East, General Hancock, and South, General Augur, constituting the Division of the Atlantic, commanded by Major-General Hancock; Dakota, General Terry, Platte, General Crook, Missouri, General Pope, and Texas, General Ord, constituting the Division of the Missouri, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sheridan; the Columbia, General Howard, California, General McDowell, and Arizona, Col. and Bvt. Maj. Gen. O. B. Willcox, constituting the Division of the Pacific, commanded by Major-General McDowell. These general officers have made full and elaborate reports of the state of facts and operations of the troops in their respective commands during the past year, which I herewith submit, viz: 1. Report of Lieutenant-General Sheridan. 2. Report of Brig. Gen. John Pope. 2 A. Report of Maj. J. K. Mizner. 2 B. Report of Col. Ed. Hatch. 2 C. Report of Lieut. Col. W. H. Lewis. 2 D. Roster of troops in Department Missouri. 3. Report of commanding general Department Dakota, General Gibbon commanding. 3 A. Roster of troops, Department Dakota. 4. Report of Brig. Gen. E. O. C. Ord. 4 A. List of persons killed, &c., in Department of Texas, &c. 4 B. Judge Paschal's letter relative to alleged attack on Lipan camp. 4 C. Translation of an editorial in a Monterey paper dated September 7, 1878. 4 D. Roster of troops in Department of Texas. 5. Report of Brig. Gen. George Crook. 5 A. Roster of troops in Department Platte. 6. Report of Maj. Gen. W. S. Hancock. 6 A. Report of Brig. Gen. C. C. Augur. 6 B. Memorandum for general staff officers and roster of troops. 7. Report of General J. M. Schofield. 8. Report of Major-General McDowell. 8 A. Statement of movement of troops in Department of California. 8 B. Distribution of troops in Division of the Pacific. 8 C. Appendix to General McDowell's report. 9. Report of Brig. Gen. O. O. Howard (not yet received). 10. Report of General O. B. Willcox. These reports are so full and complete that they leave for me nothing to record, further than to indorse their several recommendations or to emphasize some of their conclusions. Among these reports, that of Lieutenant-General Sheridan will, from his rank and large experience, attract the first notice, and I beg to invite close study of his entire report. His command embraces eight of the ten regiments of cavalry and eighteen of the twenty-five regiments of infantry, which compose the entire Army; and though he states this force to be entirely inadequate to perform the vast amount of labor required of him by the vicissitudes of service, yet it is impossible further to re-enforce him without absolutely stripping our seaboard, or abandoning other territories of equal value and subjected to the same dangers which he so graphically describes in his own. The troops now subject to his command compose quite two-thirds of the effective force of the whole Army, and his territorial command extends from "the British line on the north, to the mouth of the Rio Grande south, an average of 1,500 miles long, and from the Mississippi westward to and including the Rocky Mountain Chain, an average of 1,200 miles broad. As General Sheridan well describes, this vast region has undergone in the past ten years a more violent and radical change than any like space of the earth's surface during any previous fifty years. From being the pas ture-field of millions of buffalo, elk, deer, antelopes, and large game, affording abundant food for the Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Comanche Indians, it has already passed into the condition of a farming or pastoral country traversed by many railroads. The game is nearly all gone, the Indian has been forced on to small reservations; farms and herds of neat-cattle are fast taking the place of the buffalo, and every ox and steer has an owner who will fight for his property. Nearly all the Indian treaties were made on the theory that this change would occur more slowly, that the government would only have to furnish partial food for the Indian, and that he could procure half or a quarter of the necessary meat by hunting. I know that such was the belief of the commission, of which I was a member, which negotiated the treaties of 1868, and, having traversed the plains ten or fifteen times since that date, I can bear personal testimony that where in 1868 millions of buffalo could be found, not a single one is now seen. Again, it was then a favorite theory that the Indian would gradually see for himself, in the disappearance of these herds of buffalo, a reason why he should plow and cultivate the ground like the white man; but his progress in this direction is scarcely perceptible, save in the remnants of tribes like the Santees, Pawnees, Navajoes, Cherokees, &c., while the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, &c., "the nomade of the Great West," seem to prefer death to the common toil of the farmer. Beyond question, it was hunger which drove the Bannocks and Cheyennes to war this summer, as recounted by Generals Pope, Crook, and Howard; and similar escapades, causing great alarm and some murders, will occur each coming year unless these Indians be kept quiet by more food. It seems idle to expect that the enterprising and industrious white race will cease till every acre of this continent susceptible of cultivation is reduced to possession, and till the vast unfenced prairie which has been for ages the pasture-field for its millions of buffalo is covered by herds of horses, beef cattle, and sheep, each having an owner entitled to protection in his property by the government, local or national. It is not to be expected that these pasture-fields can be used by the two races in common without everlasting conflict; but the reservations already set apart for the Indians are large enough, and should suffice for them ultimately to raise all the meat and grain necessary for their subsistence; but mean time they must have more food, else they will steal and fight. To convert the Indians into a pastoral race is the first step in their upward progress toward civilization; that of agriculturist must be the next stage, though slower of realization; but in this direction is the sole hope of rescuing any part of the "nomade" Indians from utter annihilation. This humane end cannot be reached by means of the present peace agents, because persuasion is wasted on an Indian. There must not only be a show of force, but actual subjection and force used to compel him to guard and protect his growing herd of cattle or sheep, as otherwise he will, in his hunger and improvidence, kill and eat the very cows and ewes issued by the government for the purpose of raising a herd. In like manner, force will be necessary to compel the nomade to plow |