that at certain convenient periods, the intercalary day of the Julian correction should be omitted, viz., in the centurial years A. D. 1700, 1800, and 1900, and being inserted again in 2000, should be again left out in 2100, 2200, and 2300, and again inserted in 2400, &c.; thus reducing the error of the Julian correction to about 2h. 42 m. in 400 years, or one day in 3546 years, which he very reasonably thought the world could afford to disregard! (Norton's Astron. § 362 & seq.; 2 Burn's Ecc Law, 348 & seq.; Til. Kalendar.)

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The Gregorian calendar was adopted immediately, in all countries of the Romish faith; but in the Protestant states it was not introduced until almost two centuries later, such was the unreasoning bigotry of the times. And Russia to this day employs the Julian calendar, making a very inconvenient difference of about twelve days between her mode of computing time and that of the rest of the christian world. (Nort. Astron. § 367.) 38. The "Change of Style" in England.

The Gregorian calendar, and mode of computation of time, were adopted in England, and in the English dominions throughout the world, (and, therefore, in Virginia), in 1752, by Statute 24 Geo. II, c. 23; whereby it was enacted that the natural day next following the 2nd day of September in that year, should be reckoned the 14th day of September, omitting for that time only the eleven intermediate days (the error of the Julian correction having, since 1852, amounted to another day), and provision was made, identical with that of Gregory, for maintaining the correction through subsequent centuries. (2 Bl. Com. 140, n (3); 3 Th. Co. Lit. 357, n (F); Jac. Law Dict. Year; Bouv. Law. Dict. Year; 2 Burn's Ecc. Law, 348 & seq.)

The same statute also changed the commencement of the English civil year from 25th of March to 1st of Jannary, so as to correspond with the church year, which had always begun on the 1st of January (thereby introducing the mode of dating 1748, for days between the 1st of January and 25th of March). It seems, from ancient charters, that prior to the Conquest, the year began at Christmas. (3 Th. Co. Lit. 357, n (F); Jac. Law Dict. Year.)

48. Fractions of a Year.

Half a year is reckoned always for 182 days in England, and a quarter of a year 91 days. When the year consists of 365 days, this is a necessary rule, in order to avoid a fraction of a day; and in leap-year it grows out of the Stat. de anno bissextili, 21 Hen. III, enacting that the

intercalated day in leap-year, together with the preceding day, shall be accounted for one day only. It may, therefore, be well doubted whether, as 21 Hen. III. has not been enacted in Virginia, 183 days is not with us to be deemed the half of leap-year. (2 Bl. Com. 141, 140, n (3); 3 Th. Co. Lit. 356–7.)

2. Month; W. C.

mouth Col 15. Doctrine at common law as to the meaning of Month.

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In general, the word month means at common law a lunar month of twenty-eight days, unless the contrary appear. But by the usage of the parties, or of the trade which they exercise, the word may mean a calendar month, as in the almanac. Such a usage prevails in mercantile transactions, and therefore in them a calendar, and not a lunar, month is to understood. (2 Bl. Com. 140, n (3); 3 Th. Co. Lit. 357, n (G).)

Hence the diversity between "twelve months," which signifies twelve lunar months of twenty-eight days each, and "a twelve-month" in the singular, which includes all the year. (2 Bl. Com. 140, n (3); Čatesby's case, 6 Co. 61 b.) 28. Doctrine in Virginia, as to the meaning of Month.

The general usage in Virginia, in conformity with the principle of the common law, has changed the meaning of the word, which (unless the contrary appear) is to be understood in all cases, as expressing a calendar and not a lunar month. And in statutes it is declared in terms that it shall have the meaning of calendar month, unless it be otherwise expressed, it being superfluously added that the word "year" shall mean a calendar year, which is a mere affirmation of the common law. (Vandewall v. Com'th, 2 Va. Cas. 275; Brewer v. Harris, 5 Grat. 285; Sheets v. Selden's Lessee, 2 Wal. 189-'90; V. C. 1873, c. 15, § 9, (cl. 7).)

3. Day.

A day is usually intended, not of the period of day-light alone (which is, rather singularly, denominated by Coke, the artificial day), but of the entire space of twenty-four hours, which Lord Coke styles the natural day; and, in general, the law reckons no fraction of a day, to which no other exception is recollected, save in case of the lien of a fieri facias, and perhaps of a commission in bankruptcy. In case of an execution of fieri facias against the debtor's goods, the officer is directed to endorse on the writ, not the day only, but the hour when it comes to his hands; and if two or more come on the same day, at different hours, that first received is to be first satisfied. (V. C. 1873, c. 183, § 29, 30; 1 Bl. Com. 140, n (3); Id. 141; 3 Th. Co. Lit.

We have seen that when rent, or other money, is due on a day, it may be paid, tendered, or demanded at any time before sunset, so that sufficient day-light remains to count it, but that for all other purposes, it is not due until midnight. (Ante p. 45, 21.)

In respect to the computation of time, the general principle seems to be that, where the time is to run from an act done, the day on which the act is done is to be excluded. Thus, if a mercantile security is payable so many days after sight, the day of presentment is not to be reckoned, and so, where a security is to be given within six months after the testator's death, the day of the death is to be excluded. This doctrine, however, is discountenanced V in Virginia, in respect to statutes which require a notice to be given, or any other act to be done a certain time before any motion or proceeding, it being declared that in such case there must be that time exclusive of the day for such motion or proceeding; but the day on which such notice is given, or such act is done, may be counted. (Bayl. on Bills, 155; Lester v. Garland, 15 Ves. 253; 2 Bl. Com. 140, n (3); V. C. 1873, c. 15, § 9, (cl. 8).) 4. The little Esteem in which Estates for years were originally Held.

Originally they were entirely precarious, at the arbitrary will of the giver; and were liable, even after they became more permanent, to be defeated by collusive recoveries suffered by the lessor. In the time of Edward I, some protection against such recoveries was afforded by the statute of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I, c. 11, and a complete protection by 21 Hen. VIII, c. 15. (Bract. 27 b; 1 Reeves' Hist. Eng. Law, 303; 2 Id. 150; 3 Id. 335; 4 Id 232; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 628; 2 Bl. Com. 141-22.)

Hence, estates for years were commonly very short, for the most part, in the hands of mere bailiffs or servants of the lord, and not being allowed to be freeholds, were held to pass, after the tenant's death, to his personal representative (his executor or administrator), and not to his real representative (or heir); and in short, were and are regarded as belonging, in almost all respects, to the same general class as movable goods, being termed like them, chattels, but distinguished from them by the epithet real, expressive of their immobility. Thus, whilst movables are denominated personal chattels, estates for years are styled chattels real. (1 Lom. Dig. 403; 2 Bl. Com. 142-23, 386-'7.) 5. The Characteristic Qualities of Estates for Years.

The characteristic qualities of estates for years are, (1), A fixed period of duration; (2), Entry upon the premises or possession thereof; (3), They may commence in futuro; (4),

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They may be made to cease upon a future event, without entry; (5), The doctrine as to their being limited by way of remainder; and (6), The covenants connected with them;

W. C.

1. A Fixed period of Duration.

Every estate which must expire at a period certain and pre-fixed, by whatever words created, whether it be for one or more years, or for a half year, or a week, is an estate for years. Hence it is frequently called a term (terminus), because it has a certain beginning and a certain end. But id certum est, quod certum reddi potest; therefore if a man make a lease to another for so many years as J. S. shall name, it is a good lease for years. Hence, also, a lease for so many years as J. S shall live is not a lease for years, but a freehold, which at common law required livery of seisin in order to perfect it. But a lease for one hundred years, if J. S. shall so long live, is an estate of defined duration, and therefore an estate for years, although it may, and probably will, terminate before the lapse of the one hundred years, by the death of J. S. If no day of commencement be named, the beginning of the term is ascertained by construction of law to be from the making or delivery of the lease. (2 Bl. Com. 143; 1 Lom. Dig. 172; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 628, 632.)

2. Entry upon the Premises, or Possession thereof.

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The bare lease does not vest an estate in the lessee. only gives him a right of entry, which is called his interest in the term, or interesse termini. When he has entered, he is then, and not before, possessed of the estate or term (terminus). Thus the word term does not signify merely the time specified in the lease, but also the estate which passes thereby; and therefore the term may expire during the continuance of the time, as by surrender, forfeiture, &c. The entry thus required to consummate an estate for years, differs from the livery of seisin which is required for a freehold, in being made by the lessee in the absence, or even after the death of the lessor, whilst livery of seisin which is made by the lessor to the lessee on the premises, both being present in person, or by attorneys in fact solemnly constituted under seal. (2 Bl. Com. 144, 31415; 1 Lom. Dig. 174–5; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 630, 632.) 3. Estates for Years may commence in futuro.

No estate of freehold in corporeal tenements, can at common law be made to commence in futuro, (although it is otherwise by statute, V. C. 1873, c. 116, § 5, 4,) for two reasons, namely: first, because such estate must be created by livery of seisin, which in its nature must have a pre

sent operation, or none at all; and secondly, because the freehold, having by the livery passed out of the grantor, would be in abeyance, leaving no one to render the military services, nor to be sued, the occupant of the freehold being always the person against whom real actions for the lands must be brought. (2 Bl. Com. 144, 165–26, 314; 3 Th. Co. Lit. 102, n (G).)

Estates for years, on the contrary, are only chattels, and are reckoned part of the personal estate, and requiring no livery of seisin, but only an ex parte entry, to vest the tenant's interest, may be made, even at common law, to commence in futuro, as well as in presenti. (2 Bl. Com. 143-4, 165.)

4. Estates for Years may be made to cease upon a future event, without Entry.

As an estate of freehold in lands cannot be created at common law without livery, so neither can it be terminat, d without the corresponding notoriety of entry; and therefor a mere limitation is not sufficient of itself to terminate such an estate. An estate for years, however, requiring no livery to originate it, may be made to cease upon a future contingency, by a proviso in the conveyance itself. Thus, if land were conveyed at common law to J. S. for life, on condition that he should pay $1,000 on the ensuing 4th of July, and he failed to make the payment, his estate would not be determined ipso facto, but there must be an entry by the grantor or his heirs, in order to put an end to it. If, however, J. S.'s estate, instead of being for life, had been for one hundred years, with a similar condition, it would have been determined ipso facto, by the default of payment. (1 Lom. Dig. 175; 2 Th. Co. Lit. 87-'8.)

This distinction is much less practical than it was formerly, since by the statutory modes of conveyance most usually employed, which dispense with livery of seisin altogether, or substitute a constructive for an actual livery (V. C. 1873, c. 112, § 4, 14; Id. c, 118, § 4), an estate of freehold may be as well made to cease by a mere proviso or limitation, without entry, as an estate for years. Lom. Dig. 561.)

5. Estates for Years, limited by way of Remainder.

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There was never any doubt that, in the creation of an estate for years, it might as well be limited by way of remainder, as in presenti; but formerly such estates already existing were, like other chattels, incapable of being limited by way of remainder after a life-estate therein, or even, it is said, after any interest, even for an hour, the first gift being considered (as an estate tail still is), as equivalent

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