marriage to be opposed to the well-being of society, and void. Hence, when the court of chancery, at a later period, assumed a concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the payment of legacies, upon the ground of the trust involved, it adopted for the most part, but not wholly, the doctrines and rules it found prevailing upon the subject in the ecclesiastical courts, it being manifestly undesirable that the subject should have a different measure of justice, according as he happened to sue in one or the other tribunal. The ecclesiastical courts, however, never possessed any jurisdiction over the devises of lands, nor over legacies charged to be paid, in whole or in part, out of the proceeds of lands, these subjects having been, from their origin, in the statute of wills (32 & 34 Hen. VIII), cognizable exclusively in the court of chancery. As to devises, therefore, and legacies charged wholly or in part on lands, the court of chancery was free to adopt, and did adopt, its own (that is, the common law) maxims touching conditions in restraint of marriage, holding such as prohibited marriage altogether, or restricted it unreasonably, to be void, whilst those which imposed only wholsome restraints in respect of time, place, person, and consent of guardians, &c., were deemed valid. The doctrines of the court of chancery, therefore, in respect to such conditions, when annexed to devises, and to legacies charged on lands, are uniform, and easily intelligible The complexity is in respect of legacies charged on personalty alone; and in them it grows out of the fact that the court of chancery did not, as to them, adopt wholly the rules which it found prevailing in the ecclesiastical courts, nor without a certain regard to the principles of the common law. On the contrary, whenever it discovered that the testator's intention was fixed to make the condition respecting marriage indispensable to the enjoyment of his bounty, and that otherwise he designed the gift to go over to some one else, the condition prevailed, unless it was entirely prohibitory of marriage, when the common law held it to be void. Hence, in all cases of legacies given upon condition affecting liberty of marriage, the most important enquiry is, whether the legacy be payable out of the real, or out of the personal estate; and the next most important point to be observed, is whether it is given over to some one else if the condition be not complied with. See 1 Lom..Dig. 338 & seq; 1 Stor. Eq. § 283 & seq; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Grat. 804; Scott v. Tyler, 2 Bro. C. C. 431; S. C. 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. (Pt. I), 266 & seq; Garbut v. Hilton, 1 Atk. 381; W. C. 1". Diversity between Conditions in restraint of Marriage, and Limitations. A limitation, marking, as it does, the term of duration of the estate, beyond which it cannot last, is never void. A condition, on the other hand, which cuts the estate short, and prematurely determines it, is valid or void according to the principles above indicated. Thus, a "devise to A until she marries, and then the land to pass to Z," is a limitation, and good; whilst a "devise to A for life, on condition that if she marries, the land shall pass to Z," is a condition, and because it absolutely prohibits marriage, is void. (1 Lom. Dig. 340; Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. (Pt. I), 321.) 2. Diversity in case of Persons who have been Married. Conditions restraining persons widowed from marrying again, are sustained as valid by the current of authority. (1 Lom. Dig. 342, n *.) 3. General Doctrine as to the Validity of Conditions in restraint of Marriage; W. C. 1o. Condition in restraint of Marriage annexed to Devises of Lands, and to Legacies charged on Lands; W. C. 1P. Condition Precedent. The condition, however restrictive, of marriage, must be complied with, or the estate cannot vest (1 Lom. Dig 338, 341; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 19, n (K); Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. (Pt. I), 318; Ante, p. 228, 11.) 2P. Condition Subsequent. The validity of a condition subsequent depends on whether it is unreasonably restrictive of marriage, or not, according to the principles of the common law. Thus, where a testator gave certain property to his daughter, but declared that, as in consequence of a nervous debility, she was unfit for the control of herself, his will was that she should not marry, and that if she did, the gift should be void, the condition was held to be invalid, and the estate absolute. (Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Hare, (24 E. Chan.) 570, 579; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Grat. 804; Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. (Pt. Í), 319; 1 Th. Co. Lit. 19, n. (K); 1 Stor. Eq. § 288.) 2o. Conditions in restraint of Marriage annexed to Legacies charged on Personalty; W. C. 1P. When, in default of the observance of the Condition, the Legacy is given over to some one else. The condition, whether precedent or subsequent, must be complied with, unless it be unreasonably restrictive of marriage, in which case it is wholly void, and the legacy is absolute. The student will observe what a mingling is here of the principles of the civil and common law. The civil law, alone considered, would have disregarded the condition under all circumstances, and have held the legacy always absolute. The common law, considered alone, would have pronounced the condition, whether precedent or subsequent, necessary to be observed, unless it were unreasonably restrictive of marriage, in which event it would have disregarded the condition subsequent, as void, so making the legacy absolute; but in case of the condition precedent, it would not have suffered the legacy to vest until the condition had been performed. The court of chancery, therefore, has adopted the civil law only in allowing the legacy to vest in the case of the precedent condition in the last instance, notwithstanding its non-performance. In all other particulars it has followed its own doctrines, that is, those of the common law. (1 Th. Co. Lit. 19, n (K); n Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. (Pt. I), 320-221; 1 Lom. Dig. 341.) The reason for allowing such an effect to the bequest over, is differently stated. Some treat it as an emphatic manifestation of the testator's intent; whilst others consider that it is the interest of the legatee over who takes by way of conditional limitation, which makes the dif ference. And this latter view seems the better founded. (Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. (Pt. I), 320-21; 1 Lom. Dig. 231; Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Meriv. 117.) 2P. When in Default of the Observance of the Condition, the Legacy is not given over; W. C. 19. Where the Condition is Precedent. If unreasonably restrictive of marriage, the condition is void, and the legacy is absolute; otherwise, the condition must be observed. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 19, n (K); Garbut v. Hilton, 1 Atk. 381; Scott v. Tyler, 1 Bro. C. C. 431; S. C. 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. 266, 318-'19; 1 Stor. Eq. § 290.) 2. Where the Condition is Subsequent. The condition is inoperative in any event to defeat the legacy; for if unreasonably restrictive of marriage, it is void, and if not, it is deemed merely in terrorem. (1 Lom. Dig. 341-2; 2 Th. Co. Lit. 19, n (K); 1 Stor. Eq. § 288; Scott v. Tyler, 2 Wh. & Tud. L. Cas. (Pt. I), 319-20; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Grat. 804, 810.) 4. Effect of Illegal Conditions; W. C. The estate cannot vest, at common law, as we have seen, in any case of condition precedent, unless the condition be complied with; and when the condition is illegal, public policy will not permit one to derive a benefit from an illegal act, so that even though the condition were performed, still the estate could not take effect. It is therefore void whether the condition is or is not fulfilled. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 22; Id. 24, n (P); 1 Lom. Dig. 334; Ante p. 243, 1.) 21. Effect of Illegal Conditions Subsequent. The estate remains unimpaired, and would do so even though the conditions were performed, for the reason just stated (supra, 11). (2 Th. Co. Lit. 21, & n (N); Id. 24 & n (P); Ante p. 243, 1.) 31. Repugnant Conditions. See 2 Bl. Com. 156-'7; 1 Lom. Dig. 334 & seq.; 2 Th Co. Lit. 25 & seq.; Bac. Abr. Conditions (L). W. C. 1. The Nature of Repugnant Conditions. Repugnant conditions are conditions incompatible with the legal nature and incidents of the estate to which they are annexed. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 26 & seq.; 1 Lom. Dig. 334 & seq.) 2. Several Instances of Repugnancy. The most usual instances of repugnancy is a con dition annexed to an estate, (most frequently an estate in fee-simple), not to aliene. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 25 & seq.; 1 Lom. Dig. 334 & seq.) W. C. 11. Condition not to aliene, annexed to an Estate in Fee-simple. It will be remembered that amongst the incidents which the law generally attaches to fee-simple estates, was mentioned (Ante p. 76, 15) unlimited power of alienation. A condition not to aliene is repugnant to this incident or quality, and, therefore, as a general rule, is void. (1 Lom. Dig. 335; 4 Kent's Com. 131.) W. C. 1. When restriction upon Alienation is reasonably qualified, e. g. in respect of Time or Persons. A condition imposing restrictions upon alienation, is admissible if it be confined to a few designated persons, or limited to a reasonable time. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 27, & n (R); 1 Lom. Dig. 335.) 2. When restriction upon alienation is unqualified and universal; W. C. 1. Where the restriction is imposed upon a Corporation Grantee. The condition is admissible, apparently because corporations being created, and being allowed to acquire lands for corporate purposes only, it is not only not contrary to, but it is entirely consonant with public policy, and with what ought to have been the intention of the parties, to impose restrictions limiting the use of lands purchased, to the corporations only, and prohibiting alienation. Thus a condition annexed to land granted to New York city, that it should be used exclusively as a public square, was held to be valid, and the land to be forfeited upon the non-observance thereof. So also in case of a condition annexed to a conveyance to a railroad company;-for a church; a schoolhouse; and a town-house, respectively. (Stuyvesant v. Mayor of N. Y., 11 Pai. 414; Penn'a R. R. Co. v. Parke, 42 Penn'a, 31; Southard v. Central R. R. Co., 2 Dutch, (N. J.), 13; Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark's 483; Atto. Gen'l v. Merrimack, &c., Co., 14 Gray, (Mass.), 586; Warner v. Bennett, 31 Com. 468; French v. Quincey, 3 Allen, (Mass.), 9.) 2o. When the Restriction is imposed upon a Natural Person; W. C. |