standing Lord Coke (2 Th. Co. Lit. 646) countenances a contrary doctrine, seems to be the preferable interpretation. (2 Th. Co. Lit. 646, n (12); Ridout v. Paine, 3 Atk. 493; Paramour v. Yardley, 2 Plowd. 541, n (d).)

If, however, the repugnancy is in no admissible way capable of being reconciled, nothing remains but to apply this rule, and to hold that in a deed the first, and in a will the last prevails (Wykham v. Wykham, 18 Ves. 421); although such a method of interpretation, seeing that the whole of both classes of instruments must be considered together, and are executed at the same moment of time, can be justified only by rigorous necessity.

7. Ambiguities in a Writing cannot, in general, be explained by Parol Testimony.

Parol contemporaneous evidence is, in general, inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 275.) The writing is the only outward and visible expression of the meaning of the parties, and to allow it to be varied or contradicted by verbal testimony of what passed at or before its making would be to postpone the more certain and reliable mode of proof, to the more precarious and less trust-worthy; to prefer the less good to the best evidence. (Starkie's Ev. (Sharswood) 651; 1 Greenl. Ev. §.276, 282; Rutland's Case, 5 Co. 25 b; Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211 c, & notes, 218-'19; Gatewood v. Burrus, 3 Call. 194; Tabb v. Archer, 3 H. & M. 399; Puller v. Puller, 3 Rand. 83; Miars v. Bedgood, 9 Leigh, 361, 368, 372; Crawford v. Jarrett's Adm'r, 2 Leigh, 630; Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh, 632; Watson v. Hurt, 6 Grat. 633, 644; Townes v. Lucas, 13 Grat. 710.)

The rule applies as well to simple contracts in writing, as to wills and specialties, extending, indeed, to all writings of every description. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 276, 287, 289; Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363, 367, pr. Ld. Abinger, C. B) It is directed only against the admission of any other evidence of the language employed in the writing than that which is furnished by the writing itself. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 277; Crawford v. Jarrett's Adm'r, 2 Leigh, 630.)

The principle in question does not forbid the proof by parol of the surrounding circumstances, in order more perfectly to understand the intent and meaning of the parties, so that the court may be placed as nearly as possible in the situation of the party whose written language is to be interpreted, and may understand his

relations to persons and things around him, or, indeed, may be made acquainted with all extrinsic circumstances tending to show what persons or what things were intended, where the language is alike applicable to several; but not if the description be wholly inapplicable to the thing said to be designed. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 277, 282, 288, 288 a, 290, 291, 295 a; Miller v. Travers, 8 Bingh. (21 E. C. L.) 244; Doe v. Needs, 2 M. & W. 129; Mackey v. Fuqua, 3 Call. 19; Shelton v. Shelton, 1 Wash. 53; Kennon v. McRoberts, 1 Wash. 96; Trigg & ux v. King's Rep., 1 Rand. 252; Crawford v. Jarrett, 2 Leigh, 630; Wootten v. Redd, 12 Grat. 196; Walker v. Christian, 21 Grat. 294.)

Nor does it exclude the testimony of experts to aid the court either to decipher the instrument when in unknown characters, or to translate it from a foreign tongue, or to make it intelligible by explaining the proper local or technical meaning of particular words; but not to prove that, in any individual case, the words were used in other than their ordinary and proper sense. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 280, 295, 298.) For the rule excludes all parol evidence of intention, whether direct or by way of inference. (1 Greenl. Ev § 282 a; Skipwith v. Cabell, 19 Grat. 758; Wootten v. Redd, 21 Grat. 196.)

The rule admits proof to identify and show who are the real parties to the transaction (1 Greenl. Ev. § 282 a; Wadsworth, &c. v. Allen, 8 Grat. 174); to ascertain the nature and qualities of the subject to which the writing refers (1 Greenl. Ev. § 286; Crawford v. Morris, 5 Grat. 90; Emerick v. Taverner, 9 Grat. 220); and, as we have seen, to show the situation of the maker of the instrument in all his relations to persons and things around (1 Greenl. Ev. § 282 a, 288; Wadsworth v. Allen, 8 Grat. 174; Wootten v. Redd, 12 Grat. 196.)

Also, to show a reasonable and fair usage or custom, with reference to which the parties probably contracted, or expressed themselves; but in Virginia only where the language is ambiguous, not where the usage or custom, which it is sought to establish, is inconsistent with the terms of the writing (Wigglesworth v. Dallison, 1 Dougl. 201; Hutton v. Warren, 1 M. & W. 466; Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh, 639; Mason v. Moyers, 2 Rob. 613; Gross v. Criss, 3 Grat. 250.)

Also, to show that the instrument is invalidated by fraud, or other illegality (if not under seal), by want of valuable consideration, or by a mistake in point of

fact; or that whilst it purports to be an absolute conveyance, it was, in fact, intended as a mortgage (1 Greenl. Ev. § 284, 296, 304; Ross v. Norvell, 1 Wash. 14; Flemings v. Willis, 2 Call. 54; Jones v. Robertson, 2 Munf. 187; Stratton v. Minnis, Id. 329; Alexander & Co. v. Newton, 2 Grat. 266; Brent v. Richards, Id. 534, 543; Shepherd v Henderson, 3 Grat. 367.)

Also, to contradict or explain the writing in its recital of facts, where the party is not estopped to deny them, as in receipts and other papers which contain such recitals (1 Greenl. Ev. § 305; Brent v. Richards, 2 Grat. 539, 543; Harvey v. Skipwith. 16 Grat. 410.)

Also, to rebut an equity by showing an intention adverse to a presumption which would otherwise arise; as that two legacies of which the sums and expressed motives exactly coincide, are cumulative; that a portion is an ademption of a legacy; that a portion is satisfied by a legacy, &c. These presumptions may be all repelled by parol evidence; in respect to which it has been well said, that it is not in this case so much adducing parol evidence to contradict or explain a writing as to show that the writing means what it says (1 Greenl. Ev. § 296; Jones v. Mason, 5 Rand. 577; Kelly v. Kelly, 6 Rand. 176; Moore v. Hilton, 12 Leigh, 2; Hansbrough's Ex'ors v. Hooe & ux, 12 Leigh, 316; V. C. 1873, c. 118, § 12.)

Also, to discharge a written agreement totally, supposing it to be not under seal, even though a writing be necessary, in pursuance of the statute of parol agreements, to the validity of the transaction which is thus abrogated. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 302; Ante Phelps v. Sealy & als, 22 Grat. 585 & seq.)

p. 777;

Also, to set up a new and distinct agreement upon a new consideration, whether as a substitute for the old, or in addition to and beyond it. (Stark. Ev. (Sharswood), 655, n c; 1 Greenl. Ev. § 303-4; Flemings v. Willis, 2 Call. 5.)

Also, to enlarge the time of performance of a simple contract, or to change the place, even, it would seem, in cases within the statute of frauds, or parol agreements (Stark. Ev. (Sharswood), 724-5, & n o.), or to show a waiver and abandonment of it. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 304.)

Also, to explain a latent ambiguity. There are, as Lord Bacon observes, two sorts of ambiguities; patent, which appears on the face of the writing, and is apparent to all who read or hear it; and latent, when the ambiguity is brought to light by extrinsic circumstances,

none appearing upon the face of the instrument, but as Lord Bacon expresses it," there is some collateral matter out of the deed that breedeth the ambiguity.” (Bac. Max. Reg. XXIII.) A patent ambiguity, inherent in the words, and incapable of being dispelled, either by any legal rules of construction applied to the instrument, or by evidence showing that terms in themselves unmeaning or unintelligible are capable of receiving a known conventional signification, can never be explained by parol testimony; but a latent ambiguity, which is raised by extrinsic facts, may in like manner be resolved by the proof of like facts. Lord Bacon states the leading maxim upon the subject to be, ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur. (Bac. Max. Reg. XXIII; Stark. Ev. (Sharswood), 652 & seq.)

Ambiguitas patens," says he, "is never holpen by averment," for the reason, as he explains, that it would introduce into the construction and effect of writings an uncertainty which would breed infinite disputes and confusion. "But if it be ambiguitas latens," he adds, "then otherwise, it is; as, if I grant my manor of S. to J. F. and his heirs, here appeareth no ambiguity at all; but if the truth be that I have two manors, both of South S. and North S., this ambiguity is matter in fact (latent), and therefore shall be holpen by averment, whether of them was that the party intended should pass." (Bac. Max. Reg. XXIII; Stark. Ev. (Sharswood) 625 & seq; 653, & n (1); 1 Lom. Dig. 212 & seq; Broom's Max. 468 & seq; Crawford v. Jarrett, 2 Leigh, 630; Wootten v. Redd, 12 Grat. 196.)

8. Mere false description does not make a writing inoperative, when, after rejecting what is false, enough remains to ascertain the person or the subject intended.

This idea is frequently expressed by the maxim, Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. Its applications have been numerous enough to illustrate it amply. Thus, under a lease of "all that part of Blenheim Park situate in the county of Oxford, now in the occupation of one S., lying" within certain specified limits, "with all the houses thereto belonging, which are in the occupation of said S.," a house within the limits designated, but not in the occupancy of S., was held to pass. (Doe v. Galloway, 5 B. & Ad. (37 E. C. L.) 43.) So by a devise of "the farm called Trogue's Farm, now in the occupation of C.,”

the whole farm was held to have passed, although it was not all in C's occupation, (Goodtitle v. Southern, 1 M. & S. 299.) And where land was described in a patent as lying in the county of M., and further described by reference to natural monuments or marked lines, so as to ascertain its identity, notwithstanding the subject lay not in the county of M., but in that of H., yet the mistake as to the county was deemed not to affect the validity of the grant; although it was admitted that if the subject had been so inaccurately described as to render its identity wholly uncertain, the grant would for that reason have been void. (Boardman, &c. v. Lessees of Reed, &c. 6 Pet. 345; Wootten v. Redd, 12 Grat. 196.) Thus also, where a testator devised all his "freehold houses, in Aldersgate street," when in fact he had no freehold, but had leasehold houses there, it was held that the word "freehold" should rather be rejected, than the will be totally void. (Day v. Trigg, 1 P. Wms. 286.) And it may be observed in passing, that, independently of statute, it is a long-established rule, that when a testator, having both freehold and leasehold lands in a particular place, devises "all his lands" in that place, only the freehold lands shall pass, although if he had had no freehold lands there, leasehold lands would pass. (Rose v. Bartlett, 4 Cro. (Car.) 292; Minnis & als v. Aylett, 1 Wash. 302.) This doctrine, however, is with us qualified by a statute taken from 7 Wm. IV, and 1 Vict. c. 26, which enacts that a "devise of the land of the testator, or of the land of the testator in any place, or in the occupation of any person mentioned in his will, or otherwise described in a general manner, and any other general devise which would describe a leasehold estate, if the testator had no freehold estate which could be described by it, shall be construed to include his leasehold estates, or any of them to which such description shall extend, as well as freehold estates, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the will." (V. C. 1873, c. 118, § 15.)

On the other hand, where a testator devised all his freehold and real estates "in the county of Limerick, and in the city of Limerick," and he had no real estate at all in the county of Limerick, and in the city only a small estate inadequate to meet the charges in the will, the bulk of his real property being in the county of Clare, it was held that the devisee could not be allowed to show, by parol evidence, that the estates in the county of Clare were inserted in the devise to