5. Permanent injunction and other
relief.

§ 6. Violation and punishment.

Facts held not to show interference with
complainant's business, in violation of a re-
straining order, but only a personal quarrel
with an employé.-George Jonas Glass Co. v.
Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n (N. J. Ch.) 138.

On an inquisition in lunacy, there is no pow-
er to review on the merits, either in the com-
mon pleas or in the supreme court.-Com-
monwealth v. Harrold (Pa.) 760.

INSANITY.

INNUENDO.

See "Libel and Slander," §§ 1, 4.

IN PAIS.

Estoppel, see "Estoppel," § 1.

INQUISITION.

Of lunacy, see "Insane Persons," § 1.

INSANE PERSONS.

Insanity as defense to crime, see "Criminal
Law," § 1.

§ 1. Inquisitions.

A person of unsound mind is incapable of
waiving statutory notice.-Inhabitants of Wins-
low v. Inhabitants of Troy (Me.) 1008.

On application of municipal officers to ad-
judge a person of unsound mind without inqui-
sition, the judge can only act when the statu-
tory notice required by chapter 67, § 4, has been
given. Inhabitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants
of Troy (Me.) 1008.

A decree, on application of municipal officers,
adjudging a person to be of unsound mind and
appointing a guardian for him, held void, where
the 14 days' prior notice, required by chapter
67, § 4, was not given to him, and no inquisi-
tion was had, under section 6.-Inhabitants of
Winslow v. Inhabitants of Troy (Me.) 1008.

Act March 23, 1887, does not require the
commissioners in an inquisition of lunacy to
issue their precept for a jury of only 12 per-
sons, nor does it require the sheriff to return
only 12 persons to make such inquiry.-In re
Comfort (N. J. Ch.) 133.

An inquisition of lunacy is not irregular be-
cause taken before a jury composed in part of
constables. In re Comfort (N. J. Ch.) 133.

Where commissioners in lunacy charged the
jury, but their charge is not before the court,
and it does not appear that they did not prop
erly instruct the jury on the subject of certain
requests which were denied, the inquisition will
not be quashed.-In re Comfort (N. J. Ch.) 133.
Where, in a petition to set aside an inquisi-
tion of lunacy, it appeared that the evidence
before the jury was conflicting, but there was
no such preponderance against the return as
would justify its being set aside, a traverse
should be allowed, if the alleged lunatic intel-
ligently desires it. In re Comfort (N. J. Ch.)
133.

INSOLVENCY.

See "Assignments for Benefit of Creditors":
"Bankruptcy."

Of building association, see "Building and Loan
Associations."

Of corporation, see "Corporations," § 5.
Of fraudulent grantor, see "Fraudulent Con-
veyances," § 1.

Devise of life insurance, see "Wills," § 1.
Specific performance of contract of insurance,
see "Specific Performance," § 2.
Taxation of insurance companies, see "Taxa-
tion," § 2.

§ 1. Insurance companies.

The Prudential Insurance Co., existing under
special charter (Laws 1873, p. 1419, § S. held
within the operation of Laws 1896, p. 129, sub-
stantially re-enacted by Laws 1902, p. 415.-
Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.

Laws 1896, p. 129, substantially re-enacted by
Laws 1902, p. 415, held not to limit insurance
companies to the purchase of "stock" which has
paid dividends for the five years preceding, but
to the purchase of "stock of a company" which
has paid dividends during such period of time.
Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.)

842.

Laws 1896, p. 129, substantially re-enacted
by Laws 1902, p. 415, held not to permit insur-
ance companies to subscribe for new stock of
other corporations, but to confine their invest-
ments to stock or obligations commonly known
as "investment securities."-Robotham v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.

ance company to carry out a scheme of corpo-
An expenditure by the directors of an insur-
rate control held not an "investment," within
the meaning of Laws 1896, p. 129, substantially
re-enacted by Laws 1902, p. 415.-Robotham v.
Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.

The mere fact that an insurance company
would, by the purchase of certain stock of an-
other corporation, acquire a controlling interest
therein, held not to make such acquisition un-
lawful.-Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N.
J. Ch.) 842.

A plan by the directors of an insurance com-
pany to exchange majority holdings of stock
with a trust company held as a whole ultra
vires.–Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J.
Ch.) 842.

The establishment of a syndicate for the per-
petual control of two corporations held a direct
intentional injury to minority stockholders.
Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.
The fact that dissenting stockholders of an
insurance company could maintain a suit in eq-
uity for redress held no reason for withholding
an injunction to prevent a proposed scheme.-
Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.
The presence of a director or directors on both
sides of a transaction between two corporations
held not to give a dissenting stockholder an arbi-
trary right to an injunction.-Robotham v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.

a

Stockholders of an insurance company held
disqualified from adjudicating finally that
scheme would be advantageous to their corpora-
tion.–Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J.
Ch.) 842.

In an action by dissenting stockholders to en-
join a scheme for corporate control, held, that
the directors had the burden of proving that
such scheme would be advantageous.-Robotham
v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. J. Ch.) 842.

2. Premiums, dues, and assessments.
Assessment on premium note of a mutual fire
insurance company held invalid for noncompli-
auce with charter regulations as to the time of
making assessments.-Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v.
Jean (Md.) 950.

A member of a mutual fire insurance company
cannot be assessed on his premium note for the
payment of losses which accrued before he be-
came a member.-Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Jean
(Md.) 950.

A member of a mutual fire insurance company
cannot be assessed on his premium note for
losses covering a series of years, during which
time various other members, who would also
have been liable, have ceased to be members of
the company.-Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Jean
(Md.) 950.

Answers of an applicant for a life insurance
policy held not to be regarded as true.-Jeffrey
v. United Order of Golden Cross (Me.) 1102.

Statements of a party indemnified at the
time of the execution of the agreement are not
binding as warranties, unless they appear on
the face of the agreement sued on.-Dime Sav.
Inst. v. American Surety Co. (N. J. Sup.) 217.
§ 4. Right to proceeds.

Facts held to show the administrator, and not
the wife, of insured in a life policy, entitled to
the proceeds of the policy.-Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Opper (Conn.) 586.

A policy of life insurance when issued creates
a vested interest in the beneficiary therein.-
Laughlin v. Norcross (Me.) 834.

85. Payment or discharge, contribu-
tion, and subrogation.
Rule for determining liability as
between
blanket and specific policies, each providing for
don & L. Fire Ins. Co. (Conn.) 863.
a pro rata liability, stated.-Schmaelzle v. Lon-

§ 6. Actions on policies.

After plaintiff's evidence was in, defendant
could not file a plea setting up plaintiff's fail-
ure to exercise due care required by accident
policy sued on.-Poole v. Massachusetts Mut.
Acc. Ass'n (Vt.) 331.

In an action on an accident policy, held that,
under Acts 1896, No. 121, defendant could not
avail itself of matters showing that plaintiff
had not exercised due care, under plea of gen-
eral issue and payment.-Poole v. Massachu-
setts Mut. Acc. Ass'n (Vt.) 331.

§ 7. Mutual benefit insurance.
Where a beneficiary certificate is issued on
condition that the member shall comply with
the laws and regulations of the order, the cer-
tificate and the constitution and standing regu
lations of the order constitute the contract.-

Grand Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Gandy (N. J. Ch.)
142.

"Substantially true," as applied to an appli-
cation for a life insurance policy, means with-
out qualication in all respects material to the
risks. Jeffrey v. United Order of Golden Cross
(Me.) 1102.

The answers of an applicant for a life policy
as to his present and past health are material,
and must be true.-Jeffrey v. United Order of
Golden Cross (Me.) 1102.

Where payment of a life policy is resisted on
the ground that the statements in the applica-
tion as to bodily health were untrue, it is im-
material whether they were warranties or rep-
resentations.-Jeffrey v. United Order of Golden
Cross (Me.) 1102.

Statement, by a woman afflicted with severe
dyspepsia for nearly 20 years, that she was in
good health at the time of her application for
membership, held untrue. Jeffrey v. United
Order of Golden Cross (Me.) 1102.

Attempted appointment of new beneficiary
in benefit certificate held ineffective. Grand
Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Gandy (N. J. Ch.) 142.

Where a certificate of a benefit society was

made payable to the beneficiary's wife, held
payable to the children of the deceased member
under a regulation of the order, where the wife
dies during the lifetime of the member.—Grand
Lodge A. O. U. W. v. Gandy (N. J. Ch.) 142.

On particular classes of liabilities.
Debt of partner, see "Partnership." § 1.
Funds in hands of clerk of court, see "Clerks
of Courts."

Funds in hands of executors, see "Executors
and Administrators." § 3.
Trust funds, see "Trusts," § 4.

§ 2. Time and computation.

Under Gen. St. 1888, § 2942, held, that inter-
est on a demand note should have been allowed
from the date thereof.-Curtis v. Smith (Conn.)
902.

INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION.

See "Injunction," § 4.

INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT.
Appealability, see "Appeal and Error," § 2.
Review on appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal
and Error," § 8.

INTERROGATORIES.

To witnesses, see "Depositions."

INTERSTATE EXTRADITION.

See "Extradition," § 1.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Intoxication as defense to crime, see "Criminal
Law," § 1; "Homicide," § 1.
Validity of act relating to appeals from refusal
of liquor license, as conferring administra-
tive powers, see "Constitutional Law," § 2.

§ 1. Licenses and taxes.

Under a city ordinance providing that no
beer license shall be granted unless the appli-
cation is signed by a majority of the house-
holders within a prescribed distance, no license
can be granted without a compliance with such
condition.-Bachman v. Inhabitants of Town of
Phillipsburg (N. J. Sup.) 620.

common nuisances, it has been determined that
such places are hurtful to the peace, safety,
health, and morals of the people.-Davis v.
Auld (Me.) 118; Same v. Schoppe, Id.

§ 4. Criminal prosecutions.

In an indictment under Rev. St. c. 17, § 4,
which makes it a misdemeanor for any person
who is the owner of, or has control of, any
building or tenement to permit the same or any
part thereof to be used for the illegal sale of
liquor, an averment which alleges that respond-
ent knowingly permitted "a certain shop in a
building to be used for such purpose is suffi-
cient.-State v. Wiseman (Me.) 875.

§ 5. Abatement and injunction.

The procedure under Pub. Laws 1891, c. 98,
to enjoin a liquor nuisance, is to prevent the
further continuance of an existing continuous
nuisance.-Davis v. Auld (Me.) 118; Same v.
Schoppe, Id.

Pub. Laws 1891, c. 98, conferring on the su-
preme judicial court jurisdiction, on petition
of 20 legal voters of a town where a liquor nui-
sance exists, to restrain or abate such nui-
sance by injunction, is not prohibited by any
provision of the state or federal constitution.
-Davis v. Auld (Me.) 118; Same v. Schoppe,
Id.

Under Pub. Laws 1891, c. 98, authorizing
injunction to abate a liquor nuisance, it is un-
necessary to first obtain a judgment at law.-
Davis v. Auld (Me.) 118; Same v. Schoppe, Id.

A petition to enjoin a liquor nuisance, un-
der Pub. Laws 1891, c. 98, can be sustained on
mere preponderance of evidence in its favor.-
Davis v. Auld (Me.) 118; Same v. Schoppe,
Id.

Where, under Pub. Laws 1891, c. 98, an in-
junction is obtained to abate a liquor nui-
sance, the disobedience by the defendant an-
thorizes punishment by the court for contempt.
-Davis v. Auld (Me.) 118; Same v. Schoppe,
Id.

INTOXICATION.

Where an applicant for a beer license pro-
cured two persons to take quarters in the same
building with the proposed saloon, to qualify
as signers, they cannot be counted among the
number of signers necessary to procure the li-
cense.-Bachman v. Inhabitants of Town of
Phillipsburg (N. J. Sup.) 620.

Where remonstrant to the grant of a liquor
license presented a substantial objection to the
council, and it refused a hearing, and the li-
cense is set aside by the court, costs will be
granted the remonstrant.-Bachman v. Inhabit-
ants of Town of Phillipsburg (N. J. Sup.) 620.
An ordinance prohibiting permitting the as-
sembling of women in saloons, held within
the conditions of the saloon license.-Greiner
v. City of Hoboken (N. J. Sup.) 693.

Mandamus to county treasurer to issue liquor
license, where petitioner had not complied with
Act May 13, 1887, regulating the same, held
properly denied. Commonwealth v. McClure
(Pa.) 759.

INVENTORY.

§ 2. By default.

Burden held on defendant defaulting with
notice to disprove allegations of complaint.-
Upton v. Town of Windham (Conn.) 660.

Affidavit, with certificate of indebtedness
sued on, held not to affirmatively show plaintiff
was entitled to judgment, as is necessary for
default judgment under Rev. Code 1893, p. 789,
c. 106, § 4.-Hibbert v. Guardian Savings &
Loan Ass'n (Del. Super.) 54.

An affidavit and account attached held not
such as to authorize a default judgment, un-
der Rev. Code 1893, p. 790, c. 106, § 4, allowing
it in action on a book account.-Reybold v.
Denny (Del. Super.) 55.

Plaintiff may waive provisions of procedure
act of 1887 in respect to judgment for want of
affidavits of complainant. Muir v. Preferred
Acc. Ins. Co. (Pa.) 158.

Entry of judgment against defendant for
want of affidavit of defense held erroneous un-
der the circumstances.-Muir v. Preferred Acc.
Ins. Co. (Pa.) 158.

Judgment in attachment for want of formal
appearance of defendant held properly set aside.
-Myler v. Wittish (Pa.) 758.

The court held to have power to open a judg-
ment in ejectment, though it had no authority
to strike it off.-Davidson v. Miller (Pa.) 773.
A judgment should be stricken off only when
its irregularity appears on record.-Davidson v.
Miller (Pa.) 773.

§ 3. Entry, record, and docketing.

Act March 22, 1901, so far as it attempts to
validate defective docketing of judgments, is
ineffectual as against the vested rights of others
than the judgment debtor.-McLaughlin
Cross (N. J. Sup.) 703.

V.

The court of common pleas has power sub-
ject to review to vacate the docketing of any
judgment therein.—McLaughlin v. Cross (N. J.
Sup.) 703.

§ 4. Amendment, correction, and re-
view in same court.

Under Gen. St. § 1119, held not error, in an
action for money loaned and advanced, to cor-
rect a judgment for $1.18 more than the
amount claimed in the ad damnum clause.-
Brown v. Woodward (Conn.) 112.

5. Opening or vacating.
That a defendant's personal appearance was
entered on September 1st, instead of properly

entered of the 2d, was no ground for striking a
judgment for plaintiff entered after defend-
ant's default.--Acklen v. Fink (Md.) 423.

The failure of the clerk to make the entry of
rule to plead after the filing of the narr. held
no ground for striking judgment for plaintiff
entered after defendant's default.-Acklen v.
Fink (Md.) 423.

§ 6. Collateral attack.

A void decree finding a person of unsound
mind has no probative force as evidence.-In-
habitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants of Troy
(Me.) 1008.

53 A.-74

Where want of jurisdiction to decree the an-
nulment of a marriage appears on the face of
the record, the decree may be collaterally at-
tacked.-Inhabitants of Winslow v. Inhabitants
of Troy (Me.) 1008.

7. Merger and bar of causes of action
and defenses.

Where defendant in a real action has previous-
ly recovered a judgment for the same premises
in an action wherein plaintiff was a defendant,
the former judgment, while unreversed, is con-
clusive.-Paul v. Thorndike (Me.) 877.

The doctrine of estoppel by judgment is ap-
plicable in a real action, though the judgment
relied on
was one as of mortgage.-Paul v.

Thorndike (Me.) 877.

Judgment in ejectment held not res judicata,
when entered wrongfully under an amicable ac-
tion and confession.-Buchanan v. Banks (Pa.)
500.

Owner of surface held entitled to sue for in-
juries thereto by alleged improper mining on the
part of the owner of the coal thereunder.-Pan-
tall v. Rochester & P. Coal & Iron Co. (Pa.)
751.

§ 8. Conclusiveness of adjudication.
Where plaintiff in a real action had an oppor-
tunity as defendant in a former action to set up
in defense matters now relied upon by him,
such matters cannot be shown in the new action
to impeach the validity of the judgment recov
ered in such former action.-Paul v. Thorndike
(Me.) 877.

The question of the ownership of certain
premises held not proper to have been raised by
certain defendants in proceedings foreclosing
mechanics' liens thereon, and therefore not
res judicata as to them.-Shryock v. Hensel
(Md.) 412.

The question of the ownership of certain
premises held not decided in the proceedings
foreclosing mechanics' liens thereon.-Shryock
v. Hensel (Md.) 412.

In proceedings to enforce a mechanic's lien
it is not always necessary to determine the
status of the rem as to its ownership.-Shryock
v. Hensel (Md.) 412.

Assignees of mechanics' liens during the pend-
ency of foreclosure proceedings thereon hele
concluded by any point in the decree which was
conclusive on their assignor.-Shryock v. Hen-
sel (Md.) 412.

A disclaimer of title to certain land by the
defendant in trespass quare clausum held addi-
tional evidence of plaintiff's title thereto, in a
subsequent action against those claiming through
defendant.- Cassidy v. Mudgett (N. H.) 441.

Nonsuit in trespass quare clausum held no bar
to another similar action, where the same land
was not in controversy in both actions, though
included in both declarations.-Cassidy v. Mud-
gett (N. H.) 441.

A decree of interpleader will conclude a de-
fendant thereto as to the fund in controversy,
though his right to sue at law on his claim is
not enjoined.-McMurray v. Sisters of Charity
of St. Elizabeth (N. J. Err. & App.) 389.

An issue as to whether defendant corporation
had complied with an act authorizing the re-
tirement of preferred stock held not involved
in a prior suit to restrain such retirement, and
that the judgment therein was therefore not
res judicata thereof.-Hodge v. United States
Steel Corp. (N. J. Ch.) 601.