lease on eight hundred or a thousand acres, for which he has to pay a quarterly minimum royalty, whether he mines a pound of coal or not, and this sum is a lien upon his entire plant, and can be enforced by a distress warrant in the same manner that a landlord collects his rent. In this construction and maintenance of his houses, tipples, and mine cars he purchases his lumber at retail prices, paying a heavy freight rate for its delivery. In the purchase of store supplies and machinery, the larger concern has a material advantage in prices, because of the greater quantity consumed.

All the foregoing enumerated economies are denied the small producer, because of his lack of capital to equip his plant so that he can produce and sell on an equality with his stronger rival. These combined economies enable the large producer to deliver his coal to the consumer at a cost of 10 to 15 cents per ton less than it is possible for the small concern to do. This margin of advantage is sufficient to crush out the small mines, and the general depression of business in the last two years has forced the little mines to sell their coal at a great sacrifice and personal loss.

In the year 1910 nine companies produced 18,000,000 tons of coal in West Virginia, while in the same year 335 companies produced only 18,760,000 tons, or an average of 56,000 tons to the company, while the big concerns averaged 2,000,000 tons each. It must be borne in mind that each of the 335 companies must maintain a separate and distinct organization both in the production and the marketing of its coal and that everyone of them is not only in competition with the big producer, but with each other and with coals mined in other States. These smaller concerns are trying to obey the law and keep up this destructive and hopeless competition, for they are told that if they combine in order to reduce expenses that they are violating the law and committing a penitentiary offense; that if they attempt to save their investment by selling their property to larger concerns that their contracts are void, and would at least subject the purchaser to a prison sentence, as well as subject his organization to dissolution suits instituted by the Government.

If these operators continue to obey the law in the future as they have in the past, or if the antitrust act is enforced against them, there is no other alternative than ruin to their business and destruction of their property. When you consider that obedience to this law by the small producer spells bankruptcy, it would seem that every member of Congress should aspire to be the first to propose remedial legislation rather than see the small business man eliminated by a statute whose original purpose was meant for his protection and not for his destruction.

The industry of bituminous-coal mining is just as important to the general welfare of our people as the business of agriculture. Coal is the source of 95 per cent of all power, and it is the basic material upon which our transportation and manufacturing industries are constructed. It is the handmaiden of agriculture, for that industry could not prosper without machinery and implements that may only be produced by the use of coal. The protection of the men engaged in this pursuit should be the prime concern of this Government, because coal supplies more of the wants of civilized people than any other one commodity known to commerce. The company that mines the coal is just as much entitled to make a reasonable profit on its investment as the carrier that hauls it to market. The law says that the carriers are entitled to a fair profit for the services they render, and that neither this Congress nor the State legislatures have any power to deprive them of it. In order that the carriers may receive a profit, they are permitted without restraint or question to confer together and agree among themselves. in the first instance, as to the price they will charge the public for transportation. While this method of fixing rates is a direct and positive violation of the antitrust act, and expressly held to be so by the Supreme Court, yet it is permitted, because it is a necessity, for rates can not be fixed in any possible way without breaking this law. In other words, every carrier in this country is compelled to violate this law before they can do business and perform their legitimate functions as common carriers. With carriers it is disobedience or receiverships; with the coal men disobedience means a prison; obedience, ruin.

If any Senator or Representative desires to know just how the antitrust act is applied to our transportation systems and the effect it would have if enforced against them, let your committees call a representative of the Department of Justice and hear his statement, and he will convince you of two things: (1) That the antitrust act can not be enforced against the carriers so as to prevent them from making an agreement about fixing rates without introducing inter

minable confusion in our transportation, resulting in great losses both to shipper and carrier, and (2) he will advise you that the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the shipper and carrier is such that it can and does protect the shipper against unjust charges and undue preferences and also it saves the carrier from an unreasonable demand for rates so low that they would be unprofitable.

This last suggestion, if followed up and applied to other fields of endeavor, will furnish the best solution of the economic problems with which this Government has now to deal. In other words, industrial commissions vested with sufficient power and authority to perform their functions is the safest tribunal to which all these questions in their practical application may be referred for settlement and adjustment.

With this conviction confirmed through considerable experience in the coal business, I have prepared for your consideration the outlines of a bill creating a mining commission and vesting it with certain powers and duties. The scope of authority to be exercised by the commission would be a general supervision over the coal-mining industry of the United States, involving the power to regulate that industry in the following particulars, viz:

POWER OF THE COMMISSION.

I. To inaugurate and have carried out as perfect a system as may be of conservation in mining and for the prevention of waste.

II. To prescribe and enforce rules and regulations to secure the safety of the miner, the prevention of accidents, and the preservation of his health.

III. To administer a system of workmen's compensation provided for in the bill.

IV. To pass upon and approve reasonable trade agreements between competitors, which would restrain and limit competition within certain bounds mentioned in the bill.

I.

CONSERVATION.

It is estimated by competent authority that fully 30 per cent of the coal in the average mine is wasted; that only 70 per cent of this coal bed is recovered, and the residue is left in the mine where it must remain a total loss. This loss of unmined coal is due to many causes, the principal of which, however, is the increased cost of mining owing to local conditions. When it is considered that acute competition is operating continuously to compel the small operator particularly to first take out his coal that can be mined cheapest, it will become evident that he will not do the more expensive mining where he must sell at a considerable loss. Squeezes and faults that frequently appear are let alone and avoided as long as more favorable conditions are found in other parts of the mine, and the chances are that the coal affected by these squeezes and faults will never be mined and will finally be abandoned. A great deal of coal is lost by the unscientific method of drawing pillars and robbing the mine. Much is left in the cleansing process where the merchantable coal is attempted to be separated from the slate and impurities that adhere to it in the mining. The commission by proper rules and regulations could prevent this waste of unmined coal, and require practically all of it to be recovered before the mine is abandoned as exhausted. Such a system could be inaugurated that would secure a conservation of one of the great natural resources that would be practical and efficient. It would be real conservation, and not conversation subserving a purpose to exploit fads and fancies. It is a tremendous economic waste to withdraw from the commerce of the country more than one-fourth of its fuel supply. When we realize that coal deposits can not be reproduced, as they do not vegetate like annual crops, but when lost they are gone forever, the necessity for utilizing the whole of these deposits becomes at once imperative.

II.

Owing to the many and appalling disasters that occur to coal miners, the question of how best to prevent these accidents is and has been a matter for the most serious consideration not only of the men directly affected but of the public at large. In the last nine years 20,000 men have been killed in coal mines and over 50,000 seriously injured in the United States. For every thousand em

ployed there have been 4 deaths and 10 serious injuries, and every million tons of coal mined has cost 5 lives as a result of accidents and 13 badly injured. The last year (1909) for which we have complete statistics exacted the lives of 2,412 men and 8,000 were injured. Such a destruction of human life and energy ought to be a sufficient justification to warrant legislators going to almost any length to minimize this evil. The States have passed the most stringent laws to prevent these accidents, but they have all failed to accomplish the purpose intended, largely due, I think, to attempts made to apply State requirements indiscriminately to all the mines in the State. State laws, for instance, requiring a certain quantity of air to be propelled every minute through the mine would give the greatest measure of protection in one mine, but would be wholly inadequate when applied to another mine in the same vicinity, while still in other mines the same quantity of air would largely increase the danger instead of lessening it. Rules or regulations for the prevention of accidents must be so flexible that they can be modified to suit the peculiar conditions obtaining in each individual mine. Whether air or moisture, or both, and the quantities to be used, must be determined by the local conditions of each mine after ascertaining if the mine is gaseous or subject to accumulations of coal dust or subject to explosions from both these causes. A study and knowledge of all these conditions for every mine is essential before shot firing can be properly regulated so as to minimize the chances of mine explosions. Some mines are very dry and subject to coal-dust explosions; others are wet and little danger is to be feared from dust explosions; others are gaseous and some are free from gas. An almost infinite variety of dangers are to be found, taking a State like West Virginia as a whole, while very few of the individual mines possess identically the same elements of danger in the same degree. It is very evident to even the most casual observer that the enforcement of general rules throughout the whole State will hasten explosions in some cases while preventing them in others. A central board or commission of experts, presided over by a man like Dr. Holmes, with power to prescribe rules that will fit the conditions of each mine, and with power to create, change, or modify such rules according to the different characteristics in each mine, is in the very nature of things the best remedy that legislation can give.

The prevention of mine explosions is a scientific problem. No adequate means of prevention can be installed until the expert observes, studies, and knows the kind and character of dangers that lurk in each mine. Blame is often laid upon the ignorance or negligence of the miner. But before any miner, however ignorant or negligent, can produce an explosion there must be present in the mine some combustible and explosive substance like gas or coal dust. The explosions caused by ignorance are very few, indeed, for, generally speaking, a new man is taught how to prepare and set off shots before he is permitted to undertake it. Forgetfulness on the part of the experienced miner is generally the cause that starts the explosion. No human forethought can guard against forgetfulness, for it is a defect often found in the ablest minds of the country, and comes to all sooner or later. In some States penal statutes have been passed punishing the miners, and these statutes are being enforced without avoiding the evil. The use of powder and explosives in mining coal, 1 think, may be entirely done away with by the use of wedges, with which to pry down the coal instead of blasting, the method now generally in use. But as the wedge method would, perhaps, at first add something to the cost it would have to be adopted in all the States at the same time, owing to competition for markets. A national commission could require the adoption of the wedge method in all the States without changing the relative cost of production. Such a commission, in addition to its efforts to prevent accidents and explo gions, could also require the mines to be kept in proper sanitary condition, which has a very great influence on the health of the men working in the mines.

PROTECTION TO HEALTH AND SAFETY OF MINERS.

To all who believe that it is just as important that the health and safety of miners should be safeguarded as it is to compensate him for injuries received this plan should commend itself, because

(1) The commission would be composed of men who know all the conditions surrounding the mining industry, and to them would be given power and authority to compel the owner to keep his mine in the best possible (a) sanitary condition and to use (b) all the known appliances and methods for the prevention of accidents.

(2) The rules and regulations that such a commission would prescribe, in order to accomplish these ends, would be much more effective than any law or regulations that a State legislature could prescribe. By the constant supervision and inspection by a commission so composed, mines would be placed in the highest possible state of sanitation and accidents would be reduced to the lowest possible minimum.

(3) The performance of these duties would not be influenced by political considerations, but the commission would always strive to execute its functions in such manner as to attain the best possible results.

ADVANTAGE OVER STATE LAWS.

State uniformity of laws providing for the health and safety of the miner and making compensation to him for injuries received can not be hoped for. And without such uniformity the principle of competition can not be maintained. The Legislature of West Virginia could not be expected to place burdens upon her mine owners in the treatment of their operatives that would lessen their ability to produce and sell coal in competition with the coal produced in other States. But if healthy competition is to be maintained between the coalproducing districts of the various States for markets it is absolutely necessary that all schemes for the protection of the miner's life and health and to provide compensation for injuries must be uniform and controlled and directed by one central regulating body. In the very nature of things this can only be done by national legislation.

If the mine owners in Pennsylvania are made by statute to bear all the loss occasioned by accidents to workmen and are required to pay full compensation for such injuries, while in West Virginia, where the common law prevails, all such losses fall exclusively upon the employee, it would be a tremendous handicap on Pennsylvania operators in meeting West Virginia competition where their coals go to the same market. Such a difference in the cost of production would ultimately drive the Pennsylvania operators out of all the competitive markets.

BASIS OF EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION fund.

The basis upon which this proposition rests is a compulsory cooperative relief fund. This fund is provided by a compulsory contribution exacted from both employer and employees. It is made up by requiring the employer to pay 1 cent per ton on all bituminous coal mined and 2 cents per ton on anthracite, and a deduction from the pay roll of 1 per cent of the wages and salaries of all employees. The sums so raised will be paid into the treasury of the commission by the mine owner.

ADVANTAGES OF THE PLAN.

This plan has peculiar advantages over the English scheme of employers' liability or the German system of compulsory insurance and should commend itself to both employer and employee.

To the employee because

(1) His compensation for injuries received is certain and can not be defeated, no matter who or what agency caused the accident.

(2) The payment of the compensation will begin immediately after the accident occurs and will continue until full, complete compensation has been meted out to him.

(3) The payment will be made to the full extent of the injury without the aid of lawyers or any trial or court proceedings whatever.

(4) The payments will be certain, as the fund will be provided for that purpose, and no insolvency or bankruptcy of employers can defeat it.

(5) The contributions per man will be so small (50 cents per month) that it could not be a burden nor to any appreciable extent lessen his income. (6) It would eliminate all feeling of hostility between employee and employer which is always engendered in suits for personal injuries, and he could return to his work as soon as he is recovered.

(7) In case of his death or permanent disability the employee would have the satisfaction of knowing that his wife and children would be amply provided for and would not be in want.

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(8) The amount of the compensation would be fixed by an impartial tribunal according to the extent of the injury, without any reason or inducement to do aught but give him a reasonable and fair compensation or the injury inflicted. The employer would be benefited because

(1) It would relieve him from all suits and damages for personal injuries suffered by his employees.

(2) The amount paid by him would be an extremely small sum to pay for complete indemnity against losses, law suits and damages, for personal injuries suffered by those engaged in such a hazardous occupation.

(3) The expense in defending personal injury suits, and the payment of judgments recovered, and in settlement of claims, would amount in the long run to much more than 1 cent per ton on the coal mined.

(4) If his mine is located in States that have passed employers' liability acts, and all the States will, in the near future, have such statutes unless a better method is provided, an explosion would bankrupt his enterprise by taking all its property to pay the losses occasioned by death and injuries.

(5) If all the mines in the country are subject to the proposed act-as they would be under an act of Congress-the contributions required to raise the relief fund could be counted in as part of the cost of production and the ultimate consumer be made to pay it, thereby relieving both employee and employer from paying out of their earnings any part of the money that goes into the relief fund. The employee's wages could be increased sufficiently to cover his contributions, and, with the 1 cent per ton contributed by the owner, could be added to the selling price of the coal.

It is neither just nor humane to have all the losses occasioned by industrial accidents fall mainly upon (a) the employees, as at present and in the past, nor (b) upon the individual employer as is suggested by some in advocating employers' liability statutes after the English system.

But the true principle should be to make the industry bear the loss in the first instance by requiring an immediate and fixed contribution from all persons interested, so that the fund will always be available, and, whatever these contributions amount to, should be refunded to all parties by adding it to the selling price.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY SYSTEM.

The principal objections to the system of employers' liability acts are: (1) The loss falls on the individual employer and makes him respond in damages for accidents caused without any neglect or fault of his whatever.

(2) The individual employer can not include these losses in the cost of production and add it to his selling price, for such losses are never uniform in the various plants devoted to the manufacture of the same commodities. (3) The compensation can only be collected after long and expensive litigation.

(4) The expense and delay of litigating claims for damages for personal injuries is a very great economic waste. All the money paid out in such litigation is thrown away, and the time it takes is that much time lost. Everyone engaged in such trials, the judges, juries, court officials, attorneys, witnesses, and parties, lose the time while engaged in the trial as well as the expense and time necessary to prepare for the trial. If the money actually spent in preparation, trial, a payment of judgments were added to the money value of the time spent by each person so engaged, it would mount to more than the compulsory contributions herein suggested.

(5) Such controversies between employer and employee always engender a feeling of hostility between them to such an extent that subornation of witnesses too frequently results, and the verdicts of juries are either too high or too low to be just.

(6) Under liability acts the employer feels that he is the victim of a passion or prejudice entertained by legislators against him and his business to such an extent that he is dissuaded from extending his industrial efforts.

THE INSURANCE PLAN.

The insurance plan has sought to give compensation to injured working men by inaugurating a system of compulsory insurance. The objections to this system are:

(1) That it costs too much to execute it. It is shown by the reports that the injured workman only receives about 40 per cent of the fund required to secure the insurance. The other 60 per cent is expended in paying the cost and expense and profits for writing the insurance.