Senator EAGLETON. If the system works to perfection, the system should apply simultaneously both to the tractor and to the trailer; is that correct? Mr. SNOW. Yes. Senator EAGLETON. Suppose you had come forward with your moratorium on the trailer part. How does the system work if the 121 is in effect in the tractor but not in effect in the trailer? Mr. SNOW. That is one of the questions which was under review. That is the precise question I was seeking an answer for. I was informed by a variety of people with technical competence in the area, including manufacturers of the trucks, that it did not create a problem. I must say that not being a technical person it bothered me and I was never completely satisfied with that answer. But there is wisdom that the technical people have that the nontechnical cannot pretend to understand, I guess. I had not reached a conclusion on that point at that time. I must say I was troubled by it. I did seek the advice of a number of technically competent people who said that removing the requirement from the trailers, while leaving it on the tractors, would not create in itself a braking safety risk. Senator EAGLETON. So it is fair to say that as of March of 1977, you were fairly well convinced to issue the moratorium on the trailer part, but it was still an open question as to whether you would have applied a moratorium on the tractor; is that right? Mr. SNOW. That is correct. Senator EAGLETON. With the benefit of hindsight-and I fully subscribe to your statement in your prepared testimony that hindsight is perfect and remarkable in its accuracy-are you persuaded that the Federal Government acted precipitously in the issuance of regulation 121 standard? Mr. SNow. I think the answer is yes. I think the antilock portion of 121, was mandated without sufficient testing or knowledge of its performance in the real world, given hindsight. I cannot say I would have said that if I had been the administrator 5 years ago wrestling with trying to get this new technology to come along. This seems to me to point up a fundamental issue in the whole field of safety regulation. How do you get promising new systems out there when the industry does not see enough advantage in putting it in voluntarily? Senator EAGLETON. That was my next question. Mr. SNOW. As I suggested in my testimony, I think NHTSA has a responsibility to go out and try to push new technologies which are promising; promising to save lives and reduce injuries. That is their job. The 121 experience points to the problem of doing so without adequate field testing. I think the answer lies in NHTSA acquiring two things. One, an inhouse capability to do testing which they do not have today. One of the things I sought to accomplish while Administrator was the acquisition of a major test facility and the resources to man that test facility so that we could run tests on 121 systems and we 22-723 O - 78 - 2 could run tests on tires and on the other things which NHTSA is responsible for. Second-and this may sound like heresy to some-I think it would be very useful if some cooperative research-type undertakings could be done with the people NHTSA regulates-motor vehicle manufacturers, truck, auto, and some tire companies. I think it would be very valuable for instance right now to undertake a voluntary program whereby whatever happens with the 121 standard that on some 5,000 or 10,000 vehicles the antilock system would voluntarily be kept on so that the kind of detailed knowledge about what needs to be done to improve them can be acquired. So, I think that it's a two-part thing, enhancing NHTSA's inhouse field testing capability and cooperative research projects. Senator EAGLETON. What were the findings, as you recall them, insofar as accident experience was concerned comparing pre-121 and post-121 vehicles? Mr. SNOW. As I recall the experience, that is the data on that, it pointed at best in both directions. It just was not very conclusive. The results of the early data I saw were most inconclusive. It was mainly conjectural. I never saw hard factual data on that which I could use to give you a reasoned and thoughtful judgment. I wish I could. I can't. Maybe NHTSA now is in a position to make that kind of judgment. I was concerned about these fail-safe problems, as I pointed out. I think we discovered the fact that the fail-safe problem was much bigger than we had anticipated by virtue of the field testing. NHTSA simply was not getting the kind of reporting on the real world experience with 121 systems which it needed. Senator EAGLETON. While you were weighing the moratorium on the trailers and even considering it possibly for the tractors, you were convinced as of March that you would have postponed the effective date on both the buses and schoolbuses for target dates is that right? Mr. SNOW. Absolutely. I had no doubt about that. Senator EAGLETON. Have you learned of any data or reports of studies or information or whatever since March of 1977 which would cause you to change that opinion of absolutely postponing the effective date of both the buses and the schoolbuses? Mr. SNOW. I have not. I have not been close to the situation since leaving in March, but I would assume the situation is pretty much the same as it was then. I have no hesitancy in saving that as of March the 121 rule should not have been applied to the intercity buses or schoolbuses and that a moratorium or suspension of at least 1 year or 2 was appropriate. Senator EAGLETON. Thank you very much, Mr. Snow. We appreciate your appearance. We are grateful to you. Mr. SNOW. Thank you. Senator EAGLETON. Ms. Claybrook? We thank you for stepping aside. We will now go forward with your testimony. TESTIMONY OF JOAN B. CLAYBROOK, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY HOWARD ANDERSON, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR SAFETY, FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION; ROBERT KAYE, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY; GEORGE REAGLE, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, AND DUANE PERRIN, SAFETY STANDARD ENGINEER, NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION Ms. CLAYBROOK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to introduce my associates. On my right is Duane Perrin who is an engineer in our Motor Vehicle Safety Office. On my left is George Reagle who is Special Assistant to the Deputy of the agency and was formerly the Special Assistant to John Snow. He was asked by John Snow to initiate the study of the 121 problem. When I assumed office I asked him to enlarge that test. Further to my left is Howard Anderson who is the Safety Director for the Federal Highway Administration and responsible for the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, and Robert Kaye who is head of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety. Senator EAGLETON. For the record, the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety is part of the Department of Transportation; is that right? Ms. CLAYBROOK. Yes it is. It is part of the Federal Highway Administration which is a sister agency to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Senator EAGLETON. The Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety reports to the Secretary of Transportation but not through you; is that right? Ms. CLAYBROOK. That is correct. Senator EAGLETON. Proceed. Ms. CLAYBROOK. In response to your request to participate in today's hearing on DOT's air brake Standard No. 121. I would like to address our monitoring of the standard, the safety consequences of the standard, and the issue of reestablishing "no lockup" stopping performance requirements for air-braked buses. Standard No. 121 was issued in 1971 under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. Under the act, the Department of Transportation is required to issue motor vehicle safety standards for newly manufactured vehicles to "protect the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring as a result of the design, construction, or performance of motor vehicles." Vehicles equipped with air brakes figure prominently in the highway safety hazards addressed by the act. Statistics from our fatal accident reporting system show that in 1976 over 4,000 people were killed in accidents involving heavy trucks. This means one out of every 11 highway fatalities occurred in accidents involving heavy trucks. The percentage of deaths that occur in heavy-truck accidents has increased in recent years, relative to the decreasing percentage of car-to-car accidents. Three-fourths of those killed in heavy truck accidents are occupants of other vehicles, principally occupants of Aboudara, Deane: Testimony. ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES Supplementary statement by the American Public Transit Association, Chronological review of events regarding the Federal Motor Vehicle Memorandum to selected representatives of ATA, NAMBO, NHTSA, Memorandum to individuals from bus and component manufacturers and the transit industry who are interested in the antiskid device, air brake systems, NHTSA docket No. 74-10, standard 121; Plus the ATA-FMVSS Committee, April 27, 1974. Page 168 176 182 192 196 Letter to Docket Section, National Highway Safety Administration, from B. R. Stokes, executive director, American Public Transit Association, December 23, 1974. Memorandum to APTA transit system members from John B. Schnell, Detroit street railways experience and April 26, 1974 meeting with Testimony of George Heinle, operations manager, Southern California Testimony given before the National Highway Transportation Safety 206 208 215 218 222 226 228 233 Testimony of John J. Gilhooley, chairman president, Transport of 241 245 Chronology of events-FMVSS No. 121. 248 Letter to Elwood T. Driver, Chief, Office of Crash Avoidance, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, from John B. Schnell, manager of research, American Public Transit Association, March 11, 1976. . 251 Letter to 40-foot transit bus manufacturers from John B. Schnell, 252 Letter to FMVSS No. 121 brake antilock device manufacturers from 253 Letter from C. I. Giuliana, Director of Maintenance, Mass Transit Thomas J. Bernard, The Flxible Co., Delaware, Ohio.... 254 E. R. Stokel, GMC Truck & Coach Division, General Motors 256 238 J. J. Killinger, AM General Corp. Letter to C. I. Giuliana, Director of Maintenance, Mass Transit 260 261 263 A case study report on 14 fleets-FMVSS 121_ Page 54 64 104 A report on field experience on motor freight equipment built to 136 Bailey, Kay: Testimony Prepared statement.... Browne, Thomas W.: Testimony. Prepared statement.... Campanini, Sergio: Prepared statement.. Claybrook, Joan B.: Testimony.. Dawson, D. D.: Activities to provide data for the 121 task force_-_ Testimony. 369 Prepared statement... 373 Ginsburg, Susan: Testimony. 536 “Big Trucks: Tailgating Terror." article from the Chicago 540 "Free-Wheeling for Speedy Trucks", 542 "How Truckers Evade State Weight and Safety Laws," from 543 "Despite Safety Laws, Battered Trucks Threaten Other Drivers,' 546 A bill (draft legislation) Testimony. "Truckers: Drink, Fatigue Menace," from the Chicago Tribune, "Semi-trucks Called Rolling 'Time Bombs,'" by Jeannine Gutt- "The Unsafe Trucks: Who is Responsible?" by Jeannine Guttman. Glover, Thomas L.: Prepared statement... 548 550 553 556 559 570 468 468 Green, George D.: Testimony.. 530 "Anti-Jackknife," by D. A. Hough, Commanding Officer, U.S. 534 Hildebrandt, Richard: Testimony. Charts 480 484 Heavy vehicle systems group-service date-Bendix_-. 499 Letter to Senator Eagleton, with enclosures, from R. W. Hildebrandt, December 13, 1977... Supplement to oral testimony on December 7, 1977--- |