or 37. 3% and 1, 718 trailers or 15.9% are 121 equipped. Anti lock is thought by many

to reduce the incidence to jackknife.

You have been very kind to receive these remarks and I will be happy to try

to answer your questions.

Senator EAGLETON. If there is nothing further, gentlemen, we thank you very much for being here.

We will now have Mr. John White, executive vice president of the Private Truck Council of America.

Mr. White, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN C. WHITE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, PRIVATE TRUCK COUNCIL OF AMERICA, INC.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My statement is not very long, Senator. I would like to say this in the nature of a preparatory remark. I have had what you might call a practical witness trying to get out of Cleveland for the last 24 hours to be with me today in order to give some examples that his company has experienced. He is with the Austin Powder Co. which transports dynamite. Should he arrive before the day is over, I would hope that you might have an opportunity to hear him. He will frighten you with some of the examples he can quote, because his trucks do transport dynamite. Imagine transporting dynamite with defective brakes directly attributable to a Government agency's requirement!

Senator EAGLETON. We will hear him if he arrives before we get through.

Mr. WHITE. Thank you.

The Private Truck Council of America, Inc., is the only national, independent organization representing nontransportation companies which operate trucks in furtherance of primary businesses other than for-hire transportation. It has been actively representing its members since 1939.

Senator EAGLETON. Give me an illustration of who your clients are. Mr. WHITE. Exxon, Kroger, Safeway, Carbide, Dupont. We have been representing members like this since 1939.

Since a few short days ago when we heard of the opportunity to again make comment on DOT's 121 Brake Standard, we have wracked our collective brains as to what to do this time. I say "again" because this is only one of many appearances relating to 121.

After considerable thought, we have decided to discuss it in general terms, and, except for the statement by my colleague, Mr. Rupert, who will hopefully have appeared before the day is through, respectfully refer you to the DOT with regard to examples and specifics. Council's size is modest, representing little more than 1,000 companies, and its budget is unpretentious, thus making it a particularly frustrating experience to try to make some sense out of the incredulous 121 saga over the past few years.

When we first heard of the possibilities of a computerized truck brake about the turn of the decade, the universal reaction was one of satisfaction because it was explained to us that this would be an excellent example of the practical application of space age technology. And, from that day to this, the theory-the idea-of the computerized brake was accepted by all as a splendid theory, a great idea.

But almost at the same time a fear began growing that the new brake was going to become a reality far in advance of the state-of-the

art.

For the longest time, though this impulsive, quixotic trend was becoming more and more evident, those of us on the outside looking in had difficulty believing that the DOT would dare legislate such an important and basic part of a heavy vehicle—the epitome of the word "safety"-until it had been thoroughly tested and until the builder, the fabricator, and the user all had become reasonably familiar with it prior to its actual and universal use.

As the standard was being drafted, there was virtually no, as far as we knew, no mutual Government-industry interaction and cooperation as clearly contemplated by the law. It seemed to be all Government and always behind closed doors.

From time to time an edict would be issued requesting comment on some phase or another of the standardmaking process, but it was usually incomprehensible and had no reference to practical applications or operations.

Though we continued to disbelieve them, rumors persisted that the new computerized brake was going to be inaugurated before it was tested and before anybody really knew what it was all about. Because of this, and in an effort to stay ahead in the games the bureaucracies continuously play with the public, we tried, without success, to find somebody who could explain it, and generally make some practical sense out of the behind-doors maneuvering.

We were more or less given to believe that our worries were groundless and everything would be readily understandable long in advance of actual operations.

Then, almost like a bolt out of the blue a couple of years ago, the newest play thing of the DOT was upon us. Still not tested, still not proven to be practical, still not proven to be cost effective, still not proven to be necessary, still not understood by the truck manufacturer, still beyond the comprehension of the ordinary user-the little black box took over the retardant destinies of the Nation's trucks, with the traveling public acting as its guinea pigs.

Since then, Council has attended administrative and legislative hearings. filed statements, passed resolutions, written letters to editors, pleaded with its membership to give DOT all the information they could about brake malfunctions, maintenance problems and otherwise done everything it could to minimize the adverse effects of the computerized aspects of the 121 Brake Standard-with absolutely no

success.

It is an unbelievably anomolous situation. We are all familiar with DOT proudly publicizing vehicle recalls, often for very minor mechanical or stress problems which are the fault of the manufacturer. But when a fault lies with DOT, as it obviously does with the 121 Brake Standard, and even though there are very serious safety implications, not a peep is heard from it.

No fault lies with the brake manufacturers or the truck manufacturers. They were literally forced into making and using this spaceage gadget. Their predicament can only be termed intolerable. They are pretty big, but DOT is even bigger.

Senator EAGLETON. Not every company was bludgeoned into making brake systems. You are free to say what you want. But one big company is just getting into the act now. Nobody is pounding them

into doing this. They are doing it as a corporate policy because they think they can make a good product and sell it at a profit.

I do not adopt your implication that the giant manufacturers of this country, against all of their best judgment and against all of their resistance, were forced into this business. I think some of them got into it rather willingly to make a buck.

Mr. WHITE. Some who got into it got out. Let me explain that, Senator. It does not necessarily have to be true. We do not know that for a fact and we cannot prove it anyway, but this is the feeling we have gotten through the years as we have progressed with this problem. It's easy to get in today, but nobody was knocking DOT doors down trying to get in 2 or 3 years ago!

Senator EAGLETON. I know of no law or court orders that corrected anyone to get into the business of making computerized brakes. The companies think they can make a good product apparently, which they think they can sell and make a profit.

Mr. WHITE. To repeat, that may well be the situation today, but it was definitely not that way 3 years ago.

But, to go on, it is also unbelievably anomalous that we seem to have a situation where a Government agency, charged with developing safety standards, is in a very real sense purposely building into a truck, a hazardous feature rather than a safety feature.

Meanwhile, DOT has ingested an enormous amount of information about the inadequacies of the brake and given the public absolutely nothing in return. No compilation of statistics has been issued. No evidence has been offered as to who has given them information or the extent of it. No statements have been filed as to why they disagree with or minimize the more or less proven, but obviously multitudinous, examples of series imperfections in the space age brake mechanism.

The tragic part of it is, DOT apparently does not realize that what they are hearing, bad as it sounds, is only the tip of the iceberg. It is hearing, generally, from companies which have highly sophisticated maintenance facilities and the capability of articulating their brake problems.

These companies represent fleets which many vehicles, but many times more vehicles are operated by companies which do not have. the maintenance facilities of larger companies. Though they may operate 2, 5, or 10 vehicles, the companies themselves may number in the tens of thousands.

We do the best we can to represent some of them, but the great majority of them know as little about us as they do about the DOT.

Up to this point I have hardly said a word about cost. I have avoided it because many of us refuse to face reality when it comes to equating cost with safety. So, I will only say I hope you will have occasion to at least give a side-long glance at the dollar implications of this multimillion-dollar boondoggle.

Senator EAGLETON. We were interested in hard data as to cost. We heard Miss Claybrook say it was $100 an axle. We want any hard data we can have as to what it costs.

Mr. WHITE. One of our modest-sized members told us the other day that his annual costs directly attributable to the 121 brakes alone far exceed council's annual budget.

Senator EAGLETON. I will ask the preceding panel this. I would like to know from United Parcel, Wilson Freight, Consolidated Freightways, and Roadway Express if they can give me any hard data on what their maintenance costs are. You have the manufacturing costs and it costs you so much more per truck to have it with 121.

I would like some data on what the maintenance costs once it is on and how much that escalates. I hope that those from the preceding panel can give us that.

Without objection, so ordered.

[Material to be supplied follows:]

Mr. WHITE. Continuing my remarks, we are now faced with yet another hearing. It is set for December 15, 1977. As we would look at it, this hearing evidences a typical disregard for the public interest; there is no time for any but a very few members of the public to prepare for it. It was not even published in the Federal Register until December 5, 1977-this very week.

We have testified and argued before so many meetings and so many hearings, that I think we will finesse this one, because we have done all we can to tell our story. We can do no more. Our feeling is one of complete futility.

But that of course is why we appear here today. You seem to be our last recourse. We hope you will take a look at the massive backlog of facts and figures which DOT has been gathering for years. More facts and figures are not needed.

All that is needed is an evaluation by somebody other than the DOT. As with the seatbelt buzzer, they seem incapable of reversing themselves. Perhaps in your good, sound judgment you will again do it for them.

Senator EAGLETON. Thank you very much.

Mr. WHITE. I have two pamphlets which I would like permission to put in the record. One is a story, the best I have seen on the 121 brake up to 1975. It was published by the Heavy Duty Trucking magazine and it gives the facts of the situation as of those trying times.

Second, the council made a survey among its own members as to their experience with 121 a few short months ago. I would like to also place it in the record.

Senator EAGLETON. We will place those both in the record at this point.

Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]