Board, although I take it its budget is considered by Congress in the DOT round, it nevertheless is not a subsidiary of the Secretary of Transportation; is that correct?

TESTIMONY OF KAY BAILEY, ACTING CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY HENRY H. WAKELAND, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PLANS AND PROGRAMS, AND FRANK TAYLOR, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Ms. BAILEY. Senator, we are not even part of the budget process in the Department of Transportation.

Senator EAGLETON. When you testify on your budget before which of the Senate or the Appropriations Committee do you go to?

MS. BAILEY. Senator Bayh's committee.

Senator EAGLETON. He is chairman of the Senate Appropriations Subcommitee.

Ms. BAILEY. We were made an independent arm.

Senator EAGLETON. That's what I'm trying to bring up. You're an independent agency operating in the area of obviously national transportation safety. But you are not part of DOT; is that right?

MS. BAILEY. That is correct. I know it is a fine line, Senator, but we are independent.

With me today are Henry Wakeland, the Chief of the Bureau of Plans and Programs; and Frank Taylor, the Chief of the Bureau of Accident Investigation.

Senator EAGLETON. What do you do that is different from what Mr. Anderson does and Ms. Claybrook?

Ms. BAILEY. We are not regulators at all. We have no regulatory authority. We are overseers and we investigate all accidents in transportation to make recommendations on safety matters.

As you know, many of the regulators might not have the independence to investigate and that is our function to be the independent investigators.

Senator EAGLETON. When there is an air crash, you move in fairly promptly to examine what happened and why it happened and how it happened, et cetera?

MS. BAILEY. Yes.

Senator EAGLETON. It was designed by Congress some years back that the investigation of why something occurred ought to be separated from the enforcement divisions so as to get a totally detached objective view; is that right?

Ms. BAILEY. That's correct. In addition to investigating accidents, we also do special studies in areas that involve transportation safety. We are pleased to share our experience with the truck braking problem and the standards for antilock truck brakes and the problems of studying such standards and regulations. We believe that the situation with the MVSS-121 standard illustrates the general problem of standard setting and that improvements in the process are possible.

The original purpose of the MVSS-121 standard was to reduce stopping distances of trucks. Another purpose was to permit trucks to be fully braked and steered simultaneously on wet roads, something which had been difficult because of constant dangers of jackknifing.

In 1972 after the MVSS-121 standard was promulgated and scheduled to go into effect in 1974, the board issued a special study, "Commercial Motor Vehicle Braking." This study recommended an "Experimental Safety Vehicle-Truck Brake" to incorporate the best available braking technology in an integrated system.

We proposed that Federal funds be made available to design, build and test this experimental commercial vehicle having brake within the technically feasible performance parameters of known brake technology and to practical solutions to the vehicle interchange problem.

This study was not intended to redirect the 121 standard already required for 1974 but to improve the compatibility of brakes with brakes of other vehicles not yet reached by the 121 standard. There had been no experimental safety vehicle approach in any truck safety problem at that time and NHTSA did not adopt it for this 121 standard either.

Since that time the board has investigated some truck accidents involving both older type brakes on wet roads and trucks equipped with brakes designed to meet the 121 requirements.

In accident reports issued to date it has been nearly impossible to separate brake performance effects from the effects of driver's timing and use of brakes. In the accidents which occurred in Seattle, Wash., and Hamilton, Ga., in 1975 it was not possible to make an objective finding whether a better brake design or a full 121 brake configuration would have prevented those collisions.

In the Seattle accident a tank truck equipped with 121 brakes towing a tank trailer equipped with older brakes lost traction on the substandard pavement surface of a curve and a jackknife between full trailer and truck occurred. It could not be determined whether 121 brakes on all equipment would have permitted control to be regained after skidding began or whether the jackknife results would have been more or less damaging had no part of the combination vehicle been equipped with 121 brakes. The board did recommend that NHTSA test and resolve the apparent problem of operating any vehicle combination over the full speed range and road and weather conditions encountered in normal operations if one of the units is equipped with FMVSS-121 antilock brake systems and the other is not.

NHTSA is making those tests now and the NTSB is monitoring the results.

The board is currently investigating another major accident involving 121-type brakes and has reviewed and dropped other possible investigations as unproductive of a positive finding. In general, we expect accident investigations to show how specific failures of brake equipment under the 121 standard can initiate accidents, but we are not encouraged that the effects of drivers' actions can be isolated to show whether the improvement of performance required by the 121 standard will prevent accidents.

Obviously there is a potential distortion in public appreciation of the situation. Individual accident investigations may tend to overemphasize the problem of equipment failure whereas statistical studies which require more time will be needed to show the overall benefits.

The situation now is that truck operators are reporting many difficulties with some of the brake equipment being manufactured to meet the performance standard. The performance standard of FMVSS-121

does not itself necessarily produce the problems. Such a situation is not new in standard setting and has been found at other times.

The Safety Board pointed out the problem of difficulty in introducing new standards in 1970 study. This study, "The Roles of General Services Administration and Department of Transportation in Motor Vehicle Safety Standards," explained the system of developing advanced safety characteristics through the use of voluntary safety standards followed by mandatory standards at an appropriate stage. Commercial standards would be authorized to GSA for vehicle safety. They would be used to describe advanced safety for both Government and commercial purchase purposes. GSA would purchase and use advanced safety equipment if it was not offered in consumer markets.

This procedure, we believe, would reduce confusion and shorten the total time for a successful standard as well as to remove problems before the whole public is involved. This method would also lessen the controversy by creating the test standards in a separate step and then determining the level of safety requirements for the experience available.

The basic approach of the study is still statutorily authorized and could be implemented.

The Board's experience suggests that when equipment sold to meet a performance standard does not give satisfaction alternative standard setting approaches should be used. First, when standards are to go into effect and manufacturers' equipment designs cannot be controlled, you would initiate a heavy surveillance of equipment service and expedite defect notices and recall notices with publication to the industry of technical features and failures.

Second, broaden the standard to establish tests for reliability, resistance to harsh environment and maintainability as part of the required performance. This is a method used by the military services to insure reliable service of purchased equipment.

As a long-range change, alter the standard setting system to promote equipment to meet an advanced standard through experimental safety vehicles and by using methods described in the study of the roles of GSA and DOT referred to earlier.

The MVSS-121 standard is important because, as written, it should be capable of saving many lives.

With the smaller cars and with trucks getting larger, I believe we must deal with the problem of safe braking by the commercial vehicles. The Board has not studied the best type of action to take in the face of the apparent inability of some manufacturers and truck operators to produce reliable equipment and maintain it. However, if there is a choice betwen dropping the protection provided by the standard and requiring designers and manufacturers to solve the problems which arise in their areas, then we believe requiring designers and manufacturers to solve the problems to achieve the intended goal is best.

I do believe that NHTSA's announced hearings to air the complaints on December 15 is a good step.

Senator EAGLETON. You addressed yourself in part to the question of compatibility. You were here this morning when Mr. Snow testified? Ms. BAILEY. Yes.

Senator EAGLETON. Mr. Snow seemed to raise questions of whether a 121 system on a tractor but not on a trailer, or vice versa, actually is safe. I don't want to put words in his mouth, but he seemed to indicate to me that we don't really know for sure. He had not seen any hard evidence that it would not work; yet, I guess he hadn't seen any hard evidence that it would. Is that about how you folks see the question of compatibility? It's an open question?

Ms. BAILEY. From our Seattle accident investigation we were concerned about this incompatibility but we could not determine that it caused an adverse effect. Obviously, on one accident we could not make a fair statement so we did ask NHTSA to make these tests. NHTSA has been making quite extensive tests at Aberdeen, Md. We have been monitoring those tests and we will be anxious to see them.

But the results are not yet in. I think the results will be a much more fair statement than one we could make here.

Senator EAGLETON. So you have no personal conviction one way or the other. You would like to see further data from NHTSA ? Ms. BAILEY. Yes.

Senator EAGLETON. In the early part of your testimony you talked about the Seattle accident and another accident. You used words "nearly impossible," and "not possible." I take it from the data and from the research and the investigations that you have done that you have not been able to conclude definitively or even preliminarily the efficacy of the 121 computerized brake system; is that right?

Ms. BAILEY. I think that your paraphrasing is correct. It is just that we do not have the data with which we would feel comfortable in making a statement here today one way or the other.

Senator EAGLETON. It might be helpful and it might not. It is still an unresolved question as you view it?

Ms. BAILEY. Yes. I would like to add, Senator, that we do feel that it is very important that smaller stopping distances continue to be pursued. I believe that with energy problems as they are that trucks do have to be large and that that also means that cars are getting smaller. There is a potential there for great catastrophe. The usual recipient of the catastrophe is the automobile. I think we have got to continue to pursue this area.

Senator EAGLETON. Near the end of your testimony you said something to the effect that regulation 121 "as written, should save lives." What did you mean by that?

Ms. BAILEY. The MVSS-121 standard is important because as written it should be capable of saving many lives.

Senator EAGLETON. "S-121, as written, should be capable of saving lives." That presumes, however, that the writing is translated into routine enforcement. Am I getting across?

The books are full of wonderful regulations. Books are full of regulations on coal mine safety. There are all kinds of regulations about dust levels and fumes and so on. If you read the regulations then you might say that they will help the miner, but the regulations don't always work; is that correct?

Ms. BAILEY. That is correct.

Senator EAGLETON. That's human experience. So, if I were reading regulation 121 that said that trucks will have to have a shorter stop

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ping distance and that they should have equipment that shall keep them from jackknifing, then I would say that's a marvelous recommendation. But it doesn't work out that way, does it?

MS. BAILEY. Well, the point raised is valid. I do think that because there have been so many complaints and questions raised that NHTSA is doing the right thing by reopening the question in a hearing.

Also, Senator, I would like to add that I think it is a correct position of a Federal regulator to listen to what the people using the regulations are saying and to respond.

I think that in this case there have been so many questions raised that I'm not sure they are valid questions but I am not sure they are not valid. I think that if I were the regulator that would feel compelled to listen to what the users are saying and reopen the question. I do not think it's wrong to say that we have made a mistake or to reopen the question and listen to complaints and say, "You're wrong. We did not make a mistake."

Senator EAGLETON. Would 95 percent of your effort with the National Transportation Safety Board be on airplane accidents?

Ms. BAILEY. It is not 95 percent. It is more in aviation but the trend is turning.

Senator EAGLETON. What is the first thing when a plane goes down that you want to get your hands on? You want to get the "box," don't you?

Ms. BAILEY. Yes, that's fair to say.

Senator EAGLETON. The reason you want to get the "box" is that you want to hear what the pilot was saying, and thereby interpret what he was doing in the moments leading up to the crash.

In terms of investigation, if the truck driver survives, you would want to question him about what he was doing and how he was doing it in the moments leading up to the crash; isn't that the case? MS. BAILEY. Yes.

Senator EAGLETON. Would you not place great weight on what the truck driver said? That does not mean that you would find it in all intents and purposes at all times totally credible but you would place great emphasis on what the driver said and what his experience was and what he was doing and how he was doing it prior to the crash. MS. BAILEY. Yes. I'm not sure exactly where you're going with the line of questioning but I want to say this.

In aviation, having the voice recorders and the flight data recorders we have found it is much better evidence than talking to the pilots because many times when you have been through the shock of an accident you do not remember everything.

Senator EAGLETON. I understand. But it is useful to hear the view, isn't it?

MS. BAILEY. Yes.

Senator EAGLETON. Ms. Claybrook, in her testimony, seems to put greater emphasis on statistical analyses even if the statistics were found not particularly significant, rather than in, say, the Baker analysis. She used the word "anecdotal". She was not so taken with Baker's studies because they were anecdotal. They relied, in part, on what truckers had to say. Mr. Baker talked to 14 fleets. That was anecdotal according to Ms. Claybrook.