should replace the same with others of equivalent value. In pursuance of the contract, Jones
ADULTERY-Evidence-Venereal disease 86 delivered the time payment agreement forms to
BOOK DEBTS ACT 1896-(No. 1424), 88. 2, 3 -Deposit of documents—Equitable assignment.] Jones, a furniture warehouseman, in the ordinary course of his business sold goods under time payment agreements. In consideration of advances made by one McKell, he, by a contract in writing, agreed to deposit with McKell certain time payment agreement forms signed and complete as security therefor, which were to remain the property of McKell until the full amount of the advances and interest thereon had been repaid; and it was further provided that if any of the time payment agreements should be fully paid up by the hirer, Jones
McKell. The contract was not registered under the Book Debts Act 1896. Jones's estate was
sequestrated:-Held, that this was an equitabi assignment of the debts due to Jones under the time payment agreements, and was an assign- ment of book debts within the meaning of the Book Debts Act 1896, and therefore void for want of registration. F.C. IN RE JONES 432 BUILDING CONTRACT- Architect, provision for the appointment of-Waiver-Work to be done to satisfaction of owner-Payment-Su sequent discovery of defects.] A building contract provided that the work set out in the plans and specifications should be done to the satisfaction of such architect as should be appointed by the owner to give certificates for progress and final payments, and that no pay- ment should be made except on the certificate of the architect. It also provided that the whole of the work was to be completed to the satisfaction of the owner. No architect was ever appointed. The building was complete. and the contract price paid. An action was subsequently brought against the contracte claiming damages for breach of contract:- Held, (1) that the parties to the contract ha by their conduct, waived their right to have a architect appointed; (2) that payment of the whole amount due under the contract was not conclusive proof that the work had been dor to the satisfaction of the owner:-Semble, the provision for the appointment of the archite: was for the benefit of the owner, and could be waived by him. F.C. HOPPER v. MEYER 235
BUTCHERS AND ABATTOIRS ACT 1890-
(No. 1069), 8. 26—“ Slaughtering cattle withou licence or in unlicensed place". Contrary t the provisions of this Act"-Offence not speci cally created · Penalty Mens rea-Ofjenti. whether joint or severable-Penalty, joint of several, liability to.] By sec. 26 of the Butchers and Abattoirs Act 1890 it is provided (inter alia' that "if any person shall slaughter or cause te be slaughtered contrary to the provisions of this Act any cattle in any house or place not being an abattoir and not being a slaughter- house duly licensed under this Act such person shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding ten pounds for each and every head of cattle so slaughtered:"-Held, that the words “contrary to the provisions of this Act" meant "r circumstances not allowed by this Act," and that an offence may be committed under the section in a shire, although there is no provision in the Act in the case of a shire, other that sec. 26 itself, making it an offence to slaughter. or cause to be slaughtered, cattle without & licence or in an unlicensed place :—Held, also.
BUTCHERS AND ABATTOIRS ACT 1890- BY-LAW-continued. continued.
that a butcher's employé could be convicted of an offence under the section without proof of mens rea-Held, also, that the offences con- templated by the section were in their nature severable, so that, where more than one person was concerned in any of them, each might be fined the maximum penalty. An offence created by Statute is severable unless the words of the Act are such as to compel the Court to hold that it is joint. CHOMLEY, J. DUGDALE v. DIGHT 783
BY-LAW-Legality of-Right of Court to deter- mine- Unreasonableness-Uncertainty-Public racecourse-Betting- Bookmaker-The Victoria Racing Club Act 1871 (35 Vict., No. 398), ss. 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 24-Practice-"Rules of the Supreme Court 1884"-Order XXV., r. 5— Declaratory judgment.] The committee of the Victoria Racing Club, purporting to act in pursuance of the powers conferred on them by The Victoria Racing Club Act 1871, made a by-law, which was duly published in the Government Gazette, and not disallowed by the Governor in Council, in the following terms:- 53. No person shall after this by-law comes into operation carry on upon any part of the land vested in the chairman of the Victoria Racing Club the vocation of a bookmaker (and then only in such manner and to such extent as shall not be forbidden by or in breach of the law) unless (a) He be approved of by the com- mittee of the club and pay to the committee in advance such registration fee or sum as the committee shall from time to time determine and unless (b) He observe and comply with such directions and conditions as may be from time to time given by or on behalf of the committee and unless (c) During the time he shall be plying his vocation as aforesaid he shall (if required) wear a badge or ticket to be supplied by the committee which badge or ticket shall be visible to the public and shall have his name written or printed thereon. Provided always that all bookmakers approved of as aforesaid shall for the same division of the said land be subject to the same charges restrictions directions and conditions and be granted the same privileges. person offending against this by-law may be removed from any land vested in the chairman of the said club and shall forfeit for every such offence the sum of five pounds to be recovered in the manner prescribed by the twentieth section of the said Act":-Held, that the by-law was unreasonable and uncertain in that it provided that no person should carry on the vocation of a bookmaker on the said land, which was a public racecourse, unless he-(a) Was approved of by the committee. (b) Paid such registration fee as the committee should from time to time determine. (c) Observed
and complied with such directions and conditions as might from time to time be given by or on behalf of the committee. And that the by-law was invalid, and that the plaintiff (a bookmaker) was entitled to a declaration to such effect, and to an injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing it against him. Decision of A'Beckett, J. ([1906] V.L.R. 343), reversed:-Per HODGES, J. The Supreme Court is not deprived of the right to determine the validity of a by-law made under The Victoria Racing Club Act 1871 by reason of the provisions of the said Act-(a) that no by-law made thereunder shall be of any force until one month after it has been sent to the Chief Secretary and until publication of it in the Government Gazette, and (b) that the Governor in Council may within the month aforesaid disallow such by-law, and (c) may within six months from its publication in the Government Gazette repeal such by-law. The jurisdiction of the Court with regard to declara- tory judgments discussed:-Per HOOD, J. A by-law regulating betting, either publicly as a business or privately with friends, is an inter- ference with private rights and to be valid
must therefore be reasonable and certain. F.C. COLMAN v. MILLER 622
CAPITAL OR INCOME-Tenant for life and remainderman-Life assurance fund See COMPANY.
Lawson v. Watson (1 Legge (N.S.W.) 666). Applied by High Court of Australia. LEVISTON V. NARRACAN, SHIRE OF 553 Lethbridge v. Winter (1 Camp. 263 (n.)). Followed by A' Beckett, J. LEVISTON V. 1
SHIRE OF NARRACAN
Leviston v. Narracan, Shire of ([1906] V.L.R. 1).
Affirmed by High Court of Australia. LEVISTON V. NARRACAN, SHIRE OF 553 Macmanamny v. McCulloch (18 A.L.T. 164). Followed by A'Beckett, J. ROGERSON v. PHILLIPS AND O'HAGAN 272 Mann v. Brodie (10 App. Cas. 378). Principle of applied by A'Beckett, J., and by the High Court of Australia. LEVISTON v. SHIRE OF NARRACAN [1, 553 Marriott v. Chamberlain (17 Q.B.D. 154). Distinguished by Hodges, J. NATIONAL STARCH Co. v. ROBERT HARPER AND Co. 8 Marshall v. Colonial Bank (1 C.L.R. 632, at p. 661).
Dictum in, explained by High Court of Australia. AUSTIN v. AUSTIN 258 Martin v. O'Sullivan (24 V.L.R. 856). Explained by Cussen, J. LARKIN V. PENFOLD
Maynard, In re (12 V.L.R. 313).
Speight v. Gaunt (9 App. Cas. 1). Observations by Lord Blackburn ap- proved and applied by High Court of Australia. AUSTIN v. AUSTIN 258 Stevenson, In re (19 V.L.R. 660). Overruled by High Court of Australia. WHITELAW, IN RE 566
Stone v. Epple ([1906] V.L.R. 82). Affirmed by High Court of Australia. STONE v. EPPLE 386
Thornhill, In re (3 W.W. & A'B.
(Eq.) 110). Applied by Cussen, J. VANCE, IN RE [664 Trustees Executors, etc., Co. v. Butler ([1905] V.L.R. 650).
Affirmed by High Court of Australia. BUTLER V. TRUSTEES EXECUTORS, ETC., Co. 552 Weigall v. Gaston (3 V.L.R. (L.) 294). Followed by Chomley, J. ROBERTSON v FINK
Contract with Agreement implied from articles of association and conduct Statute of Frauds-"Note or memorandum of agree. ment-Instruments Act 1890 (No. 1103), s. 208— Waiver.] The articles of association of a company may express the terms upon which a person may contract with such company, and, if acted upon, an agreement between him and the company upon which either party may sue, may be implied partly from the articles and partly from the conduct of the parties. Ne British Iron Company, In re, Ex parte Beckwith ([1898] Ch. 324) and Isaacs' Case ([1892) 2 Ch. 158) followed and applied. In re Dale and Plant (1 Megone's Report 338; [1889] 61 LT. 206), and The Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co. ([1886] 33 Ch. D. 16), distinguished. Article 55 of the P. Company, so far as material, was in the following terms:-"B. G. and shall be the first managing directors of the P Company and the said B. G. shall hold such office for the term of ten years from the 1st August 1900. The said B. G shall
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