(133 Wash. 145, 233 Рас. 288.) enough to sustain the assertion that the organization named advocates the use of criminal means for the accomplishment of its objects and purposes. It is said that these were the earlier ideas of the organization, were "doctrines which it may have preached but never practiced," and that its later pronouncements condemn such doctrines. But in a pamphlet of the organization published as late as the year 1923, the statement is made that "the early ideas of the I. W. W. have not changed," and one has but to consult our own cases and to review recent local state history to find instances wherein certain of the doctrines here taught have been put into practice. The defendant is freely conceded the right to advocate, either publicly or privately, changes in the present form of government, however great or however fundamental such changes may be, so long as his advocacy is confined to means sanctioned by law. But he oversteps permissible bounds when he advocates changes by criminal or other unlawful means, and this the evidence demonstrates he has done both directly and indirectly. The findings of the Board of Examiners, recommending the disbarment of the defendant, should be, and are, approved and an order of disbarment entered. Fullerton, Main, Bridges, Mitchell, and Holcomb, JJ., concur. Parker, J., dissenting: language ever spoken by Smith conveying such sinister meaning as my brethen joining in the majority opinion see therein. Smith is not a member of the Industrial Workers of the World. True, he spoke at meetings held under the auspices of members of that organization. Whether or not such meetings were officially authorized by the organization or any branch thereof is not rendered at all clear to my mind. 1 look in vain in this record for any clear and certain evidence that Smith has advocated the views expressed in the quotations from the so-called "I. W. W." literature, introduced in evidence in this case, in so far as they may be considered as advocating sabotage, syndicalism, or actual violations of law. Nor can I agree that the record shows with certainty that Smith distributed, or is responsible for the distribution of, any of the literature introduced in evidence in this case and mentioned in the majority opinion. Some of the utterances of Smith may seem capable of being construed as in substance advocating crime, looking to the bringing about of social changes he seems to favor, but to my mind such construction of his utterances would have to be the result of uncertain inferences to be drawn from language used by him. For these reasons I dissent. Tolman, Ch. J., concurs with Parker, J. Petition for rehearing denied I cannot read in this record any April 20, 1925. ΑΝΝΟΤΑTION. Moral delinquency or other conduct not affecting court or client as ground for disbarment or suspension of attorney. V. Misconduct as notary public or commissioner of deeds, 108. IX. Act of disloyalty in time of war, 110. X. Personal vice, 111. a. Conduct warranting disbar- I. Introductory. This annotation is supplementary to an annotation on the same subject in 9 A.L.R. 189. In addition to that note, the following annotations on points closely analogous to that herein considered have appeared in this series: Disloyal acts or political opinions as ground for disbarment, see 19 A.L.R. 936 [Attorneys, § 10], supplementing earlier annotations. Misconduct with regard to proposed legislation as ground for disbarment, see 9 A.L.R. 1277 [Attorneys, § 10]. Presenting or permitting false evidence as ground for disbarment, see 14 A.L.R. 868 [Attorneys, § 17]. as Encouraging divorce litigation by solicitation or advertisement ground for disbarment, see 9 A.L.R. 1500 [Attorneys, § 19]. Conduct respecting coaching of law students as ground for disbarment, see 31 A.L.R. 748 [Attorneys, § 10]. II. Fraudulent transactions generally. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 190.) In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Asso. v. Hoering (1925) 317 III. 390, 148 N. E. 299, an attorney was disbarred for dishonest evasion of payment of a personal debt, together with some acts of misconduct not within the scope of this annotation. Obtaining a loan by false pretenses, and other fraudulent acts in the course of business transactions, have been held to be ground for disbarment. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Estes (1922) 105 Or. 173, 209 Pac. 486. An attorney who, by false pretenses, defrauds his associates in a joint adventure, is guilty of such moral turpitude as to warrant his disbarment. Re Cruickshank (1920) 47 Cal. App. 496, 190 Pac. 1038. III. Misconduct as trustee, or the like. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 193.) The conversion by an attorney of XI. continued. b. Conduct not warranting disbarment or suspension, 114. [No later decisions herein.] securities belonging to third persons intrusted to him to be deposited in lieu of bail for his client has been held to be ground for disbarment. Re Condon (1923) 157 Minn. 24, 195 N. W. 492. In Re Casey (1924) 208 App. Div. 24, 203 N. Y. Supp. 61, an attorney was suspended for three months for converting to his own use money intrusted to him by another attorney to pay stenographer's fees. IV. Misconduct as judicial officer. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 195.) In People ex rel. Colorado Bar Asso. v. Class (1921) 70 Colo. 381, 201 Pac. 883, it was held not to be ground for disbarment for a judge to appear as attorney for one of the parties to an election contest before the general assembly, or to call the attention of the grand jury to reports that the other party to the contest had violated the election law, a judge being allowed to appear before a nonjudicial body, and the instruction to the grand jury being unexceptionable except for test. the judge's connection with the con In Bar Asso. v. Sullivan (1921) 185 Cal. 621, 198 Pac. 7, the court held in dence was insufficient to show that an a disbarment proceeding that the eviattorney serving as a magistrate had taken bribes, saying, obiter: "It is that, with regard to any of the proclear that if it is satisfactorily shown ceedings specified in the accusation, the accused either agreed to receive, or received, any money upon any such corrupt understanding as is alleged, the accusation should be held to be sustained and the accused disbarred." V. Misconduct as notary public or com- Iowa, -, 205 N. W. 321, an attorney a bond, the signature not having been written in his presence, and signing the name of his law partner thereto as notary public, no oath having been made. VI. Misconduct as prosecuting attorney. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 197.) In the case of Re Waggoner (1925) S. D., 206 N. W. 427, a state attorney was suspended for three months for receiving part of the reward offered for the conviction of a criminal, assisting in the escape of a criminal, and instituting a criminal proceeding to force a money settlement in a divorce case in which he was employed by the plaintiff. In the case of Re Simpson (1920) 79 Okla. 305, 192 Pac. 1097, a prosecuting attorney was disbarred for taking bribes to allow a gambling house to operate unmolested. In People ex rel. Hutchison v. Hickman (1920) 294 III. 471, 128 Ν. Ε. 484, it was held that a statute forbidding a state attorney from accepting employment in a civil action depending "on the same facts on which a criminal prosecution shall depend" forbids the acceptance of such employment after the criminal prosecution is concluded, and applies to a state attorney from whose district the case has been transferred by change of venue, if he actually remains in charge of the prosecution. However, the court refused to discipline an attorney for violation of the statute on the ground that it was not wholly clear, and had not been previously construed. In the case of Re Dolphin (1925) 240 Ν. Υ. 89, 147 N. E. 538, it appeared that a meeting to discuss "birth control" was broken up by the police, and that an investigation was thereafter had to decide whether the action of the police was lawful. At the investigation a woman stated that she was at the meeting and in sympathy therewith, whereupon an assistant city attorney detailed to attend the investigation ordered her arrest. Disbarment proceedings were dismissed by the lower court on the ground that the act of the attorney was outside his professional capacity. On this point when the matter was returnable be-- Where a prosecuting attorney sat - In People ex rel. Hutchison v. Hickman (1920) 294 III. 471, 128 N. E. 484, it was held that the evidence did not show that a state attorney acted in bad faith in proceeding to secure the indictment of a person who verified a petition for his disbarment. VII. Commission of perjury. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 200.) In the case of Re Popper (1920) 193 App. Div. 505, 184 N. Y. Supp. 406, an attorney was disbarred for giving false testimony before a naval courtmartial. The court said: "The giving of false testimony strikes at the very heart of the judicial system. That an officer of the court should countenance it in another is intolerable. That he should himself be guilty of such an offense against good morals and the public weal is not to be condoned. By such conduct he has forfeited the confidence of the court and his right to its continued certificate of good character and integrity. While the acts done were not done in his capacity as an attorney, they evidence such moral obliquity as warrants the court in saying that he no longer possesses that good character which is essential to his continuance in an honorable profession. He is therefore disbarred." An attorney is guilty of misconduct showing moral turpitude in obtaining a passport by a false affidavit that he desires it for himself, when his purpose is to give it to an alien enemy to enable him to leave the country in war time. State ex rel. Grievance Committee v. Woerndle (1923) 109 Or. 461, 209 Pac. 604 (on demurrer to petition to disbar). See to the same effect the same case on final hearing in (1923) 109 Or. 470, 220 Pac. 744 (respondent suspended for six months). At the hearing reported in 109 Or. 470, the court said: "It is contended that the defendant has not offended against any law relating to his employment as attorney at law, and that he has been honest and upright in the performance of all his professional duties. But, as we said through Mr. Justice McCourt in State v. Woerndle, supra, when this case was heard upon demurrer to the petition, an inherent power rests with 'every court to strike the name of an attorney from its roll who has been guilty of conduct or acts, committed inside or outside of his professional employment, which show him to be corrupt, dishonest, or untrustworthy.' In order to procure a passport for himself, which he intended for the use of Boehn, the defendant filed a false affidavit. Do trustworthy lawyers make false oaths? That question must be answered in the negative. It was alleged, and found as a fact, which is supported by the testimony, that the defendant offended against a statute of the United States by wilfully subscribing to an oath containing material matter, which, at the time of taking such oath, he did not believe to be true." (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 201.) In the case of Re Hanna (1924) 1 Ν. Μ. -, 227 Pac. 983, an attorney was censured for participating in a mass meeting designed to arouse sentiment with respect to a pending case, and making a speech thereat in which the conduct of the presiding judge was criticized. In the reported case (Re SMITH, ante, 102) an attorney was disbarred for addressing public meetings under the auspices of the I. W. W., at which the literature of that organization was distributed. IX. Act of disloyalty in time of war. (Supplementing annotation in 9 ing decisions and rules of the court, were not ground for suspension or disbarment. Re Clifton (1921) 33 Idaho, 614, 19 A.L.R. 931, 196 Pac. 670. In that case the facts were stated as follows: "Respondent, Clifton, was a member of the bar of Ada county, Idaho, and aware that the President of the United States and the state and county bar associations had called upon the lawyers to assist in the preparation of questionnaires free of charge. In December, 1917, he charged three registrants $1.50 each for services rendered in the preparation of questionnaires. In June, 1917, he stated to two Red Cross solicitors that he was opposed to the selective draft and the war, and would do nothing to aid in its prosecution; that he would not subscribe to or aid any person or any enterprise that had for its object the promotion of the selective service draft, nor would he aid or assist any of the war activities or enterprises, or subscribe to the Red Cross or any other fund that had to do with the recognition of the war, directly or indirectly. About November 20, 1917, in conversation with one R. L. Hale, he criticized the government with reference to the war, stating, among other things, that the Imperial German Government was justified in sinking the Lusitania; that we had no right to draft men; that he would not assist the government of the United States in any way, neither would he buy Liberty bonds. He refused to subscribe for Liberty bonds or war savings stamps, or contribute to the Red Cross, or Y. M. C. A., or any other organization participating in the war work, except that he offered to donate $5 toward paying the expenses of assisting registrants immediately following the publication in the newspaper of the fact that he had charged for assisting registrants." An attorney who has been convicted of a violation of the Draft Act, and is shown to have obstructed the Draft Act in other instances, and who avows himself "theoretical anarchist," will be disbarred. Margolis's Case (1921) 269 Pa. 206, 12 A.L.R. 1186, a 112 Atl. 478, wherein the court said: "That the respondent failed in the obligations imposed by his oath is further evidenced clearly by two transactions which appear upon the record, and show plain defiance of established law. Margolis testified that, after the use of the mails had been denied to a magazine known as 'Mother Earth,' a fraud order having been issued, he received addressed copies of this officially forbidden publication in bulk, and distributed them from his office. One thus actively assisting in the evasion of the orders of the government can hardly be said to be supporting it, as the appellant was in duty bound to do. Again, the respondent was active in the organization and conduct of the Anticonscription League, having as its aim opposition to the Selective Service Act (U. S. Comp. Stat. §§ 2044a-2044k, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1136) during the recent war. Until May 18, 1917, this may have been unobjectionable, but on that date the bill was passed, and became the law of the land. Thereafter postal cards were mailed, in which the legislation was denounced, and the addressees were asked to sign pledges not to obey the laws. On one postal, mailed May 29, the words used, in part, were: 'Do not register. Do not enlist. Do not go to war.' Margolis admitted his connection with the organization, but claimed that it went out of existence on passage of the Conscription Act, yet the rooms of the league were later visited by the officers of the Department of Justice, and documents found which were offered in evidence, showing this statement to be inaccurate. At the time of the entry of the police into the headquarters of the league, the respondent was present." See to the same effect, Re Wells (1922) 121 Wash. 68, 208 Pac. 25. See also State ex rel. Grievance Committee v. Woerndle (1923) 109 Or. 461, 209 Pac. 604, on final hearing in (1923) 109 Or. 470, 220 Pac. 744, set out supra, VII. X. Personal vice. (Supplementing annotation in 9 A.L.R. 202.) It has been held that an attorney |